Making Things Up: Workshop Practice as a Place of Design by Luscombe, Philip
Citation:  Luscombe,  Philip  (2018)  Making  Things  Up:  Workshop  Practice  as  a  Place  of 
Design. Doctoral thesis, Northumbria University. 
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/39858/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright ©  and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to third  parties  in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content  must not be 
changed in any way. Full  items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
Making Things Up: Workshop 
Practice as a Place of Design 
 
P. J. Luscombe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PhD         2018 
 
 
Making Things Up: Workshop Practice 
as a Place of Design 
 
Philip John Luscombe 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements of the 
 
University of Northumbria at Newcastle 
 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Research undertaken in the 
Faculty of Arts, Design & Social 
Sciences 
 
 
June 2018 
  
Abstract 
 
This thesis considers workshop practice, specifically the production of three-dimensional 
prototype products, as a place of design. I study techniques used to make emergent artefacts, in 
an effort to better understand how they structure design practice.  
 
I begin by presenting an argument that recasts the making process as a means of thinking, 
rather than merely transcribing antecedent ideas. I draw on literature from disciplines where 
this argument has been well-rehearsed, and contribute a novel synthesis of existing ideas in 
terms relevant to design studies and practice. This provides a theoretical foundation from which 
I can understand techniques as means of both doing things to the world, and finding out how 
those things are going. 
 
I then introduce the term epistemic character in order to frame a new subject of interest – how 
techniques structure design processes. I argue that we may investigate the epistemic character 
of techniques, and I provide examples of how such investigations may be pursued. To this end, 
I combine my interdisciplinary literature review with first-hand studies of designing and 
making techniques. With reference to these studies, I describe three questions that may be 
asked to interrogate epistemic character: What are the questions posed by a technique?; What is 
its step-character?; and what is the nature of the emergent result?  
 
I end with a discussion of how these features of epistemic character influence the distribution 
of decision making throughout design processes. I suggest there is an important distinction to 
be made, between processes throughout which things emerge step-by-step, and processes in 
which things are planned in advance of their execution.  
 
The thesis provides design and craft theory with a novel and useful insight into how 
practitioners might think through making.   
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 1 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis considers workshop practice, specifically the production of three-dimensional 
prototype products, as a place of design. The ambition of the research is to better understand 
how the techniques of making—including sawing, measuring, cutting, carving, assembling 
and more—structure design practice. As design practitioners or craftspeople manipulate an 
emergent artefact, how do the techniques they are using influence the process of working 
things out and, ultimately, their results? 
All this is to presume that the techniques used to make emergent artefacts do structure 
design practice in some way. As I describe in Chapters 2 and 3, however, this is to take a 
position on the relationship of “designing” and “making” that is not well represented in 
existing design theory. In fact, if we subscribe to a typical definition of design as the 
capacity to think before we act (see 3.1), we might be left wondering what possible part 
techniques could play in cognitive processes. On this understanding, making techniques are 
the means by which to realise pre-existing ideas. Their role is that of a translator, rather than 
an interlocutor. And, whilst we may describe the risk or certainty with which they can arrive 
at a pre-determined destination, there is little else to be said about the influence of 
techniques. My thesis, however, suggests otherwise.  
In this chapter, I introduce the structure of the thesis, by giving a brief synopsis of each 
subsequent chapter. A more comprehensive introduction to the themes of the study, and their 
development, is presented throughout Chapters 2 and 3. Before presenting the synopsis, 
however, I give an even briefer account of the ideas to come. I suggest the whole thesis can 
be understood through a narrative of three ideas. 
1.1. The Thesis in Three Ideas 
Figure 1. 1 The thesis in three ideas 
 
As seen in Figure 1.1, the three ideas that summarise this thesis all relate to the “epistemic” 
nature of practice. They are all concerned with working things out. 
EPISTEMIC
ACTION
EPISTEMIC
CREDIT
EPISTEMIC
CHARACTER
1. 2. 3.
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Epistemic actions are those taken to aid cognition (Kirsh and Maglio 1994) (see 3.2.2 and 
4.2). They do not change the world in order to move us towards a goal, but to help us think. 
An example can be found in the assembly of a jigsaw. We do not sit staring at the pieces and 
solve the puzzle in our heads. We pick bits up, spin them around and try them for fit. These 
are epistemic actions.  
From this follows the idea of epistemic credit. If we recognise that things in the world can 
be used as a means of thought, we can treat them as parts of cognitive systems (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998) (see 3.2.2). On this understanding, we can study techniques as more than 
just a way to realise pre-existing ideas. They become active systems of thought.  
The last of the three ideas builds on the other two. It is my thesis’ main contribution: I 
introduce the term epistemic character. I define epistemic character as a property of 
techniques. It describes the ways in which a technique structures the process of working 
things out. I present a discussion of how we may interrogate the epistemic character of 
techniques, and I explore the influence this character has on design practice. 
Whilst lacking in detail, this basic three-idea structure maps onto the development of my 
study, and this thesis as a whole. The following chapters flesh out the the idea of epistemic 
character. In Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 I present the subtleties of this contribution, thus 
providing design and craft theory with a novel and useful insight into how practitioners 
might think through making.   
1.2. Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 2. Methods and Chronology 
In the following chapter, I introduce the inspirations for the study and describe how it has 
been conducted. I trace the development of the theoretical grounding, methodology and 
findings of the research. Alongside this chronology, I also detail my two research methods: 
an interdisciplinary review of literature and first-hand studies of techniques. 
Chapter 3. Designing and Making 
Chapter 3 expands the theoretical foundation introduced in Chapter 2. It is an 
interdisciplinary literature review, focused on the relationship between “designing” and 
“making”. I start by reflecting on the historic division of these two aspects of production in 
design literature. Taking inspiration from the fields of archaeology, anthropology, cognitive 
science and philosophy, I argue that the assumptions of design theory can be aligned with a 
more general dualism of “thought” and “action”. Alternative positions in these disciplines 
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promote “extended”, “materially-engaged”, and “distributed” models of cognition. I suggest 
these enable a richer understanding of a practitioner’s engagement with materials, tools and 
techniques. 
The key idea explored in this chapter is that thinking doesn’t just happen “in the head”, but 
occurs between people and things. I suggest that this concept sheds new light on the 
relationship between designing and making, and offers a valuable perspective from which to 
interrogate the influence of making techniques on design practice. 
Chapter 4. Making and Thinking 
Where Chapter 3 takes a broad, interdisciplinary approach to defining my theoretical 
commitments, Chapter 4 begins to apply these ideas in a more focussed critique of design 
and making practice. I present a criticism of the work of design theorist David Pye. I use 
Pye’s work as an exemplar of the assumptions made by linear models of thought and action. 
This, I suggest, is at odds with the alternative models of cognition presented in Chapter 3.  
This critique is presented alongside the thesis’ first practical study—an investigation of 
hammer use. With reference to the concept of epistemic action, I use the example of 
hammering a pin to develop an account of tool use as simultaneously epistemic and 
pragmatic. That is to say, I claim techniques are at once for doing things, and for finding out 
how those things are going. This lays the foundation for the subsequent studies of epistemic 
character. 
Chapter 5. The Epistemic Character of Techniques 
In Chapter 5, I explore what I mean by epistemic character. Although I introduce a working 
definition at the end of Chapter 2 (2.6.14), the studies of practice presented here are an 
opportunity to examine the idea in detail. To this end, I present three questions that may be 
asked of a technique’s epistemic character: what are the questions posed by the technique?; 
what is its step-character?; and, what is the nature of the emergent result? I explore each of 
these questions with respect to particular techniques. Through first-hand studies, I 
investigate the use of rulers and dividers as measurement tools, the process of carving a 
wooden spoon, and the design and construction of paper aeroplanes. 
Chapter 6. Making Things Up 
Chapter 6 discusses how the epistemic character of techniques may support, or potentially 
compromise, design processes. The main theme of the discussion centres on the subject of 
how techniques distribute decision making throughout a process. This is an idea that 
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combines the interests both of the theoretical foundation of the research, and the subsequent 
descriptions of practice. It takes influence from the claims made in Chapters 3 and 4 about 
how we use the world to support cognition, and applies them to a suggestion of how we 
should aspire to utilise techniques throughout design processes.  
Drawing on a range of practical examples (including sawing, hammering, filing and 
planing), I suggest that we may make a distinction between processes throughout which 
things emerge step-by-step, and processes in which things are planned in advance of their 
execution.  
I also move from localised studies of tool use, to a macro-level perspective, in a study of 
techniques used for prototyping furniture. Here I aim to demonstrate how the idea of 
epistemic character can be applied in a wider context. 
Chapter 7. Discussion 
In Chapter 7, I restate the contributions summarised below (see 1.3), and identify where I 
believe they have been made throughout the thesis. I then go on to present a further 
“discursive contribution”, which builds on the ideas of Chapter 6 in a more speculative (and 
potentially contentious) spirit. I explore the idea that the epistemic character of techniques 
might have a significant effect on the quality of our environment. On this, I take my lead 
from architect Christopher Alexander and his work on the importance of step-by-step 
processes.  
1.3. The Structure of The Thesis 
As described in the outline above, the chapters of this thesis are themed and arranged using a 
non-typical approach. A more standard presentation might see a sequence of chapters such 
as ‘literature review’; ‘methodology’; ‘data gathering’; ‘data analysis’; and ‘discussion’. The 
alternative approach here has been taken for two reasons. Firstly, it is a reflection of the 
methodology of the research, wherein the relationship between literature review and first-
hand studies of techniques has been ongoing throughout (see 2.3 and 2.6.7). Between these 
two methods of enquiry, writing has been a means not just to record ‘findings’, but a vital 
way of forming the ideas and contributions themselves. The writing of this thesis has been 
simultaneously a method and the result of the research—it is only through writing drafts of 
the subsequent chapters that their content has been developed, and the implications of my 
argument have become clear. To adopt a sequence of chapters that suggests a distinction 
between literature review and my sources of ‘data’ would, therefore, seem at odds with how 
the research was conducted. 
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The second reason for the interwoven structure is that it is intended to strengthen the 
legibility and clarity of the thesis’ main arguments. In Chapter 4, for example, I combine a 
discussion of hammer use with a critique of David Pye’s work and the concept of epistemic 
action (see 4.2). I do this to suggest the failings of a wholly pragmatic understanding of tool 
use. In the more typical thesis structure described above, it might have been possible to 
present the critique of Pye’s work separately from my description of hammer use. I could 
have detailed hammer use independently, as “data” that could subsequently be analysed with 
reference to Pye’s ideas. My practice-based studies of tool use would thus have become 
disentangled from the line of argument—they would have been documented as “raw” data. 
The decision to instead describe occasions of tool use alongside ideas from the literature has 
provided a means of developing an argument incrementally, with continual reference to 
practice. I believe this has benefits for both the coherence of this document and its potential 
appeal to an audience of both design researchers and practitioners. On this last point, the 
combination of practice and theory developed throughout writing the thesis has been 
usefully employed in papers I have recently written (see Luscombe 2017 and Luscombe 
2018). I have found this an efficient means of making what might be abstract ideas tangible 
(a point I claim as one of the contributions of this thesis, see 1.4, point 7). 
Despite these benefits, there are some disadvantages to the unconventional thesis structure, 
which are worth noting and reflecting upon. The first is that it makes navigating the 
document more challenging than it might otherwise have been. A more familiar structure 
would perhaps provide quicker access to the essential components of a PhD thesis, and be 
easier to read out of sequence. I have tried to mitigate this loss by including a list of my 
contributions and where to find them throughout the thesis in the introduction (see 1.4). And 
I have attempted to thoroughly cross-reference the document with links to relevant sections, 
enabling precursory ideas to be easily found if it is read non-sequentially. 
Another potential disadvantage to the chosen structure is that it makes the aims, objectives 
and findings of the research more difficult to track. It is for this reason that I have written a 
chapter on the methods and chronology of the research. Here I detail the relationship 
between the objectives and research questions throughout (see 2.5), in order to make clear 
how they were developed over time.  
One further potential criticism of the structure of this thesis might be that it does not appear 
to provide raw data, made available for subsequent (re)interpretation by another researcher. 
In Chapter 2, I justify the presentation of “cooked” data according to my subscription to a 
constructivist approach (see 2.4.2). But I would also argue that, by building my 
contributions with careful reference to existing literature, and discussing only well-
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documented, widely-used techniques (see 2.6.6 and 2.6.8), there is nothing to stop others 
drawing on the studies of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 in order to refute, support or extend my 
contributions. I have also provided an Appendix, including photographs of the workshop 
environments used for the studies, a selection of photographs used as the basis for the line 
drawings throughout the thesis, and a selection of scanned pages from my notebooks. 
1.4. Summary of Contributions 
Below is a summary of the contributions I claim to have made, along with details of where 
they may be found in the thesis, and where they have been published elsewhere. They are 
listed in the order they are presented throughout this thesis. 
1. I present an argument that recasts the making process as a means of thinking, rather 
than merely transcribing antecedent ideas. I draw on literature from disciplines 
where this argument has been well-rehearsed, and contribute a novel synthesis of 
existing ideas in terms relevant to design studies and practice. (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) 
(Also published in Luscombe 2017 and Luscombe 2018) 
 
2. I present an analysis of techniques that describes their simultaneously epistemic and 
pragmatic nature; I argue that techniques are a means by which to find out about the 
world and change it simultaneously. (Chapter 4) (Also published in Luscombe 2017 
and Luscombe 2018) 
 
3. I present a novel critique of the work of David Pye, according to the theoretical 
foundation developed in contributions 1 and 2. (Chapters 4 and 7) (Also published 
in Luscombe 2017) 
4. I introduce the term ‘epistemic character’ in order to frame a new subject of 
interest—how techniques structure design processes. I argue that we may investigate 
the epistemic character of techniques, and I provide examples of how such 
investigations may be pursued. (Chapters 5 and 6) (Also published in Luscombe 
2018) 
5. I introduce three questions that may be asked of a technique’s epistemic character: 
What are the questions posed by a technique?; What is its step-character?; and what 
is the nature of the emergent result? (Chapter 5) 
6. I provide a discussion of how the features of epistemic character influence the 
distribution of decision making throughout design processes. This offers a novel 
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insight into historic dichotomies of hand and machine tools, as I suggest there is a 
more fundamental distinction to be made, between processes throughout which 
things emerge step-by-step, and processes in which things are planned in advance of 
their execution. (Chapters 6 and 7) 
7. Through a distinctive, designerly subject of interest (the detailed study of design and 
making techniques), I develop a means of communicating and promoting extra-
disciplinary theoretical ideas in a way that is relevant for design practice.  
1.5. The Researcher 
The topic of this research is a consequence of my interests as a design practitioner, a teacher 
of design and an amateur woodworker. My practice is mostly concerned with the design of 
furniture, usually made from wood. I teach onto a Three-Dimensional Design undergraduate 
degree, which sees students design and make both furniture and products. And I consider 
myself an amateur woodworker—I make prototype and finished pieces of furniture, and a 
range of things in my home workshop for fun. 
Each of these interests, along with my more recent membership to the world of design 
research, has combined to inspire the direction and outcomes of this research. As I make 
clear when outlining my epistemological commitments (see 2.4), this is a study where the 
findings and myself are interactively linked. It should help, therefore, to briefly describe the 
influence that I feel my experience as design practitioner, teacher and amateur woodworker 
has had upon the research. In Chapter 2 (see 2.5), I also discuss my development as a design 
researcher, alongside a description of this study’s chronology. 
Design Practitioner 
I have a degree in furniture and product design, professional experience in design practice, 
and have continued to design and make things throughout the course of my PhD. An 
engagement with the practice of design (both through my own work and through 
relationships with other practitioners) has doubtless had a significant influence on my 
research. Of most benefit has been the ability to interpret extra-disciplinary literature from 
this perspective. Being aware of how ideas might be applied in the context of designing and 
making has steered my interests through unfamiliar texts. Although I have enjoyed 
diversions into apparently irrelevant subjects and unrelated ideas, I hope that anchoring the 
project in my knowledge of design practice has helped to stop these leading me too far 
astray. The acid test of trying to correlate theory with my experience has been invaluable. 
And I hope this will ensure the ideas I present in this thesis are accessible to others. 
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It should be noted however, that my tolerance for literature that would, at one time, have 
appeared hopelessly obscure has certainly expanded. As I describe in the next chapter, these 
new ideas have had a revelatory effect on my thinking. For the purposes of the research, this 
has opened up new lines of inquiry, allowing me to interrogate practice from a new 
perspective. And, from a personal perspective, it is the aspect of the PhD that I have enjoyed 
the most.   
On a practical level, already being familiar with the context of workshop practice, and 
techniques typical to designing and making practice has also enabled me to target my first-
hand studies effectively. 
Design Teacher  
Teaching design at degree level has given me full-time access to “workshop practice”. The 
Three-Dimensional Design degree I help to teach is centred around designing through 
making. Our students draw and make prototypes to develop designs for furniture and 
products. The longer projects then see them create fully-resolved final prototypes or 
products, in “real” materials.  
The workshop environment has enabled me to engage in ‘persistent observation’ (Guba 
1981, p.85), by allowing me the time and experience to develop, test, and modify my ideas. 
Potential themes of interest have come and gone throughout this extended interaction with 
my subject of study, leaving only the ‘pervasive qualities’ (ibid.) I present here.  
It has also been helpful to trial some of the ideas of this thesis as they emerged, by 
incorporating them into my teaching practice. Attempting to make the concepts relevant and 
interesting to students has been a useful challenge, and it has informed the thesis’ concurrent 
discussions of “theory” and “practice”.  
Amateur Woodworker  
Whilst also a large component of my design practice, woodwork (particularly hand tool 
woodworking) is a personal hobby. I have been able to draw on my knowledge of this 
subject in order to find useful ways of investigating and describing epistemic character. 
Keeping up-to-date with the online community of woodworking blogs—an arena in which 
discussions of technique are fundamental—has also been a pleasurable and informative 
aside to my research.  
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1.6. The Context of Workshop Practice 
The “workshop practice’ of my title is perhaps best described by flicking through this thesis 
and looking at the illustrations, or looking to the photographs in the Appendix. To be clear 
about the features of the specific workshop that has been the setting for this research, 
however, I list them below:  
Metalworking forge; welding equipment; fine metalworking tools and benches; tube 
bending and notching machines; woodworking machines; woodworking hand tools and 
benches; machine tools (lathes and milling machines); CNC machine tools; CNC routers; 
laser cutters; 3D printers 
This is the collection of equipment I have had access to at Northumbria University. In my 
design practice, throughout the course of the PhD, and through my teaching, I have used all 
of the above equipment. Despite this range of experience, however, this thesis draws on a 
more limited set of techniques in order to explore the idea of epistemic character (see 2.6.6). 
This is because I have not aspired to develop a comprehensive account of the epistemic 
character of any and all designing and making techniques. In this thesis, I have been 
interested in trying to define what I mean by the term, and developing effective ways of 
communicate the idea (see Chapter 5).   
1.7. Prior Publication 
Alongside more informal presentations of my research throughout my PhD, I have presented 
work at the All Makers Now? conference (June 2014, Falmouth) and Research Through 
Design 2017 (March 2017, Edinburgh). These have been valuable opportunities to test and 
develop my ideas. 
I have also had a paper accepted by Design Issues (Luscombe 2018). The paper could be 
considered an abridged version of this thesis. It suggests that we might apply the theory of 
extended mind (see 3.2.2) in order to better understand the potential ways in which 
techniques can structure and support design work. It makes this argument through a 
comparison of rulers and dividers as tools of measurement (see 5.1), and introduces the term 
“epistemic character” in the conclusion. 
I attach this paper, along with the one presented at Research Through Design 2017, because 
they are composed of sections of this thesis, and represent occasions where the arguments 
made herein have been subject to peer review (see Accompanying Materials). 
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2. Methods and Chronology 
 
Throughout this research, there has been a co-development of questions and methodology 
that now feels difficult to untangle. The reason for this entanglement can be summarised as 
follows; it was only through discovering appropriate methods of analysis (and their 
associated theoretical foundation) that some of the research questions became valid. My 
questions and methodology have thus become inextricably linked. In this chapter then, I aim 
not just to describe the theoretical underpinnings and methods I have used, but also give an 
account of this co-evolution. 
Take, for example, a question that has come to drive the research: “How do the techniques 
of making designs structure and support design practice?”. This is a question that presumes 
the techniques have any influence at all, and that the nature of this influence can be a subject 
of study. Whilst common sense accounts1 might seem to qualify the first of these 
presumptions, it took some time to develop a more substantial theoretical grounding from 
which to approach the issue. I have come to discover that a question like this requires a 
particular understanding of the relationship between thought and action, thus enabling 
methods of analysis that would be otherwise redundant, to provide answers that themselves 
depend on the same understanding of the relationship between thought and action. When 
drawn as a stack of blocks, like in Figure 2.1, the “foundational” quality of the theoretical 
grounding becomes apparent. If it was removed, the methods and findings would fall down. 
Figure 2. 1 The relationship of my theoretical grounding, methods and findings 
 
                                                      
 
1 Architectural theorist Branko Kolarevic, for example, observes the respectively 
rectilinear or blobby buildings designed by architects drawing by hand, or using computer 
software (Kolarevic 2003) (see also Mitchell 2001; Robertson and Radcliffe 2009). 
THEORETICAL GROUNDING
METHODS
FINDINGS
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Owing to the situation illustrated in Figure 2.1, developing and explicating the theoretical 
grounding for the research has become more vital than I ever expected. This is now one of 
my main contributions, and a crucial component of my argument as a whole. The 
methodology has become ‘simultaneously prerequisite and product, the tool and the result of 
the study’ (Vygotsky 1978, p.65). At the beginning of this PhD, however, I had no intention 
of addressing intractable issues such as “what is the difference between designing and 
making?” (see Chapter 3), or seemingly obscure ones like “where does the mind end and the 
world begin?” (see 3.2.2). And I would have been highly sceptical about the value in doing 
so. These developments in my thinking are discussed in more detail in a discussion of 
chronology below, but I begin by summarising them here, to introduce the chapter’s themes 
and sections. 
2.1. Summary of the Study’s Development 
At the beginning of my PhD programme, I became deeply impressed by the writing of the 
furniture designer, woodworker, naval architect and Royal College of Art professor David 
Pye. Having engaged in a study of designing and making, it was in some ways disheartening 
to see that he had written so brilliantly on the subjects over forty years ago. His two most 
famous books, The Nature and Art of Workmanship (1968) and The Nature and Aesthetics of 
Design (1978), seemed to me to have said it all. Pye expertly dismantles ‘the doctrine that 
form follows function’ (1978, p.12). He dismisses the imprecision of the word skill, because 
‘you can make it mean what you want it to mean’ (1968, p.52). And, perhaps most 
famously, Pye’s definition of the ‘workmanship of risk’ and the ‘workmanship of certainty’ 
(see 4.1) brought a new clarity to the subject of ‘craftsmanship’ (another word Pye didn’t 
like). What’s more, I kept finding contemporary scholars across disciplines who were 
similarly appreciative. Anthropologist Tim Ingold draws on Pye’s dissection of 
workmanship (see, for example, Ingold 2011, p.59) and his discussion of “truth to materials” 
(see, for example, Ingold 2011, p.29), to build intricate arguments on a variety of subjects. 
Contemporary craftspeople like Peter Galbert (2015) and Robin Wood (2011) find 
resonances between Pye’s writing and their work. In design literature, Pye’s work has a 
lasting legacy (e.g. Jones & Jacobs 1998; Chamberlain & Roddis 2003). And craft theorist 
Glenn Adamson goes so far as to describe Pye’s book on workmanship as offering ‘the most 
compelling technical discussion of skilled work ever written’ (2007, p.72). At every turn, I 
was reminded of the exceptional contribution of David Pye, and was left struggling to see 
what more could be said. 
In particular, it was Pye’s thinking on the relationship between designing and making that 
was difficult to see beyond. This is perhaps most clearly expressed when Pye declares that 
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the aim of ‘good workmanship’ is to realise an antecedent design (1968, p.30). In this 
definition, and throughout the rest of Pye’s writing, the underlying sequence of events is 
clear—first comes the design, and then follows its material realisation (I critique this aspect 
of Pye’s work in detail in Chapter 4). This one-way relationship between designing and 
making led my questions to a dead end. Under such a model, how could the techniques of 
material engagement influence design practice? If “ideas” always come first, how can they 
be influenced by the techniques of their realisation? 
My progress beyond this impasse was gradual, as I slowly built familiarity with a body of 
literature that challenges this one-way relationship between designing and making or, more 
generally, between cognition and action. I discovered alternative positions that did not 
assume cognition to precede action (see 3.2). I read accounts that claimed some actions were 
more like “thinking” than “doing” (see 4.2). And I even learned of theories that suggested 
the “mind” could be understood to include features of the external environment (see 3.2.2). I 
thus became involved in an interdisciplinary literature review that has illuminated and 
sustained my PhD ever since. This reading had a revelatory effect. I had found a basis from 
which tools and their associated techniques could be analysed as more than just a means to a 
pre-specified end. I felt reassured that making techniques could be considered as ways of 
working things out—as ways of thinking.  
Reading around this subject thus changed my dead end into a fork in the road. One path led 
to a cul-de-sac, where commonplace assumptions about the relationship between designing 
and making (see 3.1) would have inhibited the questions, methods and findings of this 
research. The other path led me through the fields of anthropology, archaeology, cognitive 
science and philosophy of mind. Along the way, I have come across a web of links between 
scholars from these disciplines and beyond. United in their criticism of dualist 
interpretations of mind and matter (see 3.2 and 3.3), each one provides their own particular 
contribution to an emergent model of how better to understand the relationship between 
humans and the world of materials.  
2.2. Chapter Summary 
This journey has formed the first of my two methods—an interdisciplinary literature review 
centred on the relationship between designing and making. I discuss this method in the 
following section (2.3), where I justify my adoption of an interdisciplinary approach, 
consider the potential difficulties with such an exercise, and describe how I hope to have 
maintained academic rigour. Wary of having already introduced some “big ideas” (i.e. that 
cognition does not necessarily precede action, or that our “minds” might not be located in 
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our heads), here I expand a little on the content of the literature review, to help outline the 
relevance of these issues. To avoid creating an overlong preview of subsequent chapters, 
however, I do this by documenting a similarly intentioned interdisciplinary exercise from 
archaeology (Knappett 2005). This allows me to introduce the reasoning behind my 
interdisplinarity, without detailing too much of the argument made in Chapters 3 and 4. 
As introduced above, having reflected on my research, I am unable to unravel an account of 
my methods from their subsequent findings. Under a positivist framework (Guba & Lincoln 
1994) they would doubtless be easier to isolate. The entangled nature of my research, 
however, is more typical of its constructivist basis. My consideration of this research 
paradigm forms the next section of this chapter (2.4). Here I consider several aspects of the 
paradigm’s influence on my work: its commitment to what constitutes “knowledge”; how it 
has informed my relationship with the subject; the tone of voice it has lead me to adopt 
throughout this thesis; and how my work might be judged according to its associated criteria 
of quality. 
I then return to the chronology summarised above (2.5). In a nod to a popular conception of 
design expertise, I borrow the metaphor of the “T-shaped designer” (Brown 2009) to help 
describe how both this study, and my knowledge, has developed over time. A series of T-
shaped illustrations show how a broadening of my theoretical horizons (the horizontal of the 
“T”) throughout the research has allowed me to delve deeper into my subject specific 
knowledge (the vertical of the “T”) and, ultimately, make a contribution to this field. The 
illustrations are also intended also to provide more clarity on the entangled nature of my 
questions and methods, and the relationship between my literature review and my second 
research method—a first-hand study of techniques.   
I then go on to describe these first-hand studies (2.6). I discuss; how the theoretical 
grounding developed throughout my literature review has allowed me analyse the influence 
of techniques; the definition of technology as the study of techniques; existing approaches to 
the study of techniques; how I documented the process; the back and forth of reading and 
doing; the role of “how-to” literature; and how I developed the theme of epistemic character. 
2.3. Research Method 1: An Interdisciplinary Review of Literature 
By citing a review of secondary sources as one of my research methods, I am adopting an 
approach common to discursive PhD theses from the humanities (see Knott 2011, for a 
thematically relevant example). In disciplines where the (re)interpretation of existing texts 
and artefacts is the dominant form of scholarship, it would be possible to pursue a PhD (or 
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even a life’s work) using only this method. For the purposes of this research, the inspiration 
of an on-going literature review has allowed me to develop insights on practice that I would 
never have conceived independently. It is by drawing together ideas from a range of 
disciplines that I have developed a new means of interrogating the techniques of designing 
and making.  
The reading and writing that forms this interdisciplinary literature review has been 
distributed throughout the course of the PhD, rather than completed (as might be more 
typical) within the early stages. This has given me the time to explore a much broader range 
of literature than I otherwise would have, and allowed me to follow my developing 
understanding of the research questions, towards relevant disciplines and ideas (see 2.5). 
Because of this developing understanding, at no point did the literature review employ any 
fixed and well-defined criteria for inclusion. As I describe in 2.3.3 and 2.5, the process of 
selecting texts was guided by following links between different scholars, and identifying and 
investigating shared points of reference. Reading, writing, and studying practice along the 
way has allowed me to identify relationships between ideas from the literature and my 
experience of techniques (see 2.6). This approach has also informed the structure of this 
thesis (see 1.3), which distributes key ideas from other scholars alongside discussions of 
technique. Rather than using a dedicated literature review chapter to identify a “gap” in 
existing knowledge (which could then be addressed as a contribution to knowledge), this 
thesis therefore describes the relationship between existing ideas and my new contributions 
throughout2. 
A key contribution of my research is in the way in which it frames a new subject of 
interest—how techniques structure design processes. It is in the framing of this subject, and 
developing an appropriate theoretical grounding for its study, that the integration of extra-
disciplinary ideas has been most useful. This aspect of the research was in part inspired by 
the work of archaeologist Carl Knappett, whose similarly interdisciplinary study, Thinking 
Through Material Culture: An Interdisciplinary Perspective explores how other fields have 
tackled issues he claims to have been neglected by his own (2005). I introduce Knappett’s 
work to my discussion of method for two reasons. Firstly, the theme of his criticism, whilst 
directed towards his own discipline, closely resembles the argument I develop in Chapters 3 
and 4. In short, Knappett portrays the default archaeological position to be founded upon a 
scheme that draws too crude a line between action and cognition. In Chapters 3 and 4, I 
                                                      
 
2 One such example is in Chapter 6, where I extend anthropologist Tim Ingold’s 
concepts of wayfaring and transport, alongside a discussion of distributed decision making 
(see 6.3). 
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develop a similar position with respect to commonplace assumptions on the relationship 
between designing and making. This semblance with the themes of my work is what drew 
me to Knappett’s work in the first instance, and what convinced me that a similarly 
interdisciplinary approach would be helpful for this research. My second interest in Thinking 
Through Material Culture is a methodological one. I am interested in the way in which 
Knappett builds his thesis through an assemblage of literature from different disciplines. For 
the present discussion of methodology, it is this aspect of the work that I will be focusing on. 
Before doing so, however, it will be helpful to introduce the basics of Knappett’s argument, 
to help explain the necessity for his (and, ultimately, my) interdisciplinary scope. This 
exercise will hopefully also begin to illuminate what a “scheme that draws too crude a line 
between action and cognition” looks like. 
2.3.1. Knappett’s Criticism of Archaeology  
Whilst archaeology, Knappett argues, has developed increasingly sophisticated methods for 
the analysis of artefacts themselves, he finds it to have failed to construct ‘similarly 
sophisticated theoretical models’ for understanding how those artefacts have been made and 
used (ibid., p.1). Knappett criticizes the default archaeological approach to material culture, 
and offers an alternative synthesized from extra-disciplinary sources. 
Central to Knappett’s criticism is his challenge to the ‘default archaeological approach’ 
(ibid. p.3). This approach is epitomized, according to Knappett, in a quote from V. Gordon 
Childe’s classic archaeological text, Piecing Together The Past; 
‘The archaeological record is constituted of the fossilized results of human 
behaviour, and it is the archaeologist's business to reconstitute that behaviour as far 
as he can and so to recapture the thoughts that behaviour expressed.’ (1956, quoted 
in Knappett, ibid., p.3) 
For Knappett, this short passage illustrates two underlying assumptions that dominate 
archaeology. The first of these is a ‘clear hierarchy [in which] thought is primary, behaviour 
is secondary, and material expression is at the bottom of the chain’ (ibid., p.3). In Childe’s 
passage, we find the idea that material remains can be studied in order to trace back towards 
an antecedent idea in the mind of their creator (via what Hawkes has called the ‘ladder of 
inference’ 1954, quoted in Knappett, ibid., p.43). When applied to the analysis of fragments 
from the past, this model presumes a chain of events that starts with an idea in a mind and 
ends with a thing in the world. The second assumption described by Knappett thus follows; 
                                                      
 
3 See also, Malafouris 2013, p.31.  
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behavior, in this model, is merely a means of realising pre-exiting thoughts in the material 
world. ‘[G]iven that thoughts are separated from objects by behavior,’ Knappett writes, ‘it 
follows that the internal mind is buffered from the external world via the medium of action.’ 
(ibid., p.3)  
It is this fundamental distinction, between an ‘internal mind’ and the ‘external world’ that 
Knappett challenges. I return to the content of this criticism, which is shared by many other 
scholars across disciplines (e.g. Farnell 1999; Burkitt 1998; Ingold 2013a), in more detail 
throughout this thesis. To summarise its significance to Knappett’s interests; separating out 
‘mind’ and ‘matter’ according to what he calls the ‘Cartesian dualism’ (ibid., p.3) precludes 
any investigation of how the latter may be entwined with the former. It is a position that 
neglects the potential for action, or any non-human actant, to have any influence on creative 
processes. The model thus has a profound effect on the nature of questions that can be asked 
of an archaeologist’s source material, and leaves them, according to Knappett, ‘aspiring to 
mentalism, but forever condemned to materialism’ (ibid., p.168).  
Having detailed the flaws in this approach, Thinking Through Material Culture goes on to 
promote a model of archaeology wherein artefacts should be understood not only as the end 
results of human thoughts and behaviour, but as themselves active participants, influencing 
and directing cognition as they are both made and used. This is a position that takes 
cognition to be distributed across both human and non-human “agents” (see 3.2 and 5.3).  
2.3.2. The Value of Interdisciplinarity 
In his exercise to rethink the theoretical foundations of archaeology, Knappett sets himself 
an ambitious task—attempting to both reveal the assumptions of his discipline, demonstrate 
their flaws, and provide a valuable alternative. It is this ambition that necessitates his 
interdisciplinary scope. Because the default approach is so ingrained in archaeological 
thinking and writing, Knappett must look beyond the boundaries of his own field, 
synthesizing an argument from across disciplines. The spectrum of literature used is broad, 
presumably because, as Knappett notes, the default position he identifies pervades not just 
archaeology, but much of the social sciences4. Throughout the book then, Knappett borrows 
from ‘cognitive science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and history’ (p.1) in an effort 
to piece together a more effective theoretical grounding from which to understand the 
                                                      
 
4 This is in accord with Tim Ingold, who observes, ‘[T]ime and again, scholars have 
written as though to have a design for a thing, you already have the thing itself’ (2013a, 
p.22). See 3.1. 
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relationship between mind and matter. Through careful scholarship, non-native ideas from 
these fields inspire and lend credibility to Knappett’s thesis5. 
Throughout my research, I too have drawn on a range of sources from across disciplines. For 
Knappett, interdisciplinarity is necessary in order to address a fundamental issue that affects 
the methods of analysis his discipline might adopt, and the kinds of questions it can ask. It 
plays the same role in my research. I have looked beyond the bounds of writing directly 
associated with the fields of design and craft practice, in order to interrogate the same 
fundamental subject. The issue I’m interested in is how we can better understand the 
influence of material engagement upon design processes. 
In assuming that material engagement has any influence at all, however, I am already taking 
a position on the relationship of cognition and action that is not well represented in design 
studies. And, like Knappett, before studying the subject itself in any detail, it is first 
necessary to challenge the default approach to tool use and design. In short, this requires me 
to question what has been called the ‘intramental’ (Gedenryd 1998, p.57) approach to design 
activity and tool use, wherein techniques are not credited with any influence on the 
outcomes of practice. 
Throughout the thesis, I make the case for an appreciation of the ways in which techniques 
are not inert means by which to transcribe ideas from our heads into the world, but active 
participants in the creative process, which themselves have a significant influence on the 
process. This is in contrast to what could be called the traditional cognitivist understanding 
of design activity, which, as I argue in Chapter 3, locates all thinking inside the heads of 
practitioners. Thankfully, the essence of this argument has been well rehearsed across other 
disciplines, providing me with a rich source of material from which to build my case. 
Indeed, whilst the ideas drawn from other disciplines within this thesis might appear quite 
novel in design studies (and took me some time to become familiar with), elsewhere they are 
increasingly well-recognised theoretical positions (see Marsh 2010). Models of distributed 
cognition6 have been proposed, challenged, and proven methodologically effective. Being 
able to draw from these disciplines has proven the value of my interdisciplinary scope.  
                                                      
 
5 Whilst the tone of Knappett’s book is mildly revolutionary, it should also be noted that, 
in the field of archaeology, he is not alone in his exploration of new ways of dealing with 
material culture (see, for example, Renfrew 2010). 
6 In addition to distributed cognition, the terms situated, extended, embodied, enactive, 
or dynamic cognition are also in use. As cognitive scientist Leslie Marsh points out, these 
are not precisely defined terms (2010). I stick to extended and distributed cognition 
throughout this thesis, because they are the phrases used by those I cite. 
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In summary, I have used an interdisciplinary approach to lay a credible theoretical 
foundation for my study of techniques, and also to inspire the analysis of techniques.  
2.3.3. Taking Care with Unfamiliar Sources 
In light of these benefits, I believe the interdisciplinary approach presented here to be a 
necessary requirement of this study. Very little of the subsequent study or analysis of tools 
and techniques would have been possible without first laying this theoretical foundation—
the credibility of which rests on a careful synthesis of extra-disciplinary ideas. But, although 
similar projects in comparative literature review are not uncommon (see Ingold 2013a; 
Bennett 2009; Malafouris 2013; Sennett 2008; and Pickering 1995, for a selection that have 
inspired this thesis), they are also not without their risks. In the introduction to Thinking 
Through Material Culture, Knappett points out that ‘[t]here are inevitable dangers in 
working with relatively unfamiliar areas such as cognitive science’ (p.2). Perhaps the most 
serious of these dangers is the risk of misappropriation, where decontextualized sources are 
reassembled into a narrative that disregards the authors original intent or, perhaps more 
likely, extrapolates too far from their original claim. Another risk to which Knappett alludes 
in his preface is that of heading ‘off along blind alleys’ (p.vii), presumably by following 
links through unfamiliar literature, until you catch yourself spending hours reading 
something that is almost certainly irrelevant to the research in hand. Of these two pitfalls, I 
am certainly guilty of the latter. But I have done all I can to avoid the first, chiefly by 
finding my sources through work like that of Knappett, where they have already been 
appropriated in support of the claims I am making. In doing so, I am safe in the knowledge 
that the appropriation has been both carefully considered by these “secondary” authors, and 
typically peer reviewed before being published in their field. 
I have, therefore, not aimed to unearth previously neglected literature in support of my 
theoretical foundation. Whilst I might have enjoyed exploring blind alleys until I happened 
upon a paper previously unappropriated by scholars of distributed cognition, such an effort 
would have been prohibitively time consuming. My claim for the originality of the 
theoretical foundation and methodology of this study does not lie in the use of entirely novel 
sources, but in pulling together those already used by others, as part of a coherent argument 
that is newly relevant to the study of tools, techniques and design practice. To give an 
example, in Chapter 4, I draw on a study of Tetris gameplay, in which cognitive scientists 
David Kirsh and Paul Maglio introduce the concept of ‘epistemic action’—a category of 
actions that are used not to achieve results in the world, but to support cognition (1994). This 
is a key theme throughout this thesis. I did not, however, happen upon Kirsh and Maglio’s 
paper in its original context (the journal Cognitive Science). I discovered the work having 
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seen it discussed by a variety of other authors, all using the study as an example of how 
thinking can be supported by action in the world (see, for example, Gedenryd 1998; Clark  
1997; and Malafouris  2013, who all cite Kirsh and Maglio’s study). Following citations 
back to the original paper, I developed an understanding both of the original method, intent 
and findings of the study, and an idea of how it might be weaved into an argument for 
distributed models of cognition. Kirsh and Maglio’s paper is remarkable in the number of 
times it has been employed by others in support of such models, but this story, of 
discovering ‘source’ literature through its citation in other work, is typical of most 
references I use throughout this thesis.  
Knappett describes how his interdisciplinary approach attempts to ‘create a new "network" 
in which previously separate entities and ideas are interwoven’ (p.2). I have shared this 
aspiration, but would add that, in addition to creating my own such network of 
interconnected ideas, examples like Kirsh and Maglio’s paper (as a commonly referenced 
touch-point for those writing about distributed cognition or extended mind) reveal the 
threads of connections already present in this cross-disciplinary field of inquiry. I feel as 
though I have been discovering an existing network of ideas, as much as weaving a new one. 
My theoretical foundation might be unique in its emphasis of certain sources and ideas over 
others, according to the particular interests of my study. But I feel assured, by the credibility 
of this existing field, that my position is an academically rigorous one. 
2.3.4. The Interdisciplinarity of Design Literature 
The adoption of extra-disciplinary theory is not new to design studies. Indeed, some of the 
most ubiquitous ideas have been borrowed from elsewhere. These include, for example, the 
notion of affordances, as developed by ecological psychologist James Gibson (1979) and 
popularized in the design literature by Donald Norman (1998); Donald Schon’s concept of 
framing problems (1983), as cited in, for example, Kees Dorst and Nigel Cross’s work on 
creativity in design processes (Dorst and Cross 2001); descriptions of design-driven 
innovation, developed in management studies (Verganti 2009; Norman and Verganti 2014); 
and, in the early days of the Design Methods movement, Christopher Alexander’s adoption 
of mathematics (1964). This is in sympathy with the popular notion of designers making 
connections between different interest groups, or, as designer Tim Brown puts it, being “T-
shaped” (2009), with a deep knowledge of their particular field (the vertical of the “T”) and 
a working knowledge of a wide range of complementary disciplines (the horizontal of the 
“T”). Design theory has long since looked beyond its own boundaries for ideas. In fact, even 
the ‘T-Shape’ metaphor was itself borrowed from management consultancy. 
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2.4. A Constructivist Research Paradigm 
The research paradigm upon which this inquiry is built can be defined as constructivist. On 
this basis, I have not sought to discover and define absolute, objective ‘truths’—I instead 
subscribe to the belief that ‘[t]ruth is a matter of the best-informed and most sophisticated 
construction on which there is consensus at a given time’ (Schwandt 1994, p.128). By 
making my methodology and theoretical foundations clear, and attempting to present all my 
arguments through careful scholarship, I hope to have created a well-informed and 
sophisticated construction that might answer this requirement. I take much of my 
understanding of the constructivist research paradigm from methodologists Egon Guba and 
Yvonna Lincoln. 
2.4.1. The link between an investigator and their research 
I also assume, according to the constructivist paradigm, that myself (the investigator) and 
the object of the investigation are ‘interactively linked so that the "findings" are literally 
created as the investigation proceeds’ (Guba and Lincoln 1994, p.111, emphasis in original). 
For the purposes of clarity, I have tried to give an insight into this creative process through 
my discussion of the study’s chronology (see below, 2.5). And, whilst I know this to be a 
difficult ambition to achieve, I have attempted to write this thesis in such a way that my 
‘findings’ might reveal themselves to a reader, and so be re-constructed, in a similar manner. 
Despite having already made clear my ‘contributions’ then, I would hope that the remaining 
words do not serve only to provide ‘evidence’ for these claims, but allow a reader to 
experience the same kind of active, investigative journey that I have undertaken. My 
reasoning for this is consistent with a constructivist understanding of knowledge 
accumulation—I hope that an active experience would suggest to a reader other 
(complementary) findings that I have not yet considered, inspiring ‘ever more informed and 
sophisticated constructions’ of their own (ibid., p.114). 
2.4.2. Working with ‘data’ 
Although I have been less explicit about the totality of my ‘data’ than I might have been if 
working in an alternative paradigm, I believe my treatment of this subject is typical of other 
constructivist projects. The the two kinds of ‘data’ I have been working with are 
multidisciplinary literature, and my first-hand experience of designing and making 
techniques. A thematically relevant example of a constructivist approach to the former can 
be found in architect Lars Spuybroek’s The Sympathy of Things (2011). And a thematically 
relevant constructivist approach to the latter can be found in anthropologist Tim Ingold’s 
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reflections on sawing a plank of wood (2011, p.51). Having accepted the irreducible 
relationship between the investigator and the findings, neither of these examples, as is 
typical of constructivist projects, make available significant amounts of “raw data”—it is 
served only (to extend a metaphor) once it has been “cooked” into an argument. In my case, 
even if I were to list every piece of writing read throughout the study (in addition to the ones 
cited throughout this thesis), and painstakingly document every single occasion when I have 
employed a designing or making technique, I could still not claim a different investigator 
would reach the same conclusions from this data. This is not to suggest there is any mystery 
surrounding my sources—all cited literature has been clearly referenced and I have been 
careful (as described in 2.6.8) to demonstrate my practical work is consistent with widely-
reported techniques of competent tool use. It must be acknowledged, however, that as soon 
as I, or anyone else, begins working these sources in a constructivist paradigm, they are no 
longer “raw” in an objectivist sense, but immediately orchestrated by the inquirer, according 
to their interpretations and the emergent findings of the research. 
2.4.3. Tone of Voice 
The tone of this thesis is also a result of its constructivist basis. ‘The inquirer’s voice’, as 
explained by Guba and Lincoln, ‘is that of the "passionate participant" actively engaged in 
facilitating the "multi voice" reconstruction of his […] own construction as well as those of 
all other participants’ (1994, p.115). This is a theme colourfully explored in Lars 
Spuyborek’s introduction to The Sympathy of Things. In his aim of revitalising John 
Ruskin’s Gothic ontology, Spuybroek aims to project Ruskin forwarded through time, so 
that he meets other ‘participants’ with whom he might share ‘theoretical affinities’ (2011, 
p.7). Using the metaphor of space travel, wherein probes circle planets, using gravitational 
fields to accelerate, Spuybroek lets Ruskin ‘encounter William James, revolve around him, 
and absorb some of his thought, but not enough to slow him down; sweep around Henri 
Bergson, acquiring more speed; and again around a few Germans (Theodor Lipps, Vilhelm 
Worringer and even Martin Heidegger); eject him over the twentieth century […], with its 
world wars, its minimalism and its deconstructivism; and stop him so that he appears 
suddenly in our own age, like Doctor Who, meeting the likes of Bruno Latour and Peter 
Sloterdijk’ (2011, p.8). I have at times conceived of my research (in much more mundane 
terms) as an opportunity to gather guests for a fictional dinner party, with my text being an 
imagined version of their conversations. This has informed the character of my writing, 
which can be usefully contrasted with that of an alternative paradigm—critical theory. As 
described by Guba and Lincoln, an important difference between constructivism and the 
similar paradigm of critical theory, is the tone of voice adopted by the investigator: where a 
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critical theorist would adopt the more authoritative position of a ‘transformative 
intellectual’, as is necessitated by their advocacy of lesser-heard voices (1994, p.113), the 
constructivist is a facilitator of dialog between alternative positions. The final aim is ‘to 
distill a consensus construction that is more informed and sophisticated than any of the 
predecessor constructions (including, of course, the etic construction of the investigator)’ 
(ibid., p.111). I have thus attempted to keep my dinner party guests in convivial spirits, and 
used their ideas to form a ‘dialectical interchange’ (ibid., p.111). My interdisciplinary use of 
literature here proves highly valuable—as Guba and Lincoln describe, knowledge is most 
likely to advance in this way ‘when relatively different constructions are brought into 
juxtaposition.’ (ibid., p.113) 
2.4.4. Evaluating Constructivist Research 
The last point to make regarding my adoption of the constructivist paradigm is on the notion 
of quality. If we are to acknowledge the coexistence of ‘multiple knowledges’, each one 
subject to continuous revision (ibid., p.113), how can we be assured of the ‘goodness’ of an 
inquiry (ibid., p.114)? According to my constructivist commitment, I suppose the job of 
determining the goodness of this inquiry is one for others, as they place it in the context of 
similar constructions. I would suggest, however, that a reader could use the following 
questions (as I have throughout the study) to help guide their determination of quality. These 
are a selection of the criteria suggested for the evaluation of constructivist research by Guba 
and Lincoln (see also, Guba 1981, for those relating to trustworthiness). 
Criteria of Trustworthiness 
On the criterion of credibility: Are my arguments internally valid—do they make sense? 
Have I demonstrated that my constructions are built out of other credible constructions in a 
rigorous manner? Have I been engaged in the subject for a sufficient amount of time? Is the 
argument of this thesis coherent? Is my account of the study’s chronology consistent with its 
findings? Have I successfully triangulated concepts from multiple sources? Have I tested the 
ideas via peer review? 
On the criterion of transferability: Are my arguments externally valid—are they good 
enough to be of use to others? Are the ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973) I provide in my 
synthesis of arguments from other literature, and in the documentation of designing and 
making techniques, suitable for application elsewhere?  
On the criterion of confirmability: Is my data reliable? Are the literary sources I cite 
trustworthy? Are my descriptions of designing and making techniques competent enough to 
  24 
support the analyses I have made? Do my two research methods suitably overlap in pursuit 
of my objectives? Have I made clear the relationship between my theoretical foundation and 
my findings? 
Criteria of Authenticity 
On the criterion of educative authenticity: Does my work lead to an improved understanding 
of the constructions of others? Would the findings be helpful to a design researcher and/or 
design practitioner? Does this thesis help to understand it’s subject from a new perspective? 
On the criterion of catalytic authenticity: Could my work serve to stimulate further research? 
Does it point towards further constructions? If I have promoted a new perspective from 
which to understand my subject, is it a valuable one which might be applied elsewhere? 
2.5. A T-shaped Chronology  
Although I remain unconvinced that design professionals are especially T-shaped (over and 
above people in other jobs)7, I nonetheless find Tim Brown’s “T” (2009) (see 2.3.4) to be a 
useful metaphor. I now use the “T” to illustrate the development of my two research 
methods and the chronology of my research. In addition, I describe the objectives and 
research questions driving the research at various times, to summarise their development. 
The first of my methods (the synthesis of interdisciplinary literature introduced above), can 
be understood as a method of extension along the horizontal of the “T”—an extension out 
into previously unexamined (both by myself, and design literature more generally8), but 
complementary fields. This extension has helped to lay a credible theoretical foundation for 
the second research method—a first-hand exploration of the epistemic character of 
techniques, which has extended down into vertical of the “T”. This “vertical” method, 
described in detail in the next section (2.6), aims to contribute to knowledge within the field 
of design theory, by offering a novel means of understanding the influence of techniques on 
design practice. Whilst the study has been primarily motivated by this second objective, in 
retrospect I believe the synthesis of literature developed in support of this task can itself can 
be considered a valuable contribution. As I have suggested elsewhere (Luscombe 2018), 
models of distributed cognition provide a foundation from which other studies could 
interrogate the influence of techniques on design and making practice. I believe the 
                                                      
 
7 See McCullagh (2010) for a discussion of this subject. 
8 I discuss exceptions to this tendency in 3.2.1. 
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methodological approach supported by this wider “T” could, therefore, be applied more 
generally. 
In addition to clarifying the relationship between my two methods and their respective 
contributions, I also find a repurposing of the metaphorical T-shape to be useful when 
plotting the PhD research against my own education as a researcher. This is perhaps best 
explained by returning to the issue at the start of this chapter—the chronology of the 
development of my research methods and my evolving understanding of the study. In 
Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, I use the T-shape to illustrate this chronology.  
2.5.1. Part One 
Imagine I began as illustrated in Figure 2.2. At this stage, I had first-hand knowledge of the 
practice of designing and making, and was acquainted with disciplinary-specific theory, 
such as that of David Pye’s. Both my knowledge and my understanding of my research, 
however, were roughly ‘I’ shaped. I knew that I wanted to contribute to the base of this 
“I”—from my practice as a designer (and from teaching the subject) I knew that there was 
something more to be said about the influence of techniques on the process of working 
things out—but I didn’t know what form such a contribution could take. This is the 
frustrating position I described in the opening paragraphs of this chapter. I could not see a 
way beyond the idea of tools and techniques as a means to an end, with the only negligible 
influence they have on the result being the relative risk or certainty (see 4.1) with which they 
can realise a pre-existing intent. Worse still, whilst it’s easy to describe this stumbling block 
in retrospect, at the time it was far from obvious what my problem was. 
Figure 2. 2 T-shape no.1 
 
In each of these illustrations, the dark regions represent the body of knowledge I was most 
familiar with, and the lighter regions represent areas that I was aware of, but not yet well-
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versed in. As shown in Figure 2.2, at this early stage of the PhD, there was only a small field 
of literature I knew to explore. This field consisted of scholarly descriptions of designing 
and making, mostly from the fields of design studies, art history and craft theory (e.g. Cross 
2007; Adamson 2007; Frayling 2012; Knott 2011; Smith 2010). But these were writers 
nearly always discussing things that had already been produced. Or, if they were discussing 
the design of things, it was almost always a materially disengaged exercise, performed 
through protocol studies (see, for examples, Purcell and Gero, 1998), or interviews. Each 
text seemed in a hurry to move away from the details of how a thing is designed and made. 
In the case of the more art history orientated texts I was reading, this was a movement away 
from the production of things, towards what they tells us, as a finished objects. In retrospect, 
I can ascribe this to what anthropologist Tim Ingold describes as a retrospective ‘fixation 
with objects and images’, over and above an ‘appreciation of the material flows and currents 
of sensory awareness within which both ideas and things reciprocally take shape’ (2011, 
p.10). But, again, at the time, and without the broader understanding I’ve since developed, it 
seemed like Pye had said all there was to be said about the relationship between designing 
and making. No matter how much of this literature I read then, the base of that “I” remained 
impermeable to me—there seemed no opportunity for its extension via a new contribution to 
this area (as seen in Figure 2.2, wherein there is no lighter region at the base of the “T”). I 
was unaware of “what else” could be known about the subject. 
Main objective:  
To develop an approach to my subject that can lead to a meaningful contribution to 
knowledge.     
Key research questions:  
What influence, if any, do techniques of making have upon the process of design? 
What theoretical approaches can help to understand the relationship of doing and thinking? 
What other fields have looked into this subject? 
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2.5.2. Part Two 
Figure 2. 3 T-shape no.2 
 
Despite (or perhaps because of) his uncritical appropriation of Pye’s ideas (see 2.1), it was 
reading Tim Ingold’s work that began my exploration out into horizontal of the “T”. Having 
been made aware of the book by my supervisor, and in no small part encouraged by its main 
title, I managed to negotiate a free review copy of Ingold’s Making: Anthropology, 
Archaeology, Art and Architecture (2013a). The collection of essays it contains proved 
pivotal in the development of my PhD, and my own development as a researcher. In Figure 
2.3, I illustrate this impact, showing how Ingold’s book dramatically expanded the scope of 
my reading. As suggested by Making’s subtitle, it is (in common with all Ingold’s work) a 
book that both borrows from, and contributes to, a wide range of disciplines. Whilst it took 
me time to familiarize myself with Ingold’s arguments (notice the dark region of Figure 2.3 
has expanded only a little at this stage), it was this interdisciplinarity, and the idea that there 
was more to be said about the relationship between designing and making than I had 
previously recognized, that opened up new areas of exploration. I traced Ingold’s citations 
back to their sources, and I sought out the work of his admirers and critics. In contrast to the 
relative paucity of insight I’d found in my previously narrow reading interests, here I began 
to discover ideas that helped me see design and making practices in a new light. Perhaps 
most importantly, this new body of literature began to suggest a possible methodology that 
would enable me to interrogate the influence of techniques on design practice (as illustrated 
by the lighter region that has emerged at the base of Figure 2.3).  
Main objective:  
To learn more about theories of distributed cognition/extended mind, in an effort to see how 
they might be applied to the study of designing and making. 
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Key research questions: 
Could a “non-hylomorphic” (see 3.3.1) perspective on designing and making offer an insight 
into how techniques influence design processes? 
How do David Pye’s declarations about the relationship of design and workmanship (see 
4.1.8) stand up to Ingold’s work? 
How do theories of extended mind correlate to my experience of designing and making 
practice? 
2.5.3. Part Three 
Figure 2. 4 T-shape no.3 
 
Eventually, this reading and thinking led me to the situation illustrated by Figure 2.4. 
Having explored a never-ending web of citations and become more familiar with this 
broader spectrum of literature, I had found a theoretical foundation well-suited to my study. 
In work like Charles Keller and Janet Keller’s Cognition and Tool use: The Blacksmith at 
Work (1996), I saw examples not only of how to go about the first-hand study of tools and 
techniques, but also how the specific details of practical activity can inform, substantiate and 
illuminate more general ambitions. Cognition and Tool Use draws on Charles Keller’s 
experience as a blacksmith to contribute to the authors’ main field of interest—the 
anthropology of knowledge. It is grounded in the methods of situated action (see Suchman 
1987), wherein research is conducted in real-world contexts and action itself, rather than an 
abstracted theory of plans guiding that action, is taken to be the primary focus. One of Keller 
and Keller’s key themes throughout their book is an attempt to understand the two-way 
relationships between a practitioner and their environment. By emphasizing the primacy of 
action, instead of planning and the role of intramental cognition, Keller and Keller are able 
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to analyse how knowledge (their subject of interest) is distributed across a blacksmith and 
their workshop space, in the tools, techniques and materials they use. Whilst their main goal, 
to develop an ‘anthropology of knowledge’ (1996, p.159), is far removed from my own 
ambitions, Keller and Keller nonetheless provide an inspirational example of how 
concurrent thinking and making practices might be studied. 
Main objective:  
To explore how making techniques I’m familiar with can be understood not just as a means 
to an end, but as a way of working things out. 
Key research question: 
If we take seriously the argument that cognition is distributed across both people and things, 
what are the ways in which particular techniques structure and support decision making? 
2.5.4. Part Four 
Figure 2. 5 T-shape no.4 
 
The transition between Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 can be described as a movement from a 
predominantly extra-disciplinary, literature-based approach, towards applying what I’d 
learned to my subject of interest. During this time, I began to document and analyse my 
first-hand experience with the techniques of designing and making. Informed by my newly 
discovered theoretical foundation, my aim was to study these techniques as ways of 
thinking. I was inspired by the idea of things being components of minds, and sought to 
understand what this might mean for design practice in the context of workshop practice. It 
was during this stage that I developed the idea of epistemic character (see 2.6.14 and 
Chapter 5)—a phrase I introduced to help understand what exactly I was trying to 
understand about tools and techniques. Although at first I had only the fuzziest idea of what 
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I meant by the phrase, naming my subject of interest helped to focus my documentation and 
analysis of practice. This is an aspect of what I was doing that a vague ascription to 
“reflective practice” would miss. I wasn’t reflecting on every characteristic of, for example, 
using a ruler (5.1), carving a spoon (5.2), or making a paper aeroplane (5.3). I was 
specifically interested in how these techniques structure the process of working things out. 
Even though I had invented the phrase, I was at this stage interested in what “epistemic 
character” might mean. 
Throughout this phase of the research, I was still reading as much as possible around my 
subject. My notebooks from the time are a combination of quotes, page references, drawings 
of tools, diagrams of “step-character” (5.2) and early attempts at writing studies like those 
found in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. That the later chapters of this thesis jump between the details 
of practice, and how these relate to broader theoretical points is likely a consequence of this 
approach.  
It was also during this phase that I presented some of the ideas at conferences, introduced 
them to my teaching practice, and wrote a journal article (Luscombe 2018). The imperative 
to clarify my ideas for these purposes, and the modifications I have been able to make in 
response to their reception, have been very valuable.  
Main objective:  
To develop a rich account of how techniques might structure, support or potential 
compromise design processes, which draws upon the ideas of others and my practical 
studies.  
Key research question: 
What do I mean by epistemic character? 
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2.5.5. Part Five 
Figure 2. 6 T-shape no.5 
 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the stage I am at now, as I complete this thesis. The development from 
Figure 2.5 to this present situation is a consequence of trying to assemble my ideas into a 
coherent document. Through this process, previously vague ideas have become firmer, and I 
have happened upon new relationships between my work and that of others. I have realised 
that (in symmetry with this thesis’ position on the making of designs), “ideas” do not really 
exist in advance of their realisation in words.  
Creating this document has improved my awareness of the value of writing as a 
“construction”, and how ideas may be woven together. I have also become increasingly 
aware of the potential for academic writing not to simply tell its audience something 
specific, but also to open up a line of enquiry that might be followed towards an insight. The 
most engaging, and useful, pieces of literature I’ve read have had this character. And I have 
tried to write this thesis with a similar aspiration. 
In Figure 2.6, there remain light grey areas, which I would enjoy the opportunity to study 
further. One of the most important outcomes of my PhD, for me as a researcher, has been the 
expansion of my interests across the horizontal of the “T”. By venturing out into unfamiliar 
disciplines, and then returning to my core subject and topic of interest, I have found a 
seemingly limitless source of inspiration. I hope that continued efforts in the same vein 
could help to further develop my contribution at the bottom of the “T”. 
Main objective:  
To pull the research together into a coherent and valuable thesis. 
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Key research question: 
How can the findings of this research be presented in a way that is academically rigorous 
and engaging to both design practitioners and researchers? 
2.6. Research Method 2: An Exercise in Technology  
Having introduced the first of my two research methods (a synthesis of interdisciplinary 
literature), and outlined its purpose (to lay a credible theoretical foundation for the study of 
techniques and help to inspire the analysis of those techniques), I will now describe the 
second of my methods. I call this an exercise in technology. This is to follow a lesser-known 
definition of the word (see 2.6.3), which takes it to be the comparative study of techniques. 
My studies of technique are first-hand, or what might be called practice-based, or an 
apprenticeship method (see Keller and Keller 1996; Marchand 2010a, 2010b). Put simply, I 
used techniques in my practice as a designer and teacher and reflected on the process. My 
means of reflection was to write and draw in notebooks. Owing to my concurrent literature-
based approach, these notebooks are also littered with quotes, page references, and attempts 
at linking my experience of practice with the literature I was reading (see example pages in 
Appendix). This is why, as described in 1.3, I consider the writing “between” my two 
methods to have been crucial in forming the ideas and contributions themselves.  
In this section, I will outline the ideas that guided my first-hand method. First, however, I 
describe the relationship between my literature review and practice-based methods, and 
highlight the theoretical foundation that underlies my study of techniques. 
2.6.1. Overlap Methods 
I believe the relationship between my two methods to be crucial. They ‘overlap’ (Guba 
1981, p.86) in order to compensate for their potential failings, if they were to be followed in 
isolation. A purely first-hand study of techniques, conducted with no reference to existing 
literature might be hopelessly unguided, lacking the inspiration that comes from external 
influence. And an entirely literature-based approach (especially an interdisciplinary one) to 
this subject would risk becoming irrelevant, through a disengagement with practice, or 
techniques themselves. With the exception of Chapter 3, I have attempted to make clear this 
indissoluble relationship between my methods, by writing the thesis as an ongoing 
“conversation” between “theory” and “technique”.   
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2.6.2. Theoretical Foundation for Studying Technique 
The theoretical foundation developed for the research (described throughout Chapters 4, 5 
and 6) has informed the following key features of my first-hand studies:  
• It proposes that tools should be studied as part of active systems. Rather than 
studying tools in isolation, it emphasizes their role as part of systems that 
include practitioners, the materials being worked, and the other tools being used. 
This suggests a focus on technique, a subject I discuss below (2.6.3). 
• It proposes that cognition is spread between the various parts of these systems. I 
introduce this idea in the following chapter (3.2). 
• It acknowledges the potential for action to influence decision making. Below, I 
discuss how this commitment has led to my development of the concept of 
‘epistemic character’ and how this has directed my analyses of techniques. In 
Chapters 3 and 4, I make clear my stance on the relationship of action and 
decision making. 
2.6.3. Techniques as Systems  
The word technology is typically used in the Anglophone world to refer to those objects and 
techniques that apply sophisticated, relatively novel scientific knowledge. As computer 
scientist Alan Kay pithily suggests, ‘what people mean by the word technology, is anything 
invented since they were born’ (quoted in Brand 1999, p.16)9. In French scholarship, 
however, technologie is a field of academic enquiry—it is the comparative study of 
techniques (Sigaut 1994; Audouze 2002; Salomon 1984). François Sigaut, who made the 
study of techniques a central part of his work as an historian and anthropologist, writes that 
‘[t]echnology is to technics what linguistics is to language, biology to living beings, 
psychology to mental activity, epistemology to knowledge etc.’ (1985, p.122)10. Just as 
biology studies living organisms, technology in this sense of the word is the science of 
techniques: ‘its definite aim is to acquire knowledge on technics (i.e. on the technical 
activity of men), not to use or develop technics, at least not primarily’ (ibid.). My studies of 
techniques can, under this definition, be considered an exercise in technology—an attempt to 
acquire knowledge on techniques. In several essays promoting his field, Sigaut offers 
                                                      
 
9 As my guide on this subject, François Sigaut would have it though, ‘attempting to 
separate [techniques] on the basis of scientific content is useless’ (1985, p.118). 
10 Note that Sigaut here uses technics as a synonym of techniques. Whilst I reproduce 
this in the quote here, I use techniques throughout the thesis. 
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valuable advice its potentials and pitfalls. Of particular interest here is his discussion of the 
role of tools as parts of systems. 
Sigaut himself was interested in understanding historic agriculture through the investigation 
of tools and techniques (see, for example, 1996) and was an enthusiastic advocate for this 
method of studying cultures through their technical practices. For Sigaut, a technologist 
should be interested in developing a thorough knowledge of the techniques themselves, 
before any attempts towards creating explanatory models. In criticism of simplistic 
agricultural histories, which failed to recognise the subtlety and variety of cultures across the 
world, Sigaut warns against using ‘technology before being acquainted well enough with it’ 
(ibid., p.427). In short, Sigaut considers many scholars, unsatisfied by technological studies 
that ‘look so little rewarding by themselves’, to be ‘tempted to “use” them in support of 
supposedly more interesting aims as soon as they believe it possible’ (ibid.). One of Sigaut’s 
suggested methods for guarding against this over-eager appropriation is to ensure that ‘you 
have gathered all that it is possible to know about a technique before using it for any 
“theoretical” purpose’ (ibid.).  
A common flaw in simplistic technology studies is, according to Sigaut, a misguided focus 
on tools themselves, over and above the activities of production (ibid.). Instead, Sigaut 
proposes that we should attempt to unite the study of artefacts with their use. An important 
strategy in this effort is to avoid assigning tools a fixed purpose, but to understand them as 
part of an activity. In a demonstration of this approach, Sigaut takes the example of a knife 
and claims that it should be considered not as something for cutting, but as something used 
by cutting (1994, p.430)11. For Sigaut’s historical investigations, this reduces the risk of 
imposing contemporary ideas about the function of particular tools onto apparently 
analogous ones of the past. A collection of drawings of many different knives, each from a 
different time and place, illustrates this argument (ibid., p.431-2). Despite all having been 
categorized as ‘knives’, both the form and potential uses of these objects vary markedly. If 
we understand tools as used by their associated techniques, rather than for a specific 
operation, Sigaut argues that we may avoid inflecting analyses with misplaced 
preconceptions. 
Unlike Sigaut, my concern is not with the interpretation of historical practice. His emphasis 
on techniques, however, still offers a useful insight into how to study tool use, particularly 
when considering the issue of teleology, or what tools are for (see 4.3.7). Sigaut’s 
                                                      
 
11 A rudimentary translation assures me that Sigaut expands elsewhere on this idea, in 
French (1991). 
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determination to always describe tools in the context of their use is an effort to avoid 
simplistic accounts of function. For Sigaut, the problem with describing a knife as for 
cutting is that it discourages a sufficiently detailed investigation of the nature of ‘cutting’, 
and precludes the consideration of other operations a knife might be used for (stabbing, 
prying, splitting etc.). To instead describe the knife as used by cutting is an attempt to shift 
the emphasis towards the specifics of a technique, and to encourage studying the tool in that 
context. This critical approach to function has helped me to see beyond a purely pragmatic 
understanding of tools as a means to an end. I describe this position in detail in Chapter 4, 
but to summarise, it is through studying techniques in detail that I suggest we can become 
aware of the dual-purpose nature of tools, both as for doing things to the world, and for 
finding out how those things are going. Throughout Chapter 4, I draw on the example of 
hammering in a pin to develop the argument that, even in the simplest of operations, tools 
are both instruments for doing and for sensing feedback on our progress. This idea grounds 
the subsequent studies of epistemic character (the ways techniques structure the process of 
working things out). 
Studies of ‘technique’ have thus become central to this thesis. Techniques involve a 
temporary coming together of tools, materials and practitioners: they involve movement and 
change that cannot be understood by studying tools in isolation, or just the eventual results 
of a process. Whilst I also discuss tools and materials throughout this thesis then, it is only 
within the contexts of their use—techniques—that they come to life as the subjects of study. 
This is a point well-illustrated by anthropologist Gregory Bateson when discussing the 
action of cutting down a tree. Bateson’s ecological approach necessitates we pay attention to 
the indivisible system of ‘trees-eyes-brain-muscles-axe-stroke-tree’ (1973, p.318) when 
studying the process. Techniques can be understood as the link in such systems, between a 
practitioner, their tools and the materials they are working (see also Malafouris 2013).  
2.6.4. The Difficulties of Technology 
A recurring theme in Sigaut’s work is his disappointment with regards the popularity of 
technology. Helpfully, he offers us an insight into why this might be the case, which, I 
believe, can illuminate a similar issue in studies of design. 
Relative to other approaches in archaeology, anthropology and history, Sigaut considers the 
advancement of technology to have stagnated. As an advocate of the field, Sigaut argues that 
the situation requires a shift similar to that in botany or chemistry, which ‘could only 
develop after it had been first decided that plants or substances should be studied for what 
they were, rather than what they were useful to’ (1985, p.123). Where before plants and 
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chemicals has been manipulated to achieve material ends, the sciences that grew out of these 
activities developed by assuming their study to be valuable for its own sake12. Sigaut’s 
version of technology, wherein techniques become the object of study, requires a similar 
development.  
Speculating on the reasons for the stagnation of technology, Sigaut suggests that it is due to 
a ‘lack of people at once academically and technically trained’ (ibid., p.124). Here Sigaut 
draws on the history of linguistics to illuminate the problem—observing that academics 
‘well acquainted with belle lettres might [have been] more or less reluctant to adopt the new 
point of view of linguistics, but at least they did not lack the minimum of basic skills and 
knowledge necessary to make their choice’ (ibid.). Language was something all academics 
were familiar with, allowing them to understand, at least in principle, the value of studying 
it. ‘On the other hand,’ Sigaut continues, ‘academics did completely lack this minimum of 
basic skills as far as technics was concerned’ (ibid.). Without any knowledge of technical 
operations, Sigaut claims that scholars have repeatedly failed to acknowledge the potential 
value of technological investigations.  
Despite some reservations regarding this claim (observations like Sigaut’s appear to me a 
little too general), the effort to unite technical and academic knowledge is nonetheless an 
ambition I have shared throughout this research. And the theme of disconnection between 
academic thought and technical practice is one that I touch on in Chapter 3. Rather than 
make claims about the knowledge held by academic groups, however, I follow Knappett’s 
and Ingold’s approach to this issue, in sketching out the dualisms that pervade much 
thinking about material culture (see 3.2 and 3.3). The separation of mind and matter 
described by Knappett, for example, can be seen to relegate technical practice to the mere 
transcription of an antecedent idea. Under this model, the role of planning is promoted over 
and above material engagement and improvisation (see Ingold and Hallam 2007). And the 
influence of techniques upon the outcomes of practice is understood to be negligible. 
Unsatisfied by these internalist models, which, as I discuss (3.1), appear to dominate studies 
of designing and making, I have sought to follow Sigaut’s lead and take techniques to be a 
subject of study. The underlying philosophy I have synthesised from other academic 
disciplines has enabled me to see beyond the assumptions typical of internalist approaches, 
                                                      
 
12 In the field of design studies, I suggest there has been a similarly pragmatic 
understanding of techniques (see Chapter 4), as means to an end, rather than a potential 
subject of inquiry. 
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and develop an approach to the subject of how techniques influence design practice from a 
novel, rigorous and, as I hope to show, valuable perspective. 
Whilst, as I hope to have explained, I find Sigaut’s discussion of technology a helpful 
inspiration, it should be noted that I do not anticipate a widespread redefinition of the term. I 
draw on the more obscure French usage here not out of an affection for things obscure and 
French, but because of its relevance to the research I am concerned with, and because of the 
methodological guidance Sigaut offers. As I have suggested elsewhere (Luscombe 2018), 
and hope to demonstrate throughout this thesis, I believe that a more widespread pursuit of 
“design technology” would be a worthwhile enterprise. It could help to sensitise 
practitioners to the ways in which their techniques structure, support, or potentially 
compromise their design processes. 
In accord with Sigaut’s advice to ‘gather all that it is possible to know about a technique 
before using it for any such “theoretical” purpose’ (1996, p.427), I have spent this study 
actually using the techniques I have studied. This has been my primary means to investigate 
what I mean by epistemic character, and how the epistemic character of particular 
techniques can be defined. This method has also been supplemented, however, by another 
valuable source of literature. Before explaining the methods of my first-hand studies, I’ll 
briefly introduce this literature, and describe how it has been crucial in informing my 
understanding of technical competency.  
2.6.5. The Technology of Practical Guidebooks  
Throughout this research, whilst trying to engage in the kind of technology promoted by 
Sigaut, I have also drawn from a complementary body of work on techniques. I have studied 
sources that provide practical advice about how best to perform techniques. I include in this 
category of source material: instructional documentation provided with hardware and 
software; online forums for the discussion of practice; and books, periodicals and websites 
published to assist in the use tools and their associated techniques. Each of these sources has 
proved valuable throughout this PhD, by validating my use of techniques as competent, 
helping me to become familiar with new techniques, and helping me to contextualise when 
and why a technique might be used. 
I have thus researched the techniques I describe throughout this thesis by both employing 
them myself, and studying the theory of their use. Both strategies have helped to deepen my 
knowledge of making practice. Sometimes the literature has affirmed that which I knew 
already, and sometimes it has opened my eyes to alternative approaches.  
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This kind of information about productive techniques has been published for centuries. 
Historic examples include Joseph Moxton’s Mechanick Exercises: or the Doctrine of 
Handyworks (1703), André-Jacques Roubo, L'Art du Menuisier Paris, (1769) (see also the 
translation by Williams et al, 2017), and Bertrand’s Descriptions des Arts et Métiers (1783). 
These authors wrote on the subject of technical activity not as an academic pursuit, but in 
the service of other “technicians”, to provide instruction and advice. 
To this day, a wealth of resources is published in the service of practitioners aiming to 
improve their understanding and application of making techniques (e.g. Hayward 2016; 
Sellers 2016; Watson 1982) (see, for a history, Knott 2015). Most often written or presented 
(in the case of instructional videos) by people who have acquired knowledge on techniques 
through their own practice, such work is intended to advise those looking to improve their 
skills.  
Although, as Tim Ingold observes, there might be a popular mythology surrounding the 
‘tacit knowledge’ of ‘the silent craftsman who is struck dumb when asked to tell of what he 
does, or how he does it’, in their interactions with anthropologists, real-life skilled 
practitioners are ‘often inclined to expound upon their crafts vociferously, demonstrably and 
at very great length’ (2013a, p.109). In my experience, such expounding is also easily found 
in print. 
2.6.6. Techniques Studied 
The techniques studied during this research are (in the order they appear throughout this 
thesis): 
• Hammering a panel pin (see Chapter 4 and 6.2) 
• Using dividers (see 5.1) 
• Using a ruler (see 5.1) 
• Carving a spoon using a saw, an axe and knives (see 5.2) 
• Designing and making paper aeroplanes (see 5.3) 
• Using a panel saw (see 6.3) 
• Using a radial arm crosscut saw (see 6.3) 
• Using a nail gun (see 6.3.3) 
• Using a metal file (see 6.4.1) 
• Using a belt linisher (see 6.4.1) 
• Using a bench plane (see 6.4.2) 
• Using a (timber) thicknesser (see 6.4.2) 
• A series of techniques for prototyping staked furniture (see 6.5) 
• Using a spokeshave (see 6.6) 
• Using a coping saw (see 6.6) 
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This collection of techniques has served a dual purpose. Firstly, their study has helped me to 
think through the idea of epistemic character, and how it may be understood and applied. 
The three aspects of epistemic character I discuss in Chapter 5 were developed and tested 
with respect to these techniques. Second, the range of techniques provides me with a way to 
illustrate the contributions of this thesis, and show how investigations of epistemic character 
can be performed more generally. 
The selection criteria for the techniques were as follows: 
Accessibility 
Each technique had to be accessible enough for me to use, and re-use, as often as I felt 
necessary. This reduced the pressure on my recording methods (see 2.6.7), and enabled me 
to revisit a particular technique if, in light my developing understanding of epistemic 
character, I wanted to reflect on another aspect of its nature. Inevitably, this criterion 
reduced the variety of techniques I was able to study (see 2.6.6). 
Brevity 
To further enable me to revisit techniques, each one had to be a brief operation. A sawing or 
hammering task, for example, can be completed in seconds. This brevity also suited the 
micro-level perspective (see 2.6.12) I adopted towards the techniques. 
Competency 
So that I could write about each technique from a knowledgeable perspective, I was sure to 
select only those for which I had a pre-existing competency and confidence that I was using 
a widely-acknowledged approach (2.6.8). Choosing techniques that I had no experience of 
would have left me struggling to become proficient, instead of reflecting on the ways they 
might structure design processes. As I discuss in Chapter 7 (see 7.2.2), studying the 
epistemic character of unfamiliar techniques would perhaps be best achieved through 
collaboration with a knowledgeable practitioner in the relevant field. 
Range 
For the purposes of illustrating the contributions of this thesis, I sought to work with a range 
of techniques across different material disciplines. These range from the techniques of 
design drawing (the rulers and dividers of 5.1), to woodworking and metalworking 
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techniques. I believe this strategy helps to demonstrate how the ideas are applicable across 
different fields of practice. 
Comparative Value 
A recurring feature of most studies in this thesis is the comparison of two similar techniques, 
in order to identify the differences in their epistemic character. I have found this to be a 
useful means of both determining what contributes to epistemic character, and also 
describing it to others. The first of these comparisons, for example, considers the difference 
between using rulers and dividers as instruments for design. Considering whether a 
particular technique has a useful ‘counter-technique’, was thus an important criterion for 
selection. It should be noted, however, that whilst this approach was valuable in developing 
the contributions of this thesis, having two comparative techniques would not be a 
requirement of subsequent studies of epistemic character. 
2.6.7. Recording Methods 
The primary means of recording the details and insights from my first-hand studies was 
reflective note-taking (see Appendix for scans of notebooks). This was done either during, 
or shortly after the event. Owing to the accessibility and brevity (see 2.6.6) of the techniques 
studied, the demands on “capturing” the details of practice were reduced—I always had the 
opportunity to revisit the techniques, in order to refine my thinking about their specific 
character, and the notion of epistemic character more generally. This can be considered an 
instance of what Guba calls ‘persistent observation’, where ‘[e]xtended interaction with a 
situation or a milieu leads inquirers to an understanding of what is essential or characteristic 
of it’ (1981, p.85). As I discuss in Chapter 7 (see 7.2.3), if future studies were to investigate 
less accessible and more prolonged techniques or operational chains, the demands on 
recording methods would likely be increased. For the purposes of the studies document here, 
however, note-taking provided a comprehensive and unobtrusive means of reflecting on 
practice. 
Whilst not part of a preconceived methodological strategy, the fact that I made these notes in 
the same books in which I was simultaneously taking notes from other literature, attempting 
to develop my ideas about epistemic character, and write drafts of this thesis, has doubtless 
affected the content and presentation of the research (see Appendix for scans of the 
notebooks). It is for this reason that I consider writing as the bridge between my two 
methods of inquiry (see 1.3 and 2.3). The series of notebooks produced during this research 
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are largely filled with attempts at pulling together insights from technical practice and those 
from literature.  
The line drawings of techniques-in-use have been created by tracing photographs using 
Adobe Illustrator. Once the content of each chapter had been developed, I determined what 
images would helpfully illustrate the text, and took the necessary photographs. This 
approach was inspired by instructional books of craft practice (e.g. Galbert 2015; Watson 
1982; Sundqvist 1990), which use text and images to communicate complex guidance about 
tools, techniques and materials. 
These post-hoc illustrations were only made possible by the accessibility and brevity (see 
2.6.6) of the techniques studied—this strategy would have to be revised if future work aims 
to study more complex operations that could not easily be repeated. It should also be noted 
that the original photos (a selection of which are presented in the Appendix) were not 
something that I used for any analytical purpose—though again, the use of photography or 
video might be a valuable documentary method when dealing with greater complexity (see 
7.2.3). 
2.6.8. Competent Tool Use  
I have been eager, throughout this research, to ensure that I have practiced and described 
techniques in accord with well-recognised approaches. In a discussion of hammering a pin in 
Chapter 4, for example, I describe how one end of the head of a specific kind of hammer—
the Warrington pattern—is typically used to first set the pin, before the other end of the 
hammerhead is used to drive the pin home. In this, and all the other descriptions of tool use, 
I have sought to analyse widely acknowledged techniques. Although I appreciate both 
experienced and novice practitioners may have idiosyncratic habits when using certain tools 
and techniques, my studies are grounded in what I have established to be ordinary, 
competent practice13. The sources of technical guidance introduced above (2.6.5) have been 
key in validating this approach, and I cite them alongside my descriptions of practice. This 
particular approach to hammering, for example, is described in Aldren Watson’s popular 
book Hand Tools: Their Ways and Workings (1985).  
                                                      
 
13 I see no reason, however, for idiosyncratic techniques to be precluded from the kinds 
of analyses I present in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, but for this thesis, I have aimed to stick to 
straightforward techniques. 
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2.6.9. Expertise 
None of the procedures I describe throughout this thesis are particularly complicated in 
theory or practice. Hammering in a pin (4.1), using a pair of dividers (5.1), or carving a 
wooden spoon (5.2) (to use three of my examples) are all tasks that, with instruction and a 
little practice, could be successfully completed by a novice. Whilst I acknowledge that there 
are differences in the efficiency and outcomes of novices compared to those who are highly 
skilled, the features of technique I am interested in remain the same. Even though, as 
philosopher Hubert Dreyfus describes, the once explicit procedures of a process might 
eventually be performed intuitively by a well-practiced expert (2002), the same identifiable 
characteristics of a technique remain14. Both ends of the Warrington hammer, to continue the 
example, will still be used. And all practitioners, however skilled, will have to take multiple 
strikes to hammer in the pin. As Ingold’s statement about craftspeople being very able to 
talk about their work illustrates, these characteristics can be identified within periods of 
practice, either through self-reflection, or third-party observation. Indeed, the very existence 
of instructional literature, in which techniques are explicated clearly and systematically, 
demonstrates that there is much that can be described, shared and analysed. This is a record 
of what sociologist Harry Collins’ calls ‘interactional expertise’, a kind of knowing that sits 
between formal knowledge (as in rules, formulae and facts) and informal, or tacit knowledge 
(2004). Collins introduces this third kind of knowledge to make the point that ‘it is possible 
to learn to say everything that can be said about bicycle-riding, car-driving or the use of a 
stick by a blind man, without ever having ridden a bike, driven a car, or been blind and used 
a stick’ (2004, p.127). Although I have actually used the techniques discussed throughout 
the thesis then, I make this point to be clear that my analyses do not depend only on the 
specifics of an idiosyncratic approach—they correspond to an existing body of 
“interactional” knowledge.  
2.6.10. Techniques Embedded in a Context 
In addition to validating my studies of technique, sources of technical advice have also 
allowed me to contextualise, if necessary, when and why a certain process might be used. 
Whilst most of the studies of technique I present throughout this thesis are removed from 
longer sequences of production (the hammered pin is not joining anything in particular, for 
                                                      
 
14 On this idea, cognitive scientist John Sutton is wary of subscribing totally to the idea 
of unconscious, non-rule governed expertise, wherein the maxims associated with 
developing skills are discarded. In a study of professional cricketers, he shows that maxims 
continue to act as ‘instructional nudges’ (2007, p.773-4) 
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example), it has at times been useful to describe why a practitioner might choose one 
technique over another, or to at least acknowledge that the process I describe is one of 
several possible approaches. This is an idea promoted by Siguat’s version of technology—
just as the focus on techniques shifts attention away from isolated artefacts, and towards 
systems of use, it also encourages the examination of those systems in a broader setting15. As 
observed by archaeologists Sillar and Tite, techniques are always ‘embedded’ in a particular 
context (2000, p.12). Technical practice is not just informed by material constraints, but also 
by ‘wider environmental, technological, economic, social, and ideological practices’ (ibid., 
p.17). 
2.6.11. The Limits of The Context 
For each technique I study, I suggest where it might sit in a “chaine opertoire”, or 
“operational sequence” (the archaeological term for a sequence of techniques: see Leroi-
Gourhan 1993; Conneller 2011). The technique of hammering a pin, for example (see 
Chapter 4), is described with reference to joining pieces of wood together16. Beyond this 
local contextualization, however, most of the studies presented here do not place techniques 
within longer chains of operations17, or a within a wider social context. This focused 
approach has enabled the research to take what archaeologist Lambros Malafouris calls a 
‘micro-level perspective’ (2013, p.224; see 2.6.12) on practice. When founded on the idea 
that cognition is distributed across both people and things, Malafouris has shown that such 
isolated studies can yield valuable insights into how techniques might structure thought and 
action (2008). Methodologically, limiting the boundaries of the studies in this way has 
focused my attention on the nature of the techniques themselves, rather than any associated 
social context. In support of a theme that runs throughout the thesis, I also believe that this 
approach helps to demonstrate the value of studying technical practice in its own right. As I 
discuss in Chapter 5, paying careful attention to the details of techniques allows us to take 
seriously the role they might play as extensions of minds. 
                                                      
 
15 Sigaut himself sees techniques as subsidiaries to ‘operations’—they can be considered 
‘alternative ways of carrying out a given operation’ (1994, p.435).  
16 Such tightly bounded contexts are typical of studies of “situated action” (see 3.2.4), 
which as anthropologist Bonnie Nardi (critically) suggests, are inclined to take the situation 
for granted, without acknowledging that it is part of a larger activity (1996, see especially 
p.45). I have done this consciously, to suit the purposes of my research. 
17 The exception to this is the investigation of staked furniture prototyping (see 6.5), 
which considers a longer sequence of techniques to discuss how decisions may be 
distributed throughout a design process. 
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Given this narrow focus, it is worth acknowledging those aspects of designing and making 
activity that I have consciously excluded through the method used here. 
Collaboration 
Perhaps the most notable feature of real-life practice missing from this research is 
collaboration between people. My studies are focused upon the relationship between a single 
practitioner and the tools and materials of a technique. Given the adoption of a distributed 
understanding of cognition, this might seem a strange omission. Indeed, Edwin Hutchin’s 
pioneering study of distributed cognition on board naval vessels (1996; see 3.2.4) famously 
looked at how the knowledge necessary for navigation was not held centrally, either by an 
individual crew member or piece of equipment, but spread across the whole system (see 
p.219). Here the interactions between people (see, for example, p.237-9) were as much the 
subject of investigation as the interactions with artefacts (see, for example, p.96-102). As 
described above, my decision to avoid this macro-level perspective on practice was a tactic 
intended to excavate the details of a practitioner’s relationship with tools and materials, in a 
way that would have been difficult to achieve if I were also trying to understand the 
intricacies of conversation between people. Rather than seeing the work in this thesis as 
somehow incongruous with the study of collaboration, however, I believe the research 
presented here is well-placed to be extended into other contexts in the future. This is a point 
I discuss in Chapter 7 (see 7.2). 
Alternative Approaches 
As described in 2.6.8., I have practiced and analysed only instances of ‘competent tool use’. 
By this, I mean well-recognised approaches to operations that follow an uncontroversial 
process. Another feature of ‘real-world’ practice that this research therefore excludes is the 
alternative approaches to operations that might vary between people, communities and 
cultures. In my description of sawing (see 6.3.1), for example, I document the use of a 
Western panel saw. Western saws differ to their Japanese counterparts in that their teeth are 
sharpened to cut on the push stroke, rather than the pull stroke. This simple difference has a 
multitude of implications for the practice of woodworking, from the kind of structure 
necessary to hold the workpiece in place, to the ease of sighting the cut line as it fills with 
dust, and the kinds of wood joints a practitioner might be inclined to employ.  
In addition to these widespread alternative approaches, there are likely to be many more 
idiosyncratic techniques that a broader study of other practitioners would reveal. Whilst such 
varied processes would doubtless be fascinating in terms of their epistemic characters, I have 
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avoided their study during the course of this research. The reasoning behind this was to 
avoid any controversy regarding my descriptions of techniques (and whether they represent 
‘best’ practice), and instead focus on my developing understanding of epistemic character. I 
have sought to keep the details of the studies as ordinary as possible, whilst analysing them 
in an extra-ordinary way. 
Variety of Techniques 
Because the techniques I study are those that I am familiar with, and are accessible within 
the environment the research has taken place (see 1.5), I present a limited range of 
techniques. The ambition has not been to undertake a comprehensive survey of designing 
and making techniques, but to interrogate a small selection in order to develop and define 
the idea of epistemic character, and demonstrate how it may be applied. In Chapter 7, I 
discuss how, by building on the foundation of this thesis, a wider variety of practices could 
be subject to further research (see 7.2.2).  
2.6.12. Chrono-architectures 
Having introduced the idea of studying techniques, I now describe my approach in more 
detail. This continues the theme of delineating the terms of my engagement with techniques. 
On this, I follow archaeologist Lambros Malafouris’ micro-level perspective: 
‘On the one hand, pottery making, when seen from what previously was called a 
macro-level perspective, can certainly be classified as a voluntary rather than a 
passive act—the potter certainly intends to perform a sequence of goal-directed 
bodily movements aimed at producing a pot. On the other hand, when seen from a 
micro-level perspective, pottery making, as a demanding skilled action, can be 
described as a dynamic chain of voluntary, passive, and reflexive action elements’ 
(2013, p.224) 
Throughout his book, How Things Shape Mind (2013), Malafouris develops a criticism of 
his discipline in similar terms to Carl Knappett’s. Drawing on the idea of distributed 
cognition and the theory of extended mind (see 3.2), Malafouris presents studies of practice 
(such as the pottery example introduced by the quote above) that aim to redress the 
internalist approach to cognition. The micro-level perspective he adopts is crucial to explore 
how ‘material agency’ (ibid., p.209-226, see 5.3) and the temporal arrangement of 
techniques influence the outcomes of practice. He calls the associated stance towards human 
thought, action and production material engagement theory. I discuss the details of 
Malafouris’ approach, as well as the ideas of distributed cognition and extended mind in the 
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following chapter (see 3.2.3). An aspect of his work relevant to the present discussion of my 
method, however, is his concept of chrono-architectures.   
For Malafouris, the chrono-architecture, or ‘temporal anatomy’ (ibid., p.222) of a technique 
relates to how it is arranged in time. It is the dynamic chain of actions involved throughout a 
process. Malafouris writes that ‘in order to understand creative agency we have to 
understand the temporality of creative action’ (ibid., p.213). The chrono-architecture of a 
technique thus aims to describe the roles played by the agencies of a practitioner and their 
tools and materials over time. Defining the limits and granularity appropriate for such 
studies necessitates that ‘we carefully define the portion of time encapsulating the event we 
want to describe and then decide whether this portion of time constitutes a meaningful event 
in the larger enchainment of events constituting the activity we seek to explain. This is 
necessary if we want our account of the causal hierarchy of events not to trivialize the 
complexities of their cognitive ecology’ (ibid., p.223). In my studies, I have been similarly 
mindful regarding what constitutes a “step” of production, and when identifying where 
significant decision making takes place (see Chapters 5 and 6, especially 5.2). 
2.6.13. The Unit of Analysis in Ethnography 
As in Malafouris’ work above, determining the appropriate unit of analysis has long been a 
concern for studies of cognition. By tracing the antecedents of theories of cognition in the 
field of Computer Supported Collaborative Work (CSCW), information science researcher 
Gerry Stahl summarises a historical shift in focus, from the individual towards social 
systems (2011). From Socrates (born c.470 BCE) until Hegel (born 1770), Stahl describes 
how ‘cognition was assumed to be an innate function of the individual human mind’ (ibid., 
p.194). Post-Hegel, Stahl observes how social relations have become included in the unit of 
analysis. 
For fields such as CSCW, with its frequent interest in interactions between people (in 
addition to interactions with artefacts), this socially-minded view of cognition is 
fundamental. As Stahl observes (ibid.), there are range of theoretical approaches that 
underpin much of the work in this area. These include a selection that have also informed 
this research: Edwin Hutchins Distributed Cognition (see 2.6.11 and 3.2.4); Lucy 
Suchman’s Situated Cognition (see 3.2.4); and (owing to its potential relevance for an 
extension of this research), Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory (see 7.2.1).  
As I describe in Chapter 7, if post-doctoral work were to expand the unit of analysis to 
include collaborative, more complex studies, the ethnographic approaches that inform 
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CSCW and Science and Technology Studies (STS) would provide an effective foundation 
(7.2.1). According to the micro-level perspective I adopt for the studies in this thesis, 
however, I have not benefitted from the potential of these approaches to guide analyses of 
multi-participant contexts. Instead (thanks to its simultaneously methodological and 
thematic relevance) the most inspirational piece of ethnography I have read throughout this 
research has been Cognition and Tool Use: The Blacksmith at Work, by anthropologists 
Charles Keller and Janet Keller (1996). As I discuss in 2.5.3, 5.2.1, and 5.3.1, Keller and 
Keller use a first-hand study of blacksmithing to understand how cognition is distributed 
across a workshop—in the tools, techniques, materials and the practitioner themselves. 
Grounded in the ‘situated’ approaches to cognition developed by Suchman (1987) and Jean 
Lave (Lave and Wenger 1991)18, Keller and Keller’s work promotes the study of action, 
over mental representations. On the subject of units of analysis, however, they follow a more 
focussed perspective than others working within these frameworks might. Comparing their 
work to the ‘activity theory’ approach of Engeström (1993; see also Stahl 2011), Keller and 
Keller describe how ‘Engeström focuses on the system in sociohistorical development, while 
it is our task to account for the accomplishments of a person acting within such a system’ 
(1996, p.110). This focus on individual accomplishment is what differentiates Keller and 
Keller’s study from much work on situated action. Owing also to its first-hand, 
apprenticeship-based method, and the nature of the craft studied, Keller and Keller’s work 
has offered a valuable ethnographic guide in how to interrogate practice.  
One aspect of Keller and Keller’s work that has been particularly influential to this research 
is their use of the ‘heats’ of blacksmithing, as a means to inform an analytical strategy. A 
heat is a period of time in which, once removed from the forge, a piece of hot iron remains 
workable. Once it has cooled and lost the requisite malleability, the heat ends and it is 
returned to the forge (p.110-11). By using this fact of practice as a marker for how they 
delineate the steps of production—for how they how they determine the units of analysis—
Keller and Keller’s study was crucial when developing my analyses of step-character (see 
5.2.1). 
2.6.14. A Definition of Epistemic Character 
As described above (see 2.5.4), the reflective nature of my first-hand studies has been 
guided by the concept of epistemic character. This was predominantly influenced by Kirsh 
and Maglio’s concept of epistemic action (1994) (see 4.2). When in its embryonic state, I 
                                                      
 
18 Lave is another influential theoretician in CSCW, as cited by Stahl 2011 
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didn’t really know what I meant by the term. But it’s meaning, significance, and the means 
by which it may be studied have evolved alongside my studies. This was not a sudden 
revelation, but came about through my ‘persistent observations’ (Guba 1981, p.85; see 
2.6.7). Through exposure to a diverse range of techniques in the workshop setting of my 
design and teaching practice, and through continual reading and attempts at writing, a more 
precise concept of what I meant by epistemic action became apparent. I have developed a 
definition of the term: 
Epistemic character is a property of a technique. It structures the process of working things 
out whilst using the technique. 
I have used the verb “to structure” because it may apply to both the temporal and physical 
arrangement of the technique (an idea inspired by Malafouris’ chrono-architectures), and 
alludes to the structure of a cognitive system. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7 I elaborate on this 
definition, by suggesting how we may investigate the epistemic character of techniques and 
considering the significance of the concept. An important aspect of this definition (worth 
noting before the following chapter on ‘Designing and Making’) is that it does not 
discriminate between techniques usually considered “design techniques” (e.g. drawing with 
a ruler, see 5.1.6) and those usually considered “making techniques” (e.g. using a bench 
plane, see 6.4.2).  
2.7. Summary 
Although I have presented what I consider the key features of my methodology in this 
chapter, and described its development, there remain aspects of my theoretical foundation 
that have yet to be clarified. In particular, I have alluded to the topics of “distributed 
cognition” and “the extended mind”, without providing much detail on what I mean. This is 
a situation I rectify in the following chapter, where I introduce the ideas by weaving them 
into a narrative about the relationship between designing and making.  
This point returns us to where this chapter began—the intertwined nature of my questions 
and methodology. It should be noted that the entwinement of methodology, theory and 
practice continues on into this thesis. Whilst I have presented two discrete methods of 
investigation here, I also hope to have made clear (through my “chronology”) that these two 
approaches are deeply connected. In an effort to capture this interrelatedness, I do not 
present the thesis in a linear “Literature Review – Data Gathering Phase – Analysis” format. 
As I have described above, I hope that the structure of this document can communicate not 
just the “findings” of my research, but also be suggestive of how these ideas have presented 
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themselves to me, along the way. Later chapters therefore continue to introduce new 
theoretical ideas alongside studies of practice. Also in this spirit, the next chapter critiques 
the relationship of designing and making, through a discussion that attempts to recall my 
dawning appreciation for alternative understandings of creative activity. 
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3. Designing and Making 
 
Throughout this chapter, I consider the relationship between designing and making. I begin 
at a time often associated with their division—in the Fifteenth Century, with the publication 
of Leon Battista Alberti’s architectural treatise, De re aedificatoria (1452). Alberti is widely 
credited with defining, for the first time, the role of the architect as distinct from that of the 
master mason. Where before building practice had been directed on-the-ground, by a figure 
in and amongst their materials and men, Alberti defined architecture as a chiefly 
representational practice, its goal being the creation of plans for others to follow. 
I then travel forward through time, to the early days of “design science” and the work of 
Bruce Archer at the Royal College of Art. Through the example of Archer and others, I 
identify that the theoretical distinction of designing and making remains an implicit feature 
of design studies. In making this claim, I am not alone. I explore the pioneering work of 
Henrik Gedenryd, who demonstrates that this dualism of designing and making is a result of 
design theory’s adoption of an “internalist” model of cognition. Gedenryd argues instead for 
an approach to design (and cognition more generally) that does not draw such a sharp 
distinction between thinking (designing) and acting (making). This leads us to theories from 
the disciplines of anthropology, archaeology, science & technology studies and cognitive 
science, all of which promote “extended”, “materially-engaged”, and “distributed” models of 
cognition. The key idea is that thinking doesn’t just happen “in the head”, but goes on 
between people and things. As I hope to show throughout this chapter (and the rest of this 
thesis), such ideas shed new light on the relationship between designing and making, and 
offer a valuable perspective from which to interrogate the influence of technique on design 
practice. 
The final section of this chapter presents two philosophies of design. The first underlies 
Alberti’s distinction—it takes matter to be inert and receptive to a designer’s wishes. The 
alternative philosophy of design promotes the heterogeneity of the material world, its active 
and emergent nature, and the resulting demand for improvisation. I describe how 
philosophers have associated each of these models of production with an archetypal figure, 
by contrasting the “architect” with the “artisan”. Although I’m wary of imposing this 
dichotomy (a point discussed with reference to the idea of “craft”), I believe these 
discussions offer a useful corrective to prevailing understandings of production. And, in 
making the case for a richer understanding of practitioners’ engagement with materials, tools 
and techniques I suggest an “artisanal” philosophy can helpfully inform my research. 
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3.1. How are things designed?  
‘[W]e shall call the Design a firm and graceful pre-ordering of the Lines and Angles, 
conceived in the Mind, and contrived by an ingenious Artist.’ (Alberti 1452 
[translated 1785], p.27]) 
3.1.1. Leon Battista Alberti 
In A History of Architectural Theory (1994), Hanno-Walter Kruft introduces the work of 
architect and renowned Renaissance figure Leon Battista Alberti. On the evidence of his ten-
volume architectural treatise, De re aedificatoria, Alberti is widely credited with being the 
first writer to distinguish the role of an architect from that of the builder (see, for example, 
Hanson, 2013, see p.3). The architect was responsible, according to Alberti, for creating the 
‘Design’—that ‘firm and graceful pre-ordering of the Lines and Angles’ in the quote above. 
With this came an important theoretical distinction, between the design for a building and its 
subsequent material realisation. As Kruft observes, Alberti believed ‘that the architectural 
idea is crystallised in the drawn design. In both his theory and practice, design and execution 
were divorced from one another’ (1994, p.48-9). 
The aim of this chapter is not to dispute definitions of ‘design’. In agreement with design 
theorist Richard Buchanan, I believe such ‘battles’ to be ‘fruitless’ (2004, quoted in Per 
Galle 2011, p.92). But I also follow Buchanan’s observation that definitions nonetheless 
‘serve the purpose of shaping a particular line of inquiry’ (ibid.). My particular line of 
inquiry demands that I consider the relationship between designing and making in detail. 
And it is the nature of this relationship that Alberti defined.  
The model of production that underlies Alberti’s definition is a widely-held account of how 
things are designed and made. ‘This is to start’, writes anthropologist Tim Ingold, ‘with an 
idea in mind, of what we want to achieve, and with a supply of the raw material needed to 
achieve it. And it is to finish at the moment when the material has taken on the intended 
form’ (2013a, p.20). On this understanding, making is considered an activity wherein ideas 
(or designs) internal to the mind are projected outwards, upon a world of materials. The 
problem with this understanding, and the central theme of the criticisms I draw together 
below, is that it fails to account for the role of material engagement in the processes of 
production. ‘Time and again’, observes Ingold, ‘scholars have written as though to have a 
design for a thing, you already have the thing itself’ (2013, p.22). In the academic study of 
art, or in the field of archaeology, this model of production leads to objects being treated as 
indices of their makers’ intentions (see also Knappett 2005 and 2.3.1). In the study of 
design, I argue that it obscures the value of, and inhibits the study of, making practices.  
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My aim is not to entirely refute Alberti’s definition of design, or become embroiled in an 
intractable debate about what is and is not designing. With reference to interdisciplinary 
literature on the subject, however, I hope to explore how a less binary distinction between 
acts of designing and making could enable a greater understanding of the influence of tools 
and techniques on design processes. For whilst Alberti’s model is perpetuated in prevailing 
accounts of design, it is not without criticism. And, as I hope to show, some of these 
criticisms provide a valuable theoretical basis from which my later explorations of epistemic 
character can proceed. 
3.1.2. Alberti vs. The Gothic 
As architectural historian Robert Tavernor discusses, Alberti’s own buildings were actually 
made via a somewhat compromised version of his ideal model—concessions had to be made 
both to material constraints and throughout the negotiations necessary in the politics of his 
era (1998, see p.201-2). But the underlying philosophy still took hold. In the practice of 
contemporary architects, we can see the enduring success of Alberti’s attempt to elevate the 
role of planning, and the creation of drawn specifications in advance of construction (see for 
example, Eisenman 1999).  
The role of drawing in Alberti’s theory diverged from that of the Gothic era. As architect 
Lars Spuybroek discusses, when master masons were directing the construction of Gothic 
cathedrals, they created drawings that operated in a descriptive, rather than a prescriptive 
way (2011, p.18). Drawings did not aim to specify the subsequent built work in detail, nor 
were they all made in advance. Often, drawings would be created throughout the 
construction work; some drafted on paper, but ‘also cut into wood and carved into stone 
floors’ (ibid.). A small number of these carvings can still be found incised into the floors of 
the buildings themselves (p.18). To most modern architects or builders, such drawings 
would seem incomplete, offering too little detail, especially when considered in relation to 
the elaborate carvings and tracery that they preceded (see Turnbull 1993; Ingold 2010, see 
p.93). It was against this backdrop, following centuries throughout which buildings were not 
tightly-specified in advance, that Alberti’s definition of design was formulated. Whilst it 
might seem like common sense now, the delineation between a design and its execution was 
thus a point worth making. 
3.1.3. Bruce Archer 
Jumping forward in time, Alberti’s model of production has been expressed more recently 
by other prominent design theorists. One example of this legacy can be found in the early 
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work of Bruce Archer. Archer worked for 27 years at the Royal College of Art (RCA), and 
can be considered a key figure in the history of design studies. Prior to the early 1970s, 
when he was promoted to the role of Research Professor in the RCA’s Department of 
Design Research, Archer had spent time as a mechanical engineer, a lecturer, and was 
involved in research projects at the college (Boyd David and Gristwood 2016). Articles 
published throughout these early years at the RCA were later assembled into Archer’s 1968 
PhD thesis, The Structure of Design Processes (1968). It is to a recent discussion of the 
formulation, achievements and failings of this thesis (Boyd Davis & Gristwood 2016) that I 
now turn. I draw on Archer’s work in order to demonstrate the continuing separation of 
designing and making in studies of design. 
In accord with other publications of the era (for example, Alexander, 1964; Simon, 1969; 
Jones, 1970), Archer’s thesis can be seen as an attempt to create a generalised model of 
design processes. It was a project in the nascent “science of design”, which has since exerted 
a profound influence on the direction of design studies (Dorst 2006; Cross 2001). Whilst I 
am chiefly interested in Archer’s conception of the relationship between designing and 
making, I first introduce his idea that design problems should be fully defined in advance of 
design practice. I will then discuss how, of these two aspects of Archer’s ideas, the claim 
about the definability of design problems has since been eroded, yet the distinction he draws 
between designing and making largely remains an implicit feature of design studies.  
Archer on Solution Spaces 
‘An important feature’ in Archer’s model of design, write Boyd Davis and Gristwood, is the 
‘calculation of the solution space within which the final design must lie’ (2016, p.9). Archer 
proposes that design work should proceed by first ‘defining the brief, establishing the 
requirements and giving them appropriate weights, securing the necessary data and then 
actually designing’ (ibid.). In this model, the parameters of a project are to be determined 
before the design work can begin. Designers are expected to know all that can be known 
about their problem, so that they may then design a respondent solution. 
Despite Archer’s promotion of this ideal, Boyd Davis and Gristwood identify that even parts 
of his own thesis appear skeptical as to its practical possibility. In later passages of the work, 
Boyd Davis and Gristwood consider Archer to undermine key aspects of his model, in 
admissions such as: ‘[t]he complete set of objectives is only rarely definable at the beginning 
of the project.’ (Archer 1968: 6:15), and ‘any effective design procedure must therefore 
permit radical reappraisal of the problem at any stage.’ (Archer 1968: 6:17) (both quoted in 
Boyd Davis and Gristwood 2016, p.11). Speculating as to the source of these seeming 
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inconsistencies, Boyd Davis and Gristwood suggest that it was perhaps Archer’s latter 
experience of the ‘messiness’ of real world design (ibid., p.10) that would have suggested 
the problems in his model. As in Tavernor’s analysis of Alberti’s architectural practice 
(1998, see 3.1.2), Archer’s theory didn’t quite harmonise with the reality. Although still 
committed to the ideals of his system, Archer’s apparently conflicted thinking on this issue 
was a sign of things to come. 
3.1.4. A Messier Reality 
More recently in design studies, the conflict present within Archer’s thesis has been 
abandoned, in acceptance of a messier reality. The assertion that that there can be a well-
defined ‘solution space’ in advance of design work has given way to the idea that there is a 
co-evolution of design problems and solutions (Dorst and Cross 2001). Rather than 
determining all requirements in advance, this idea accounts for the inevitability of new 
requirements emerging throughout the process. Archer’s ideal has thus been criticized for 
being too linear an approach. Such criticism is typical of those levelled at early projects in 
the science of design, where overtly rational or positivist approaches to the subject have 
fallen out of favour, in the face of real-world complexity (Cross 2001, see p.53-4; Dorst 
2006; Per Galle 2011, see p.82-4). Where idealised design processes were once drawn with 
straight lines and arrows pointing in one direction, they now as likely to rely on curves, lines 
that might double back on themselves, overlaps and fuzzy bits (see, for example Badke-
Schaub & Frankenberger 2004, p.123). Or else, as in the case of Christopher Alexander, a 
pioneer (and equally pioneering sceptic) of early design studies (see  Bayazit 2004), 
diagrams have been forsaken altogether (see, for example, Alexander 1979).  
The field of design studies has thus retreated from the idea that there can be a well-defined 
set of requirements drawn up in advance of a design project. In all but the simplest of design 
challenges, such an aspiration has been shown to be impractical. In what follows, however, I 
aim to show how Archer’s similarly linear interpretation of the relationship between 
designing and making has remained an implicit assumption of the field1. 
Archer on Designing and Making 
 ‘A key element in the act of designing’, Archer claimed in one of a series of 1963 articles, 
‘is the formation of a prescription or model for a finished work in advance of its 
embodiment.’ (Archer 1963, p.70, quoted in Boyd Davis and Gristwood 2016, p.9). In this 
                                                      
1 I discuss the limited number of exceptions to this claim in 3.2.1 
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assertion, we find the same distinction of designing and making that Alberti had committed 
to paper over 500 years before.  
The article thus went on to declare that ‘a sculptor working directly with his or her material 
is not designing, but “when a sculptor produces a cartoon for his proposed work, only then 
he can be said to be designing it”’ (Boyd Davis and Gristwood 2016, p.9-10). In another, 
even more contorted attempt to see this logic through, Boyd Davis and Gristwood describe 
how it leads Archer to the ‘odd contention that a couturier is designing even when making a 
garment on the stand—but only provided this is not the finished item but a prototype for a 
garment that is going to be made subsequently’ (ibid., p.10, footnote 10). 
Ignoring the strange lengths Archer goes to in order to maintain the theoretical distinction of 
designing and making, his treatment of the subject is typical of design studies. The model of 
designing being prior to making has remained an implicit feature of the field2. Even whilst 
acknowledging the material engagement throughout processes of design (in, for example, 
the practice of a couturier), there remains a commitment to prioritise the planning-based 
nature of the discipline. As I discuss below, this is symptomatic of a “design-centric” 
treatment of the relationship between thought and action. Crucially for my study, this 
approach inhibits the notion of what constitutes a valid subject of interest—it disregards the 
importance of tools, techniques and materials upon design processes. There has been, writes 
design researcher Theodora Vardouli, a ‘long tradition in which abstractions—models, 
descriptions, representations—of things have been viewed as a language proper of design, 
frequently coming to stand for the things themselves’ (2015, p.154; see, for example, Archer 
1979). My determination to understand the techniques of material engagement throughout 
design processes is thus in accord with Vardouli’s suggestion for design researchers to 
supplement abstraction with materiality (2015, see p.154). 
 
3.1.5. Horst Rittel on Plan Making 
Unlike the subsequent move to understand design ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ as co-
evolutionary then, there has been little challenge within the discipline to the linear 
relationship between designing and making. Even in work like design researcher Horst 
Rittel’s The Reasoning of Designers (1987), which acknowledges the ‘disorderly’ nature of 
design problems (ibid., p.2), we still find a subscription to the definition of design as 
separate from its execution. In the following quote from Rittel, I suggest we see both further 
                                                      
2 See Vardouli for a recent critique of this ‘design-centric’ attitude (2015, p.143-4). 
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evidence for the dominance of this assumption, but also the beginnings of a thread that we 
may follow into a valuable alternative. 
‘All designers intend to intervene into the expected course of events by premeditated 
action. All of them want to avoid mistakes through ignorance and spontaneity. They 
want to think before they act. Instead of immediately and directly manipulating their 
surroundings by trial and error until these assume the desired shape, designers want 
to think up a course of action thoroughly before they commit themselves to its 
execution. Designing is plan-making. Planners, engineers, architects, corporate 
managers, legislators, educators are (sometimes) designers. They are guided by the 
ambition to imagine a desirable state of the world, playing through alternative ways 
in which it might be accomplished, carefully tracing the consequences of 
contemplated actions. Design takes place in the world of imagination, where one 
invents and manipulates ideas and concepts instead of the real thing - in order to 
prepare the real intervention. They work with models as means of vicarious 
perception and manipulation. Sketches, cardboard models, diagrams and 
mathematical models, and the most flexible of them all, speech, serve as media to 
support the imagination.’ (1987, p.1, emphases in original) 
The designers of Rittel’s definition want to think before they act. This is a restatement of the 
default approach Carl Knappett finds in archaeology (see 2.3.1), wherein thought is primary, 
and action secondary. For these designers, thought always precedes action. It is through 
challenges to this assumption, which promote instead an alternative, bi-directional 
understanding of the relationship between thought and action that I hope to build a 
productive theoretical basis for my work. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to this aim. 
Before discussing such challenges, however, I suggest we can find a clue, hinting at the 
potential for such an exercise in the last few lines of Rittel’s quote. Whilst the primacy of 
planning and internal cognition appears to underlie his position, we nonetheless see an 
acknowledgment that the plans of Rittel’s designers are indeed made. They are made using 
things—drawings on paper, cardboard models, screen based diagrams—that do not just 
reside in the heads of the practitioners, but in their environment. In the next section of this 
chapter, I investigate the theory of extended mind and models of distributed cognition to 
suggest that the ‘world of imagination’ about which Rittel writes, might thus be understood 
to include features of the external environment. First, however, I look to an inspirational 
precursor to this argument.  
3.2. Making Designs 
Whilst design studies might be dominated by a dualism of thought and action, there is one 
notable exception that points the way to an alternative. Henrik Gedenryd’s How Designers 
Work: Making Sense of Authentic Cognitive Activity provides a detailed critique of design 
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studies and their relationship with cognitive theory (1998). Gedenryd demonstrates that the 
definitions like those found in Archer’s early work are based upon a model of rational action 
that takes thinking and doing to be separate activities, wherein thought always precedes and 
determines action (ibid. see p.57).  
3.2.1. Gedenryd’s Folk Model of Cognition 
Gedenryd identifies the links between this default view of production and a ‘folk model of 
cognition’ (ibid., p.37). The folk model presents an ordered sequence ‘from perception to 
thinking to action, based on an imagined “flow” from input to output: Information enters 
through the senses and via perception goes into the mind. Then, a decision is made which 
transforms this information via the motor system into action, and this is regarded as 
“output”’ (ibid.) (see Figure 3.1, after Gedenryd’s Figure 1.9, ibid.).  
Figure 3. 1 The folk model of cognition 
 
That Gedenryd refers to this as a “folk model” is suggestive of how intuitive it feels. It is an 
‘example of a notion that is hard to rethink or disregard: How could it be different; how 
might it not be this way?’ (ibid.). These are questions that Gedenryd offers valuable answers 
to. He provides a discussion of the historic basis for our most familiar understandings of 
cognition, and considers how these have influenced design theory. Gedenryd then 
demonstrates the flaws behind the folk model and its application, and suggests an alternative 
understanding of thought and action based upon the real experience of designers. As noted 
in a blog post by professor of design Chris Rust, that Gedenryd died not long after 
completing How Designers Work leaves us to ‘wonder where he might have taken his 
knowledge if he had lived’ (1998). It is only very occasionally, such as in Vardouli’s recent 
discussion of making theory (2015) (see also, Knight and Vardouli 2015; El-Zanfaly 2015; 
Lim, Stolterman, and Tenenberg 2008; Brereton 2004; Gill, Sanders and Shim 2011), that 
the ideas suggested by Gedenryd’s work have reemerged3. 
                                                      
3 I have found these ideas are more often ignored or, as in the case of design theorist 
Willemien Visser, dismissed on the basis that they do not ‘establish an appropriate 
differentiation between human and artificial cognition’ (2006, p.81). 
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Following the folk model of cognition, Gedenryd identifies another, similarly “common 
sense”, triad (see Figure 3.2, after Gedenryd’s Figure 1.10, 1998, p.38). 
Figure 3. 2 The folk model of intention, planning and action 
 
This second sequence is ‘essentially a causal explanation of action’—of how action comes 
about and how it is controlled (ibid., p.37). Gedenryd describes it as a ‘folk-psychological 
“theory” of action’ (ibid.). The three-part sequence can be understood as a more focused 
instantiation of the more general folk model of cognition (ibid., p.38). It is similarly linear, 
but concentrates upon just the ‘thinking’ and ‘action’ parts of the first model. Figure 3.3 
(after Gedenryd’s Figure 1.11, ibid., p.39) places the two models on the same timeline, to 
help to illustrate this elaboration. 
Figure 3. 3 The relationship between the folk model of cognition and intention, planning and 
action 
 
As seen in Figure 3.2, the folk-psychological theory of action takes the creation of plans to 
be the defining feature of cognition. Intentions are the inputs that inform planning. Planning 
then controls action. The plan thus defines the relationship between thinking and doing—
actions are understood to follow plans developed during “thought” (see 3.2.4 for other 
critiques of planning). As Gedenryd notes, in this refinement of the folk model of cognition, 
the ‘origin of the intention is non-essential to the relation between thought and action’, and 
can thus be left out (ibid., p.38). Both this feature of the theory of action, and the linear 
narrative illustrated in both Figures 3.1 and 3.2, leaves little space for the potential for action 
to influence perception or intention. I return to this failing below, when discussing the theory 
of extended mind, and in the next chapter, when I critique David Pye’s writing along similar 
lines. 
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As we found in the example of Archer’s PhD thesis, the ambition to define the requirements 
of a project in advance of design practice has since given way to a less linear understanding. 
There is now a recognition that problems and solutions co-evolve. On this subject, Gedenryd 
agrees that the ‘conventional models’ of early design science were flawed because they 
considered ‘the problem as a given’ (ibid., p.70). And he suggests that the underlying cause 
of this mistake was the adoption of rational, or “folk”, models of action and cognition—‘a 
large oversight that cannot be resolved by making minor adjustments to these models’ (ibid., 
). 
For the purposes of my research, Gedenryd’s most valuable contribution is this: although the 
commitments both of the individuals associated with early design methodology, and design 
studies more generally have shifted, Gedenryd does not believe that this underlying theory 
of cognition has been abandoned. Indeed, the chief contribution of How Designers Work is a 
fundamental challenge to what Gedenryd calls “intramental” accounts of cognition, wherein 
all thinking takes place in the head; as assumed by the folk theory of action. This does not, 
Gedenryd argues, correspond with observations of design practice. The main subject of How 
Designers Work can thus be summarized as a question: ‘Why do designers work the way 
they do, when the traditional theories of cognition and design say that designers should be 
doing something quite different?’ (p.101) 
Gedenryd’s work can be understood as an attempt to expose the flaws of these traditional 
models, by demonstrating their incompatibility with design practice, and then suggesting an 
alternative. The main flaw upon which Gedenryd focusses is the idea that all cognition takes 
place in the head. Even in light of revised assumptions about the definability of design 
problems, the orthodox view of design practice remains wedded to a foundation that neglects 
the role of the world in cognition.  
Gedenryd counters this by analysing studies of design sketching (often taken from Donald 
Schön’s studies of architectural sketching, see Schön 19834) to demonstrate that sketches are 
not used only to render pre-existing ideas, but also to provide feedback throughout a design 
process. The practice of sketching helps to discover previously hidden qualities or 
characteristics of an emergent design. Gedenryd’s analysis of thinking and drawing thus 
‘gives little justification for treating them as separate activities, but rather as two aspects of 
                                                      
4 See also Cross (2001, p.53) for a discussion of how Schon’s work has provided a useful 
departure from ‘design science’ and its positivist doctrine. 
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one single activity. Thinking and sketching go on in parallel and mutually enable one 
another to move forward.’ (1998, p.104) 
Throughout How Designers Work, Henrik Gedenryd’s primary interest is to use evidence 
from the practice of designers to challenge overtly mental accounts of human cognition. His 
study is intended to be as much a contribution to the field of cognitive science as it is to 
design theory. From my perspective, Gedenryd provides an invaluable source of inspiration 
from which to pursue a study of the role of techniques on design practice. Where I diverge 
from Gedenryd’s path, however, is in the subject of our respective studies. Whilst we 
broadly share a theoretical foundation, it is what we use this foundation for that differs. 
Gedenryd develops a highly sophisticated account of design practice, and has ambitions for 
it to provide a more general theory of externalized cognition. He does this through third-
hand analysis of accounts of design practice, combined with the deep theoretical 
examination summarized above. Later in this thesis, I employ the theory of extended mind 
as a basis from which to conduct first-hand studies of the influence of the techniques of 
material engagement of design processes. Although Gedenryd does discuss the production of 
three-dimensional prototypes, his is predominantly an analysis of the resultant objects, as 
external components of minds, rather than an investigation into the processes that went into 
their creation. Whilst he talks of the ‘combination of soft lead pencil, drawing paper, and 
techniques such as thumbnails, which together enable a highly fluid and expressive way of 
working that computers are far from matching’ (ibid., p.213), Gedenryd’s analyses do not 
look in detail at the process of using such techniques. He instead develops more global 
ideas; such as a description of good “inquiring materials” being ones that, in common with 
many accounts of design practice, suits the current stage of the process, i.e. rough sketches 
early on to ‘explore’ (ibid., p.123) a problem, followed by more refined ones later on to test 
ideas through ‘experimentation’ (ibid., p.126). Gedenryd is thus satisfied to identify why 
such materials can be usefully employed throughout design practice, in order to make more 
general points about externalized cognition. My thesis, on the other hand, aims to “zoom-in” 
on these practices, in the same way that archaeologist Lambros Malafouris creates chrono-
architectures of production techniques (see 2.6.12). And I do so with the primary motivation 
not of evidencing a theory of external mind: thanks to work like that of Gedenryd’s, I feel 
assured to take this theoretical foundation as a basis. I am interested in looking in more 
detail at the features of “inquiring materials”, and the ways they might influence processes 
of design. 
Where, as architect Lars Spuybroek observes, ‘tools are usually understood as mediators, as 
in-between instruments, as if the goal already exists, as if the end has already been reached’ 
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(2011, p.300), I believe the foundation laid by Gedenryd (and those similarly minded 
scholars in other disciplines) enables me to study tools not just as inert instruments, but as 
influential components of cognitive systems. I propose that this reframing of action, as a part 
of thought, provides a useful grounding from which to consider the significance of 
techniques during processes of design. And it also begins to erode the dualism of designing 
and making instated by Alberti and implicit in much design theory. 
3.2.2. The Theory of Extended Mind 
Henrik Gedenryd seeks to advance extended understandings of cognition more generally 
than just in the field of design. In bringing together the practice of design with theories of 
extended cognition, however, he provides a rare example of their compatibility that benefits 
design theory as much as it does cognitive science. Following Gedenryd’s lead, I now look 
into other work on the extended mind, so that I might draw on its insights into the role of 
action in thought. 
In their influential paper, The Extended Mind, philosophers of mind Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers begin by asking, ‘Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?’ 
(1998, p.7) As suggested by the paper’s title, Clark and Chalmers’ answer is to understand 
the mind not as limited by the bounds of the skull, skin, or body, but as a coupling of 
humans and their environment. Thinking thus takes place not only within the confines of 
human brains and bodies, but within a cognitive system that relies on two-way interactions 
between people and things. This is the central idea behind the theory of extended mind. 
For Clark and Chalmers, examples of such cognitive systems can be found everywhere—in 
the rearrangement of Scrabble tiles, the use of pen and paper to solve math problems, and 
interactions with navigational instruments. Indeed, they regard the ‘general paraphernalia of 
language, books, diagrams, and culture’ all to operate as parts of extended minds (ibid., p.8). 
Under Clark and Chalmers’ analysis of cognition, any aspect of a human’s environment has 
the potential to become part of a human mind. 
The ideas proposed in The Extended Mind are developed in more detail in Andy Clark’s 
book Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Back Together Again (1997). This can 
be considered a classic text in the field. In the following extract, Clark draws on the example 
of assembling a jigsaw, to introduce the idea of ‘action loops’. 
‘One (unlikely) way to tackle such a puzzle would be to look very hard at a piece 
and to try to determine by reason alone whether it will fit in a certain location. Our 
actual practice, however, exploits a mixed strategy in which we make a rough 
mental determination and then physically try out the piece to see if it will fit. We do 
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not, in general, represent the detailed shape of a piece well enough to know for 
certain if it is going to fit in advance of such a physical manipulation. Moreover, we 
may physically rotate candidate pieces even before we try to fit them, so as to 
simplify even the more "mentalistic" task of roughly assessing potential fit. […] 
Completing a jigsaw puzzle thus involves an intricate and iterated dance in which 
"pure thought" leads to actions which in turn change or simplify the problems 
confronting "pure thought.'' This is probably the simplest kind of example of the 
phenomena known as action loops’ (ibid., p.36) 
 
A critical foundation for both Clark’s theory, and my later analyses of tool use, is a bi-
directional understanding of thought and action. The action loops used when assembling a 
jigsaw demonstrate this back and forth character. The theory of extended mind promotes the 
idea that actions are performed not just to advance toward a goal, but also to help work 
things out. Rather than seeing tool use as a means by which to transcribe predetermined 
forms onto paper, screens, or three-dimensional materials, an extended approach to 
cognition recognizes that there are occasions when tools are used to find out what these 
forms should be. Cognitive scientists David Kirsh and Paul Maglio here provide a useful 
distinction, by describing two kinds of action: pragmatic action and epistemic action (Kirsh 
and Maglio 1994) (see 4.2 for a longer discussion of this idea). The former refers to actions 
intended ‘to bring one physically closer to a goal’ (ibid., p.513), and the latter sees actions 
‘performed to uncover information that is hidden or hard to compute mentally’ (ibid.). For 
example, rearranging Scrabble tiles or jigsaw pieces can be considered epistemic action in 
that the tiles are moved to help reveal how they might be used in the game. When parts of 
the world are used in this way—so that, ‘were it done in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in recognizing [it] as part of the cognitive process’—then Clark and Chalmers 
believe the things used should be recognized as the components of minds. ‘In a very real 
sense,’ they write, ‘the re-arrangement of [Scrabble] tiles on the tray is not part of action; it 
is part of thought’ (1998, p.10). 
Importantly for my study, the theory of extended mind proposes that wherever we find such 
epistemic action, a ‘spread of epistemic credit’ should occur across the non-human 
components of minds (ibid., p.8). The studies of technique discussed throughout Chapters 5 
and 6 are my attempt to bestow tools with epistemic credit, and an exploration of how we 
can better understand design tools and techniques in these terms.  
For archaeologists, the theory of extended mind has offered a new methodological 
foundation from which to consider the relationship between thought and things. In the 
traditions of the discipline, as Carl Knappett describes, there was a ‘Cartesian’ tendency to 
treat the mind as a ‘domain separate from the body and the world’ (2005, p.35). Material 
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remains were studied in an effort to understand behaviour, which could be interpreted as the 
expression of antecedent thoughts in the minds of people. Although this might remain ‘the 
implicit model behind most archaeological accounts of prehistoric cognition’ (Malafouris 
2004 p.54), Knappett is part of recent efforts in archaeology to move beyond this separation 
of mind and world (see also DeMarrais, Gosden and Renrew 2004; Renfrew 2010; Knappett 
and Malafouris 2008).  
Knappett is critical of the way this understanding portrays the body as a passive receptor of 
stimuli from the environment and the brain as a ‘kind of central processing unit’, which 
interprets sensory information and formulates responses to be ‘conveyed to the body and 
enacted in the external environment’ (2005, p.35). By drawing on the insight of extended 
mind theory and associated work, Knappett attempts to develop a distributed, situated and 
embodied approach to cognition and material culture. Central to this effort is the idea that 
actions are not always performed to realise antecedent representations in the brains of 
people, or even to move them towards a goal. By demonstrating the possibility that some 
actions are a part of thought, Knappett aims to undermine any dualism of mind and world. 
3.2.3. Material Engagement Theory 
In his book, How Things Shape Mind (2013), Lambros Malafouris  presents the same 
criticisms of internalist accounts of cognition that we find in the above literature. His 
position towards archaeological theory and practice is similar to that of Carl Knappett. In 
short, Malafouris believes that his discipline’s assumptions about the relationship between 
cognition and action need to be redressed. Malafouris sketches out the failings of these 
assumptions in a familiar fashion—they are ‘dualist’, ‘internalist’, ‘neurocentric’ (ibid., p.3), 
and ‘tend to leave material culture outside the cognitive equation’ (ibid., p.10). In How 
Things Shape Mind, Malafouris develops his ‘Material Engagement Theory’ as a way 
beyond these shortcomings. It is intended to offer ‘a new relational ontological foundation’ 
(ibid., p.35). 
Material Engagement Theory is founded on an extended understanding of mind. The 
“relational ontology” connects people and things according to the idea that they may be 
understood as cognitive systems. The boundary of the “mind” is, therefore, one of 
Malafouris’ recurring themes. For archaeological studies, the implications and appeal of 
extended mind theory is easy to understand. In a discipline concerned with studying material 
remains, if those remains may be reconceived as the components of cognitive systems, it 
certainly advances their epistemological potential. Rather than being the results of cognitive 
processes, artefacts can be understood as parts of those processes. For Malafouris’ interests 
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in the prehistory of mind, and the evolution of human intelligence, this gives reason to be 
enthusiastic. There is no prehistoric brain tissue to study, and no early hominins to put in an 
MRI scanner. Bits of material culture are all that is left. 
In a novel interpretation of ancient cave engravings, Malafouris neatly demonstrates the 
potential of the material engagement perspective. Instead of understanding carving as a 
means to externalise representations of an image held inside the mind of a prehistoric carver, 
Malafouris argues that the process of engraving might have been a ‘technique through which 
a new consciousness of the physical world was attained’ (ibid., p.202). The depictions, 
according to Malafouris, offered people a ‘kind of perception of the world that was not 
previously available’ (Ibid., p.203). In this way, the carvings are what Clark and Chalmers 
would consider a part of thought, rather than merely the results of action. They are 
components of minds, and can be studied as such. 
Although developed from an archaeological perspective, I’ve found Malafouris’ material 
engagement theory to offer a valuable insight into the potential application of work on 
extended mind. I find two of his contributions particularly valuable: the description and 
study of the ‘chrono-architecture’ of techniques (as discussed in 2.6.12), and his evaluation 
of the state-of-the-art in extended mind theory. It is this latter contribution that I explore 
here. 
In The Extended Mind, Clark and Chalmers introduce the idea of “active externalism”. For 
Malafouris, this represents a crucial aspect of the theory. It is important to recognise, 
explains Malafouris, that the theory of extended mind had a precedent in “externalism”. This 
position, now widely-acknowledged, takes the view that cognitive content can be 
externalised. In a diary, for example, proponents of externalism would see an externalisation 
of our memory. Where Clark and Chalmers’ active externalism developed this idea was to 
understand not just static content as externalised, but also dynamic cognitive processes. 
Malafouris writes: 
‘Whereas mainstream externalism (or the idea of external symbolic storage) implies 
externalization of cognitive content, active externalism implies externalization of 
cognitive states and processes. For active externalism, marks made with a pen on 
paper are not an ongoing external record of the contents of mental states; they are an 
extension of those states. Cognition and action arise together, dialectically forming 
each other. There is a huge ontological distance between a mind able to externalize 
its contents to material structures and a mind whose states and processes aren't 
limited by the skin’ (ibid., p.74) 
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In Gedenryd’s example of designerly drawing, this is the ‘[t]hinking and sketching’ that ‘go 
on in parallel and mutually enable one another to move forward’ (1998, p.104). We do not 
draw just to externalise ideas that may then be evaluated. The process of sketching is a 
process of thought. As Malafouris describes, it is important to fully appreciate this 
implication of active externalism. It is very much distinguished from the more mundane, less 
controversial idea of externalised content. And it asks us to dispense of any lingering notion 
of discrete internal and external mental processes (see also Aydin 2015). ‘In a very 
important sense,’ writes Malafouris, ‘from the perspective of material engagement, 
cognition has no location. The active mind cannot be contained. Cognition is not a "within" 
property; it is a "between" property’ (2013, p.85, emphasis in original). This idea of 
cognition being “between” the features of a cognitive system is an idea I return to in Chapter 
5, when I present one of the features of epistemic character—the questions posed by a 
technique (5.1).  
3.2.4. Distributing Cognition and Planning 
I have outlined the theory of extended mind here because I believe it offers a readily 
understood introduction to the theoretical foundation underlying this project. It should be 
noted, however, that Clark and Chalmers were not, and are not, lone voices in calling for this 
view of cognition. Examples of a similarly distributed approach stretch back before Clark 
and Chalmers’ theorizing of the extended mind (see, for example, Suchman 1987; Hutchins 
1995; and Pickering 1995). And in more recent years, such examples can be found with 
ever-increasing frequency (see, for example, Ingold 2013, Malafouris 2013, Bennett 2009). 
I’ve relied on the theory of extended mind here not to suggest that it is unique but because, 
in and among the different terminologies applied by various authors, it offers a concise 
explication of this general, cross-disciplinary tendency toward distributed models of 
cognition5. In The Extended Mind, Clark and Chalmers are themselves alert to the 
similarities between their own work and that of others; they draw on other studies to stress 
that their work is much more than an exercise in redefining the word “mind”: ‘[S]eeing 
cognition as extended is not merely making a terminological decision,’ but proposing a way 
of thinking about cognition that ‘makes a significant difference to the methodology of 
scientific investigation’ (1998, p.10). They use the work of others to demonstrate that 
conceiving the mind as a system that includes features of the external environment allows 
interactions with that environment to be subjected to novel analyses. 
                                                      
5 See also Sutton (2006), for a discussion of the relationship between the theories of 
distributed cognition and extended mind. 
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A classic text in the field of distributed cognition is Edwin Hutchins’ book Cognition in The 
Wild (1995). As an anthropologist, cognitive scientist, and open-ocean racing sailor, 
Hutchins develops an account of cognition in the context of nautical navigation. The “wild” 
aspect of his work is that this is a resolutely “real-life” study of cognition, not one conducted 
through a series of laboratory tests. Through time spent aboard naval vessels, Hutchins 
develops a description of how sailors navigate that focusses not just on individual minds, but 
large groups of people and an environment filled with instrumentation. Hutchins’ concern is 
to describe how this system of people and things is not guided by a detailed plan held 
centrally: the knowledge required to solve the problem of navigation is instead spread across 
each component of the cognitive system (ibid., p.199). In Clark and Chambers’ terminology, 
it could be said that Hutchins spreads epistemic credit across this system of people and 
things. 
This criticism of centralized planning and control is typical of distributed or extended 
approaches to cognition. It is a theme taken up by Clark in Being There, where he describes 
the situation we have seen identified in Gedenryd’s “folk” theories as a ‘classical 
disembodied vision of planning’ (1997, p.63). This ‘imagines, in effect, that complex 
sequences of actions are determined by an internalized version of [a] set of instructions’ 
(ibid.). It is to assume a linear, one-way path from intention to planning to action, where we 
adopt the idea of ‘plan-as-program’ (ibid., p.63) and infer that ‘there exists layer upon layer 
of increasingly minute plans exhaustively controlling our every move’ (Costall and Leudar 
1996b, p.169). Of course, no description of planning, however (ir)rational, would suggest 
that plans are infallible. It is uncontroversial to admit that plans often go awry. But what 
Clark, Hutchins and the following examples propose is to fundamentally rethink plans as 1) 
non-internalised, and 2) not entirely specified. 
In Hutchins’ study of navigation, for example, the idea that plans can be centralised, 
internalised or entirely specified is discredited by the observation that no member of the 
crew, even the captain, knows in detail every action that must contribute to a successfully 
steered course. Instead, each person and instrument is doing its own small bit, responding to 
what Clark calls ‘local environmental alterations’ (1997, p.77) with an appropriate action. It 
is the collective force of people responding to these partial commands, which in turn create 
the situations for other subsequent actions, that leads, step-by-step, to successful navigation. 
That all these human actions are performed using tools and instruments that themselves 
structure and support cognition, in an environment organised to ‘reduce the complexity of 
problem solving’ (ibid.), leads Hutchins to claim that cognition in the wild is fundamentally 
distributed. 
 68 
Whilst Hutchins’ discussion focusses on a situation that is collaborative—navigation is a 
joint enterprise with multiple human actors—other, similarly themed, criticisms of the plan-
as-program understanding also demonstrate its flaws at the individual level. One such 
(likewise water-based) example can be found in anthropologist Lucy Suchman’s description 
of canoeing down a set of rapids (1987, p.52). Whilst Suchman acknowledges that a canoeist 
at the top of the rapids would develop a loose plan of how to negotiate the hazards in front 
of them; by, for example, aiming to get as far to the left as possible, or using large rocks as 
waymarks for certain turns, it does not follow that it is this plan that controls the action. 
‘[T]he purpose of the plan in this case’, writes Suchman, ‘is not to get your canoe through 
the rapids, but rather to orient you in such a way that you can obtain the best possible 
position from which to use those embodied skills on which, in the final analysis, your 
success depends.’ (ibid.) This canoe analogy is taken from Suchman’s book Plans and 
Situated Actions, in which she develops and promotes the idea of “situated action” in order 
to capture the emergent nature of action, as it is created through ‘moment-by-moment 
interactions’ between people and their environment (ibid., p.179). 
Whilst Suchman thus recognises that plans do play a role, she claims their execution is 
always situated in changeable contexts and requires intelligent improvisation6. The situated 
action approach proposes a rebalancing of the dominance of planning and plans, by 
promoting, in Clark’s words, the ‘complex interplay between the plan and the supporting 
environment’ (1997, p.63).  
To return to the subject of instructional literature discussed in the previous chapter (2.6.5), 
we here find an analogy to the idea of plans as loose resources, rather than programs for 
action. The sequences of action specified by instructional texts are kinds of plans. They are 
not, however, highly specified plans that make explicit every feature of practice. As 
philosophers Costall and Leudar observe in a discussion of instructional texts on skiing and 
wallpapering (1996b), such guides do not specify every detail, but they specify enough to be 
useful7.  
Anthropologists Charles Keller and Janet Keller, here provide a useful term—“umbrella 
plan” (1996) (see 5.3.1). An umbrella plan is created before work begins and ‘integrates the 
                                                      
6 On this point, Suchman (1987, p.200) for an interesting discussion of David Turnbull’s 
work on Gothic building, and how it is the under specification of plans that makes them 
work. 
7 On this subject, philosopher Beth Preston presents and interesting discussion of cooking 
by following recipes (2013, see p.39-43), as does philosopher Andrew Harrison (1978, see 
p.71-2). 
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overarching formal goal with an outline of a rough procedural sequence for attainment […]. 
Enacting the initial steps and evaluating the material results of that action allow an 
individual to revise and elaborate the umbrella plan and further specify steps for attaining 
the increasingly detailed representation of the end product’ (ibid., p.127). In the context of 
their study—a traditional blacksmith’s workshop—Keller and Keller suggest that the 
concept of an umbrella plan, which is open to revision throughout production, helps to move 
‘beyond analyses that would focus exclusively on either mind or matter to see their 
integration and mutually constitutive contributions to planning and production’ (ibid., p.23). 
This allows Keller and Keller to appreciate the productive influence not just of ideas internal 
to the smith, but also recognise the effect of their tools, techniques, templates, workshop 
arrangement, and the behaviour of the iron itself.  
It seems obvious that this degree of material engagement would be fundamental to a craft as 
physical blacksmithing. Interestingly, however, Keller and Keller do not aim only to identify 
the nature of a smith’s work; they are also eager to extrapolate from the specifics of their 
chosen context to develop a more general account of human accomplishment. And it is on 
this theme, of what might be called “ubiquitous material engagement”, that I end this section 
with. To do so, I turn to another account of the role of the world in human performance—
sociologist of science Andrew Pickering’s characterisation of scientific practice. Even 
though it might seem far removed from the apparently ancient techniques of blacksmithing, 
the techno-scientific examples Pickering draws upon tell the same tale of moment-by-
moment interaction with the world. 
In The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency and Science, Pickering argues that there is a 
popular misconception of scientists as ‘disembodied intellects making knowledge in a field 
of facts and observations’ (1995, p.6). This casts the practice of science as somehow 
removed from the world of materials, aiming to produce knowledge chiefly through models 
and representations. Pickering’s aim is to rebalance this understanding, by emphasising the 
material conditions of practical science. Scientists, Pickering reminds us, conduct 
experiments in the real world. They encounter the same material resistances that everyone 
else does—as we do things to the world, it does things back and, very often, this response is 
not the one that was either intended or expected. Things go wrong, models and machines 
don’t work, goals are often revised throughout. Far from a predominantly conceptual 
activity, Pickering therefore suggests we think of scientific practice as a ‘dance of agency’, 
between human and non-human actors (ibid., p.21)8. In this dance, scientists shift between 
                                                      
8 I return to the notion of agency in more detail in section 5.3. 
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periods of activity and passivity, between doing things—modifying a machine, mixing a 
new compound, introducing a new variable—and then monitoring the results. There is a 
back and forth between themselves and an emergent result. 
According to his interest in Science and Technology Studies (STS), Pickering draws 
examples from experimental particle physics and the early days of computer numerically 
controlled (CNC) machine tools. In each case study, he is interested in demonstrating how 
the metaphorical dance of agency plays out, as people try, and often fail, to get machines to 
perform as they would like. For Pickering, material agency is ‘temporally emergent in 
practice’ (ibid., p.14)—it is what the world “does back” in response to human agency. 
Importantly, despite popular conceptions of science that might champion representation and 
predication, Pickering argues that ‘[t]he contours of material agency are never decisively 
known in advance, scientists continually have to explore them in their work, problems 
always arise and have to be solved in the development of […] new machines’ (ibid.). What 
might be considered the umbrella plans of scientists and technologists are thus respondent to 
change in the same manner as Keller and Keller’s blacksmiths. Just like when working with 
heterogeneous molten iron, Pickering stresses that the apparently unknowable properties of 
the material world also affect techno-scientific practice. Pickering calls this interaction a 
‘dialectic of resistance and accommodation’ (ibid., p.39), where resistances are a block on 
the path towards a goal (caused by emergent material agency), and accommodations are 
ways of incorporating this new reality into a revised approach, made in response to the 
resistance. It is in this way that materials and humans become partners in Pickering’s dance9.  
The notion of material agency leads us to the next section, where I wish to discuss what 
could be considered the philosophical foundation to many of the subjects discussed above. 
To first return briefly to the topic of plan-making (the thread that lead us out of Rittel’s 
description of design practice), however, I hope the discussion of extended and distributed 
models of cognition has helped to illuminate the following claim: whilst it is reasonable to 
understand design as a plan-making enterprise, it is important to recognise that those plans 
must be made. And they are not made in advance of their material realisation, but “along-
the-way”, through episodes of material engagement. 
                                                      
9 Further to Pickering’s work, an interesting perspective on the similarities between 
scientific and design practice can be found in Glanville (1999, specifically p.86-91) 
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3.3. Two Philosophies of Design 
“How are things made?” This is a question that might seem to prompt the clarification, “how 
is what made?” Whilst we are accustomed to enquiring about the specific production 
processes of particular objects: “how is a brick made?”; “how is a light bulb made?”; “how 
is a cricket bat made?”, to consider the question at a more general level, “How are things 
made?”, is to expose the kind of widely-held assumptions about the processes of designing 
and making (and thought and action more generally) described above.  
As found in Alberti’s account of architectural practice, the orthodox answer to the question 
could be summarised as follows: 
Things are made according to a design. An intention exists in advance of 
production, in isolation from its realisation in material. During processes of 
designing and making, pre-conceived forms are imposed upon the material world. A 
practitioner thus makes something by starting with an idea of what they want to 
achieve, and then manipulating materials until they take on this form. (see Ingold 
2010 for similar formulations) 
Having already discussed criticisms of the linear relationship between thought and action 
that underlies this statement (a point to which I return in the following chapter), I now wish 
to consider what might be an alternative answer. For disciplines interested in people’s 
relationship with the material world, this kind of investigation is already a key concern. 
Anthropology, archaeology and philosophy thus provide me with useful guides. As the 
assumptions upon which the orthodox view is based have come under increasing challenge 
in these disciplines, new approaches to the question of ‘How are things made?’ have been 
developed (see, for example, Malafouris 2013; Ingold 2013). Because the foundation of this 
default approach runs deep through Western thought, it is typical for these new approaches 
to first retrace this idea back to a fundamental dualism between mind and matter (see, for 
example Knappett 2005; Preston 2013; Conneller 2011). What they find is a separation 
between the world of ideas (mind) and the world of materials (matter). In essence, the 
revised approaches to the question of ‘How are things made?’ share a common theme—
which we have already found in work on the extended mind—to reunite and rebalance this 
relationship between people and the world.  
3.3.1. Aristotle and Hylomorphism 
A recurring theme in discussions of the philosophy of designing and making is to trace the 
division between form (the idea, or design, that exists in advance of its material realisation) 
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and matter back to Aristotle (see, for example, Protevi 2001; Gedenryd 1998; Ingold 2013; 
De Landa 2001; El-Zanfaly 2015). In A Philosophy of Material Culture (2013), Beth Preston 
provides a detailed account of Aristotle’s contribution to this idea. Summarising his text in 
Metaphysics, Preston describes how Aristotle’s production process ‘starts with a 
specification of the thing to be produced (the form in the mind of the producer)’, after which 
‘the ensuing deliberation or thinking concerns the specification of the steps by which this 
form may be realized in matter. So, at the end of the thinking process, the producer has in 
her mind a mental design for the product’ (ibid., p.18). Preston then goes on to observe the 
division Aristotle thus creates between designing and making; 
‘Aristotle suggests that this mental design is finished prior to the production proper, 
the actual construction. So, for Aristotle, there are two clearly demarcated phases in 
the overall production process—an antecedent design phase and a subsequent 
construction phase. Moreover, since all of the thinking is relegated to the design 
phase, the construction phase must be a matter of unintelligent execution of the step-
by-step instructions. Thus, for Aristotle, the real interest of production lies in the 
mental process of design, not the actual construction process.’ (ibid., p.18) 
It is easy to see, from Preston’s summary of Aristotle’s work on production, why he has 
been co-opted as the archenemy of those proposing non-dualist interpretations of designing 
and making. His concept, sometimes referred to by its technical term—hylomorphism 
(owing to its bringing together of hyle, or matter, and morphe, or form)—is often understood 
to be at the root of divisions between thought and action. 
In Political Physics (2001), John Protevi offers a useful account of the philosophy 
hylomorphism. Drawing on the work of fellow philosophers Deleuze and Guattari (1988) 
(themselves indebted to Gilbert Simondon - see Bennett 2009, p.56), Protevi contrasts the 
behaviour of the “architect” with that of the “artisan”, to illustrate the hylomorphic model 
with reference to material engagement (ibid. p.8). The architect here becomes the archetype 
of hylomorphism, defiantly refusing to ‘surrender’ to the inherent properties, or resistances, 
of materials. Forever seeking to ‘command’ materials from afar, the architect treats matter as 
an inert substrate for a preordained form (ibid.). The artisan, on the other hand, who is 
(following Deleuze and Guattari’s example) a woodworker, does surrender to materials. The 
artisan is receptive to the self-ordering potential of timber and his or her forms are thus 
developed according to these ‘suggested potentials of the matter rather than being dreamed 
up and then imposed on a passive matter’ (ibid.). 
It should be noted that the “architect” of Protevi’s discussion is only ‘an ideal figure of 
hylomorphism’ (ibid, footnote 23). Protevi uses the metaphor of architect vs. artisan as a 
means to contrast two modes of material engagement, which might be considered the 
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opposite ends of a spectrum, rather than discrete categories. Protevi thus points out that the 
observation that ‘a real person with the professional title “architect” is aware of material 
limitations to the imposition of form is no escape from hylomorphism’ (ibid,). The “ideal 
architect” is intended as a useful illustration of a way of thinking. It serves, for example, to 
illustrate the political angle to Protevi’s work, which sees him build out from the specifics of 
material engagement, towards broader concerns—he sees the hylomorphic idea ‘that a 
simple unchanging commanding origin is responsible for change in others [as] one of the 
fundamental philosophical issues of the West’ (ibid., p.8). Promoting instead the artisanal 
ideal of recognising and coaxing forth the inherent properties of materials, argues Protevi, 
might offer a valuable shift in behaviour. 
Protevi’s contrast of the architect and artisan, and their alternative approaches to material 
engagement, is the same idea (also borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari) that we find in an 
essay by Manuel De Landa. De Landa describes two ‘different philosophies of design, or 
what amounts to the same thing, two theories for the genesis of form’ (2001, p.132). The 
first of these theories aligns to Protevi’s architectural approach: it is the one underlying 
Alberti’s separation of a design and its execution, and the derivatives that have followed 
since. In this theory, ‘one thinks of form or design as primarily conceptual or cerebral, 
something to be generated as a pure thought in isolation from the messy world of matter and 
energy. Once conceived, a design can be given physical form by simply imposing it on a 
material substratum, which is taken to be homogenous, obedient and receptive to the wishes 
of the designer.’ (ibid.) ‘The opposite stance’, De Landa describes, ‘would be represented by 
a philosophy of design in which materials are not inert receptacles for a cerebral form 
imposed from the outside, but active participants in the genesis of form. This implies the 
existence of heterogeneous materials, with variable properties and idiosyncrasies which the 
designer must respect and make an integral part of a design process’ (ibid.). 
De Landa presents these two philosophies of design alongside a discussion of materials. The 
first, he suggests, is encouraged, and in many ways satisfied, by a modern material like steel. 
Drawing on the work of materials scientist James E. Gordon, De Landa suggests that the 
highly uniform, predictable behaviour of steel makes it ideally suited to being manipulated 
following a hylomorphism-inspired approach. Indeed, Gordon suggests that the widespread 
adoption of steel has as much to do with this predictability, as it does steel’s technical 
properties (Gordon 1988, see p.135). The accumulated experience of working with the 
material has enabled the design of many components (Gordon cites the example of gear 
wheels) to be routinized, as designers can be assured that the steel parts will behave exactly 
as expected. 
 74 
In contrast to the obedience of steel, De Landa presents the heterogeneous iron of an historic 
blacksmith as a typically artisanal material. Depending on the fluctuating availability of 
material at their local foundry, the properties of the smith’s iron would vary markedly, 
requiring that they be sensitive to its individual characteristics, and sympathetically coax it 
into shape. De Landa considers the successive heating, hammering, annealing and quenching 
of the artisan, in this way, to be “non-routinisable”; they must always be alert to the 
emergent nature of their work and develop forms accordingly.   
In comparing the practiced, dexterous techniques of a blacksmith with modern steel 
fabrication, De Landa risks equating the contrast between the hylomorphic model and his 
alternative proposition with a distinction between “craft” and “industry”. It might seem, on 
the strength of these examples, that the two “philosophies of design”, or “theories of the 
genesis of form”, introduced by De Landa can be understood chronologically—on a timeline 
running from the embodied knowledge of traditional smiths, up to the standardised and 
computer-modelled creations of modern engineering. We might thus interpret an increasing 
command over materials and the associated philosophy of hylomorphism as an inevitable 
consequence of industrialisation. Indeed, in his analysis of steel and its effect upon design 
processes, James Gordon writes that it is ‘archetypically, the material of big business—of 
large factories, railroads and so on’ (ibid.). As material science becomes more and more 
adept at controlling the properties and behaviours of materials, industrialised production 
seems to resemble ever more closely the model of ideal forms being imposed upon inert, 
docile and receptive matter10. Before subscribing to this understanding, however, it will be 
useful to investigate the idea of craft, and the validity of contrasting it with a thing called 
industry. 
3.3.2. Craft and The Control of Materials 
The ‘fantasy of control over materiality’, writes Glenn Adamson, ‘is one of the signature 
elements of modernity’ (2013, p.89). In the context of contemporary techniques, this fantasy 
is perhaps most clearly expressed in the efforts to develop digital materials. As computer 
scientist Neil Gershenfeld describes, the current ambition is to develop components just a 
few nanometers long, which can be programmed to self-assemble and disassemble with one 
another using Lego-like alignment mechanisms (2012). This is quite different to existing 
digitally-controlled fabrication techniques, which control the motion of tools that manipulate 
                                                      
10 Elsewhere, however, Gordon reminds us that, whilst our idealised models of materials 
treats them as static and unchanging, this is only ever an abstraction of reality. See, in 
particular, his discussion of ‘creep’, which, despite the contrary assumptions of elementary 
Hookean elasticity, sees substances move over time under a constant load (1978, p.145-8). 
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analogue materials. Our current digital techniques are limited by the properties of the 
material being worked, the accumulation of errors throughout processes, and the size of the 
machine. The individual building blocks11 of digital materials, however, would snap together 
without error; define their own spacing and thus grow to any size outwith a machine bed; be 
designed to have electrical and magnetic properties; and, once the assemblies are no longer 
required, they could be broken back down to a bag of bits. Gershenfeld expects digital 
materials to one day be used to make things from tiny ‘3D-integrated circuits’, up to ‘larger 
structures, such as aircraft components and even whole aircraft that will be lighter, stronger, 
and more capable than today’s planes—think a jumbo jet that can flap its wings’ (ibid., 
p.52). The ultimate aspiration is to revolutionise all manufacturing processes, to the degree 
that things are no longer moulded, machined or forged, but all assembled from a set of cell-
like parts. In the promise of digital materials then, we find a recurring theme in technology, 
of technical developments inspiring radical new visions of human production.  
In The Invention of Craft, Adamson describes how the newly-available materials of papier 
mâché, rubber and cast iron appeared to Victorians to ‘short-circuit traditional 
understandings of making’, allowing technique to operate independently of the human hand 
(2013, p.89). The remarkable plasticity of these materials—their capacity to be moulded into 
complex shapes—differentiated them from the materials of old. In the face of new technical 
possibilities, existing practices began to be regarded as an entirely different kind of 
production. It is in this context, argues Adamson, that “craft” was invented. 
Advances in the techniques for casting iron had a particularly dramatic effect, leading 
‘immediately to the idea of the blacksmith as a figure rooted in the past, or at best the 
pastoral scenery of the countryside’ (ibid., p.79). Well before the modern steel of De 
Landa’s comparison then, it was the innovations of coke (as a fuel for the smelting furnace) 
and the steam engine (to continually pump air through the furnace)12 that made possible the 
foundry’s development, and began to erode the smith’s monopoly on the business of 
metalwork.  
During this time of industrialisation, Adamson argues that the opposition of craft and 
industry was also engendered by inventors and innovators seeking protection from newly 
devised patent systems. The likes of Wedgwood, Babbage and Edison were eager to 
distinguish themselves from the ‘echelon of artisans’, and did so by defining invention in 
purely intellectual terms—‘a matter of the mind alone that was not guided by human hands’ 
                                                      
11 For an interesting critique of the metaphor of “building blocks” see Ingold (2013b). 
12 See p.76 of Adamson (2013)  
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(ibid., p.74). Creativity was thus promoted in terms cerebral novelty, and the technical 
expertise of craftspeople was characterised as a matter of mere mechanical execution13. Here 
we find, perhaps surprisingly, that a dualism of mind and matter, and the hylomorphic model 
of production, played their part in the genesis of popular ideas about “craft”14. 
 
In truth of course, as Adamson documents throughout his book, there is more to making than 
mechanical execution. Technicians, even those working with apparently pre-determined 
techniques, must still negotiate the resistances of their tools and materials. No doubt the 
work going on at Gershenfeld’s Centre for Bits and Atoms in MIT is highly experimental, 
requiring the same dance of agency found in Pickering’s other techno-scientific settings. 
Looking to the history of digital fabrication, this point is demonstrated in David Noble’s 
illuminating account of the introduction of computer-numerically-controlled (CNC) machine 
tools to a General Electric (GE) production plant (1986; see also, Pickering 1995, p.157-
176). On GE’s factory floor, the expected narratives about deskilling and rises in efficiency 
did not apply. It was only the improvisatory practice of machinists that eventually enabled 
GE’s CNC techniques to be successfully implemented. Although such feats of technical 
expertise are “hidden” by the time artefacts roll off a production line, both Noble and 
Adamson show us that, behind-the-scenes, “craft” and “industry” are inextricably linked. 
3.3.3. How Things are Made 
By dividing the architectural and the artisanal modes of production, we introduce a dualism. 
In light of much of the above literature’s efforts to discredit the dualisms of mind/matter, 
thought/action, or designing/making, this seems an odd strategy. And, according to our 
examination of the origin of this distinction, nor does it appear particularly substantive. The 
concept of craft was created in response to industry, but the two fields of production were 
always, and remain, co-dependent15. To return to our prototypical architect, we have read 
                                                      
13 Tim Ingold and Elizabeth Hallam have presented an interesting criticism to this 
association of creativity with novelty. They challenge ‘the polarity between novelty and 
convention, or between the innovative dynamic of the present and the traditionalism of the 
past, that has long formed such a powerful undercurrent to the discourses of modernity’ 
(2006, p.2). Their strategy is to focus on the creativity of improvisation, rather than the 
novelty of creativity. As Beth Preston suggests similarly, ‘improvisation displays a kind of 
creativity distributed throughout the action itself’ (2013, p.91). 
14 A defining characteristic of “craft”, for example, is identified by sociologist Richard 
Sennett as the capacity to solve problems as one goes (2008, p.19-20). Adamson shows that 
innovators were cast in opposition to this, as those working in the idealised model of Alberti: 
thinking, planning and solving before they acted. 
15 As seen in David Pye’s discussion of the reliance of factory production on the 
workmanship of risk (1968, p.23), and David Knott’s discussion of contemporary amateur 
craft practice (2015) 
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about how Alberti’s actual building practice failed to live up to his representational 
aspirations. As Protevi cautions us then, these two philosophies of design should only be 
understood as the poles of a spectrum. 
In an essay that helpfully applies the hylomorphic model in the context of artisanal 
production, philosopher Vilém Flusser leaves us between these poles, in the middle ground. 
Using the example of a wooden table, Flusser explains that, following hylomorphism, we 
can take the actual material table (which we could eat a meal around) to be a transient 
realisation of an eternal table form (which can be held forever in our imaginations) (1999, 
p.24). Whilst the table itself will one day rot or be burned for fuel, the design for that table, 
its form, stands apart from the material world and is ever-lasting. Like those examples 
discussed above, Flusser traces the origins of this idea back to its Greek root (ibid., p.22). To 
make a table according to this philosophy is to impose an eternal form onto materials. ‘This 
illustrates’, Flusser writes, ‘what carpenters do: They take the form of a table (the idea of a 
table) and impose it upon an amorphous piece of wood. The tragedy here is that in so doing 
they not only in-form the wood (impose the table form on it) but also deform the idea of the 
table (distort it in the wood). The tragedy is therefore that it is impossible to make an ideal 
table’ (ibid., p.24). When up against the recalcitrant nature of timber, the carpenter’s hopes 
of controlling materials remain a fantasy16.  
I suggest the best way to get over such a tragedy is to recognise that it is just the way things 
are. This is what opponents of the hylomorphic model are advocating. Although it is a 
caricatured account, the dualism of architect and artisan serves the purpose of exposing 
assumptions that might otherwise go unrecognised. It forces us to reconsider the folk theory 
of action described by Gedenryd, and challenge the dominant theory of production that 
disregards the role of material engagement. This more emergent17 understanding of 
designing and making suggests an enhanced appreciation for the making of designs. And, 
crucially for my study, we find an interactive relationship between doing and thinking. 
                                                      
16 As David Pye observes, ‘[t]he only considerable technical limitations on design are 
imposed by our ineptitude at processing material […]. It seems unlikely that this deficiency 
will ever be made good’ (1978, p.44) 
17 I use “emergent” here in two senses: firstly, it captures the emergent nature of form 
throughout productive processes, a quality promoted in non-hylomorphic models. Second, I 
hope it speaks of the nascent, multidisciplinary and increasingly widespread attempts at 
shifting towards alternative theoretical models of making as an engagement with materials.  
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3.4. Summary 
To summarise the influence of the above literature on my research, it provides a theoretical 
grounding that: 
 
• Accepts that design is a plan-making discipline, but emphasises that those plans 
must be made through techniques. 
• Understands cognition to be spread between the various parts of a technique (the 
practitioner, tool and material), and therefore ascribes epistemic credit to each part. 
 
This chapter has covered ground from a range of disciplines, all in an effort to illuminate the 
distinction between designing and making. In Alberti’s foundational text, we found that the 
practical division of these two elements of production first took root in the architecture of 
the Renaissance. Through Bruce Archer and Horst Rittel, we saw how this division has 
continued to be an implicit assumption of more recent design theory.  
With Henrik Gedenryd’s work came an alternative understanding, that sought to reconcile 
the dualism of designing and making or, more generally, thought and action. This lead us 
away from design-focussed literature, into questioning the limits of “mind”. Here I hope to 
have shown that the excursion into the idea of “extended mind” and “distributed cognition” 
provides us with a useful foundation from which to re-evaluate the relationship of designing 
and making. A key contribution of this section was the idea that, even if we subscribe to the 
model of design as a plan-making discipline, the plans still need to be made with something. 
Another extra-disciplinary tangent followed, as we traced the philosophical underpinnings of 
Alberti’s theory, and contrasted them with an alternative philosophy of material 
engagement.  
I conclude with two quoted passages, in order to reaffirm what I believe is the advantage of 
the theoretical grounding developed in this chapter. Familiarising myself with the literature 
discussed above has had a significant impact upon how I interpret any writing on the subject 
of designing and making. Take, for example, design theorist Per Galle’s (admittedly 
propositional) definition of design: ‘[c]reatively proposing an idea, so as to enable yourself 
or others to make an artefact according to the idea’ (2011, p.93). Once sensitised to the 
theory of extended mind and criticisms of hylomorphism, I’ve found such a casual 
delineation of the realms of thinking and making to be quite jarring. And it often strikes me 
that work like Per Galle’s could be radically (and I would suggest beneficially) reconceived 
with reference to ideas like those I’ve been exploring. In the following two quoted passages 
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then, I contrast “the problem” of design theory’s internalist position, with “the solution” of 
Tim Ingold’s materially-engaged understanding. 
The first passage is from the same paper as Per Galle’s definition… 
‘[I]t seems to me that, to obtain a sufficiently deep understanding for coming up 
with a full-fledged foundational design theory, we need to address the vexed 
questions that arise from the simple fact […] that at the time a given artifact was 
designed, it did not exist. For example, according to a widely accepted 
understanding of properties, they are always properties of some existing entity. 
From this perspective, as long as the artifact did not exist, it could not have had any 
properties. Thus, at the time of its design, the artefact could not have had the 
particular property of serving its purpose. How then, could the designer know (or be 
confident) at that time that the artifact would eventually serve its purpose? 
Prediction rather than predication of properties appears to be involved, but what 
exactly does that mean, and what, if anything, makes it reliable? How, indeed, is 
design possible—thrusting forward, as it does, into an empty space of non-
existence?’ (2011, p.94) 
… and from Ingold’s book, Making… 
‘Artists, architects, composers and writers are likewise bent upon capturing the 
insights of an imagination always inclined to shoot off into the distance, and on 
bringing them back into the immediacy of material engagement. Like hunters, they 
too are dream catchers. Human endeavours, it seems, are forever poised between 
catching dreams and coaxing materials. In this tension, between the pull of hopes 
and dreams and the drag of material constraint, and not in any opposition between 
cognitive intellection and mechanical execution, lies the relation between design and 
making. It is precisely where the reach of the imagination meets the friction of 
materials, or where the forces of ambition rub up against the rough edges of the 
world, that human life is lived.’ (2013, p.74) 
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4. Making and Thinking 
 
This chapter considers the concept of epistemic action in the context of workshop practice. 
Epistemic actions are those that are performed in order to help work things out, to uncover 
new information and help people make decisions. The phrase was first introduced by 
cognitive scientists David Kirsh and Paul Maglio (1994), as they proposed that, contrary to 
much thinking about human behaviour, not all actions are strictly goal-directed. Whilst they 
acknowledge that pragmatic actions (actions that are intended to change the world in order 
to move a practitioner towards their goal) do exist, Kirsh and Maglio present the concept of 
epistemic actions to help discuss how some interactions with the world can be better 
understood as a means of thought. 
As described in the previous chapter, Kirsh and Maglio’s insight into the relationship of 
actions and thought, has helped theorists of the extended mind to question the distinction 
between an internal world of thought and an external world of action. Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers, for example, have argued that, epistemic action ‘demands a spread of epistemic 
credit’ (1998, p.8). This leads them to the conclusion that we should rethink the limits of the 
mind, such that it is not confined by the boundary of the skull, skin or body, but extends out 
into the world, as part of systems that include both people and things. From this theoretical 
grounding, this chapter explores the nature of epistemic action during the techniques of tool 
use. 
I begin by critiquing what craft theorist Glenn Adamson has called ‘the most compelling 
technical discussion of skilled work ever written’ (2007, p.72), David Pye’s book, The 
Nature and Art of Workmanship (1968). I argue that, whilst providing an enduringly useful 
account of making practice, Pye’s analyses are founded upon an entirely pragmatic 
understanding of action. In the same way that other studies of human and world interaction 
have benefitted from the richer perspective afforded by theories of epistemic action (see 
3.2), I aim to demonstrate what could be gained by applying this perspective to a study of 
workshop practice. Whilst I focus here on drawing out the pragmatic assumptions of David 
Pye’s famous work, I also suggest that the vision of production he describes is widespread in 
design literature. That is to say, I use Pye’s work as an exemplar to provide a more focused 
critique of the “default” model described in the previous chapter.  
Throughout the chapter, the hammer is a recurring example, used as an archetypal tool, and 
the basis for understanding the epistemic nature of tool use. Through an investigation of the 
nature of dexterity, I argue that a hammer is at once a tool for getting a job done, and an 
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instrument for reporting on the progress of a task. Hammer use and, I propose, techniques 
more generally, are both epistemic and pragmatic. 
4.1. The Problem with Pye 
This first section describes Pye’s best known contribution to the literature of designing and 
making—his definition of the workmanship of risk and the workmanship of certainty. I 
introduce these ideas with reference to the technique of hammering in a panel pin, and 
develop an argument that Pye relies on an entirely pragmatic account of action. 
4.1.1. Hammering a Panel Pin: The Workmanship of Risk 
To hammer a panel pin successfully requires practice. The first challenge is to locate the pin, 
driving it far enough into the wood so that it no longer needs to be supported by hand. 
Figure 4.1 shows how the thin, rounded cross peen of a Warrington pattern hammer allows a 
practitioner to avoid hitting his or her own fingers during this process (Watson 1982, see 
p.158-9). 
Figure 4. 1 Setting a pin using a Warrington pattern hammer 
 
This stage is critical to the success of the procedure—it is with these first few taps that the 
position and angle of the pin becomes determined. Subsequent strikes made with the round 
face of the hammer can only drive the pin further along this path (Figure 4.2). Once located, 
blows can be delivered to the pin with more force than before.  
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Figure 4. 2 Repeated hammer strikes drive pin along path 
 
At this stage, so long as the practitioner hits the pin squarely, to avoid bending it or slipping 
off the head, the chances of error have reduced. In rougher work where the finish is less 
critical, blows of increasing force are often used to drive a nail, aiming towards a final 
forceful strike that pushes the nail head below the wood’s surface and draws a joint up tight 
(Ibid., see p.163). For highly finished work however, it is more common for the last few 
blows to be less powerful, as care is taken not to bruise the timber surrounding the pinhead. 
Often, the pinhead is left slightly protruding and then driven into its final position using a 
nail set (Figure 4.3), in an effort to avoid so-called ‘French hammer marks’ (Figure 4.4) that 
will, according to woodwork writer Aldren Watson, ‘haunt the workman forever’ (ibid., 
p.163). 
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Figure 4. 3 Using a nail set 
 
Figure 4. 4 French hammer marks 
 
The procedure of hammering a panel pin into a piece of wood is an instance of what design 
and craft theorist David Pye calls the workmanship of risk. This phrase describes techniques 
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wherein the quality of the result is continually at risk and relies upon the ‘judgement, 
dexterity and care’ (1968, p.20) of a practitioner throughout the process.  
During the task of hammering a pin, the degree of risk varies. As a practitioner first locates 
the pin, the risk of it veering off course, or the hammer slipping and bruising the timber is 
high. It is at this stage that the judgement, dexterity and care about which David Pye writes 
are most critical. Once driven far enough into the timber so that it can support itself, 
however, the degree of risk drops. Tentative early blows can now become more forceful, as 
the pin is driven along its own length and guided by the fibres of the timber. The pin and the 
timber have become part of what Pye would call a determining system (Ibid., see p.21-2), a 
kind of jig that causes the outcome of the process to be more certain. Each blow fixes this 
outcome more and more firmly. As less of the pin is exposed above the timber’s surface, the 
chances of it bending are reduced. This state of relative certainty increases until the pinhead 
nears the wood’s surface, at which point the hammer strikes are eased. Whilst the 
determining system of pin and timber helps to guide the pin along its length, there is no such 
guidance to help stop it at the correct point. As the risk of French hammer marks increases 
then, the final few blows must reprise the tentative approach of the first. 
4.1.2. The Risk Profiles of Workshop Practice 
Throughout the duration of the process the degree of risk varies, creating what I term a risk 
profile. The variability of risk whilst hammering a pin may be plotted as in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4. 5 Risk profile of hammering 
 
David Pye did not consider how the risk of a process can vary throughout its duration, but 
the risk profiles shown here (Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7), demonstrate how his concept of risk 
in workmanship may be applied across various techniques. 
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Figure 4. 6 Risk profile of thicknessing a board with a bench plane 
 
Figure 4. 7 Risk profile of cutting an MDF part on a CNC router 
 
4.1.3. The Workmanship of Certainty 
In the above risk profiles of hammering, hand planing a board of timber to thickness and 
cutting an MDF (a relatively homogenous material without grain) part on a CNC machine, 
the vertical axes run from certainty to risk. David Pye introduced the concept of a 
workmanship of risk as a contrast to what he called the workmanship of certainty. Where the 
workmanship of risk describes processes that rely on continual adjustment, care and 
dexterity throughout, the workmanship of certainty applies to techniques wherein the results 
of production are ‘predetermined and unalterable once production begins’ (Ibid., p.22) (see, 
for example, the risk profile of the CNC machine, Figure 4.7). In its most ideal state, the 
workmanship of certainty would exist in a fully automated factory, through which materials 
are processed in an entirely predetermined manner. In practice, however, this condition 
could never be fully realised. Even the most homogeneous materials might occasionally vary 
in quality, and the tools of a factory will always be subject to wear, affecting their results. As 
observed in the risk profiles then, techniques of production are not either ‘risky’ or ‘certain’. 
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The workmanship of risk and that of certainty are not discreet categories into which 
techniques may be placed, but poles on a continuum of risk/certainty (Adamson 2007, see 
p.73). There are no absolutely certain manufacturing process and no absolutely risky ones 
either. And the degree of risk may vary throughout. 
4.1.4. The Enduring Relevance of Pye’s Analyses 
Pye’s workmanship of risk and certainty introduced, as craft theorist Glenn Adamson 
observes, a ‘purposeful reframing of [the] dichotomy between craft and industry, or hand 
and machine’ (Ibid., p.73). By defining production in terms of risk and certainty, Pye’s 
analyses can be applied universally across different processes, scales, types of production 
and work environments. The Nature and Art of Workmanship considers all kinds of making, 
from the free workmanship of Pye’s own wood carving practice, to the highly regulated 
manufacture of industrially-produced artefacts. Pye is quick to insist that even the largest 
volume manufacturing processes can rely on the workmanship of risk at some point. And he 
uses his woodworking experience to describe how the seemingly unguided chisel is inclined 
to travel in a certain direction, with the shape of its bevel and the grain of the timber forming 
a semi-determining system (1968, see p.28) (Figure 4.8). The universal nature of Pye’s 
analyses gives them a lasting relevance and appeal. Even in the context of contemporary, 
digitally controlled manufacture, where one-off artefacts are made with an increasing degree 
of certainty, Pye’s concepts remain applicable.  
Figure 4. 8 The semi-determining bevel of a gouge 
 
For Adamson, Pye’s legacy is clear - his writing on workmanship constitutes ‘the most 
compelling technical discussion of skilled work ever written’ (Adamson 2007, p.72).  In 
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other reappraisals of craft’s value, David Pye’s ideas remain key reference points (see, for 
example, McCullough 1998, see p. 202-3).  Contemporary woodworkers such as Peter 
Galbert still find a valuable link between Pye’s writing and their work (2015, p. xiii).  And 
in broader anthropological enquiry, Pye’s analyses of human production are readily 
repurposed in studies of craft practice (see, for example, Keller & Keller 1996, see p.56; 
Bunn 2011, see p.24; Ingold 2011, see p.59).  
It is perhaps strange that David Pye’s enduring relevance to craft theory comes despite his 
insistence on avoiding the term craft almost altogether. Pye dismissed the word as loaded 
with the imprecise, fuzzy thinking he found in the ‘doctrines’ of the Arts and Crafts 
movement (1968, p.114). An entire chapter of The Nature and Art of Workmanship is in fact 
devoted to criticising the writings of John Ruskin and William Morris. Ever eager to 
discredit any valorisation of ‘handwork’ over ‘machine work’, Pye was determined that the 
techniques of production—be they the stroke of a chisel, or the pass of a CNC tool head—
should be the subject of rational analysis, rather than indicators of a greater or lesser degree 
of moral virtue. Pye preferred to treat all making in purely mechanical terms. The movement 
of a woodworker’s chisel could be analysed in the same way as a computer controlled router 
bit. For Pye, the hands of the woodworker guide the chisel, informed by the design (either in 
his mind or described on paper), in the same way that the CNC router bit’s path is 
determined by lines of computer code. The only logical difference in these two practices, 
according to Pye, lies not in the involvement of the woodworker’s hands, but in the degree 
of risk with which they are executed. The concept of risk and certainty workmanship, rather 
than a vague notion of craftsmanship thus provided Pye with what he considered a more 
logical basis upon which to base his discussion of making.  
4.1.5. The Problem with Pye 
As Adamson observes (2007, see p.73-4), it is this apparently logical, almost scientific basis 
for Pye’s writing that has given it a lasting appeal. In what follows, however, I aim to 
demonstrate that, despite being widespread, this theory of production is a limited one. In 
short, I argue that Pye’s account of making, as the realisation of a pre-existing design intent 
precludes a richer understanding of the influence of tools, techniques and materials upon the 
process of design. This is an argument well-rehearsed by the work reviewed in the previous 
chapter1. Here, I use Pye’s writing as an exemplar of the hylomorphic assumptions dominant 
in design theory. The focus of my criticism lies in what I consider to be Pye’s entirely 
pragmatic understanding of productive techniques. Under Pye’s analyses, tools are always 
                                                      
 
1 For succinct discussion, see also Ingold (2010). 
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employed in the pursuit of pre-formed objectives, with all action assumed to be an effort to 
move towards those objectives. Below, I introduce the notion of epistemic action in order to 
demonstrate the flaws in this account. Epistemic actions are those performed in order to help 
work things out, to uncover new information and help people make decisions (Kirsh and 
Maglio 1994).  
Before introducing the concept of epistemic action in more detail, however, I wish to 
introduce two more of Pye’s concepts, regarding skill and good workmanship. I discuss 
these subjects for two reasons; 1) to reinforce the point of Pye’s reliance on a dualism of 
thought and action, and 2) to also admit that, despite their failings, Pye’s concepts and 
definitions have a powerful common-sense appeal. It is not the aim of this chapter to 
wholeheartedly refute Pye’s contribution. Ultimately, I aim to demonstrate how his work 
might be complemented by a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between 
thought and action, or, more specifically, designing and making. This understanding will 
then, throughout the remainder of this thesis, become the foundation for a novel 
interpretation of workshop practice as a place of design. 
4.1.6. Pye on Skill 
Attempts to discredit the moralistic rhetoric of the Arts and Crafts movement led David Pye 
to challenge the terminology of craft and craftsmanship on many fronts. For Pye, the word 
skill was as troublesome as craft. It was a ‘thought-preventer’ (1968, p.20) that was best 
avoided, because it could mean whatever one wanted it to mean. Throughout his discussion 
of the nature of workmanship, Pye attempted to recast skill not as something ‘with a deep 
spiritual value of a somewhat mystical kind’ (Ibid.), but as the mechanical control of 
movement. 
For Pye, the main problem with the word skill was its imprecision. It could be invoked to 
describe very different kinds of knowledge, even within the same domain of production. In 
blacksmithing, for example, we might talk both of the skill with which a smith wields their 
hammer, and the skill with which they judge the working temperature of iron. ‘Skill’ can 
therefore be applied variously, to describe both a kind of physical dexterity (in hammer use) 
and mental know-how (the judgement of temperature). Whilst the former would be an 
instance of Pye’s workmanship of risk, the knowledge of working temperatures would, for 
Pye, be something that could be measured and specified in words and drawings and 
therefore a matter of design, rather than workmanship.  
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Glenn Adamson has since observed that, if there is any place in The Nature and Art of 
Workmanship for the notion of skill, it is limited only to the dexterity upon which the 
workmanship of risk relies (2007, see p.73). This is the manual dexterity required to guide a 
tool along a certain path. Under this understanding, dexterity is the human equivalent of the 
predetermined motion of a machine. ‘All workmen using the workmanship of risk’, writes 
Pye, ‘are constantly devising ways to limit the risk by using things such as jigs and 
templates. If you want to draw a straight line with your pen, you do not go at it freehand, but 
use a ruler, that is to say, a jig. There is still a risk of blots and kinks, but less risk. You 
could even do your writing with a stencil, a more exacting jig, but it would be slow’ (1968, 
p.21). For Pye, there is a clear equivalence between the human capacity for dexterity and the 
determining jigs of machines. On this understanding, dexterity, once developed in the skilled 
practitioner is a means of limiting risk. Just as jigs allow an action to proceed in a 
predetermined way, The Nature and Art of Workmanship considers dexterity to be the ability 
to control movement according to a specific intent (see also Pye 1978, p.50-3). 
This account of skill may be illustrated by overlaying the risk profiles of a novice and expert 
hammer user (Figure 4.9). Whilst the degree of risk might vary similarly throughout the 
task, it is always higher for the novice. Without the experience of repeated practice, there is 
a greater likelihood that the results of hammering will deviate from the intended outcome. It 
is this model of production, wherein either human dexterity or the predetermined motion of 
a machine is put to work in the pursuit of a pre-existing design that underpins all David 
Pye’s analyses of making practice. 
Figure 4. 9 The risk profiles of novice and expert hammer users 
 
4.1.7. Pye on ‘Good Workmanship’ 
The application of workmanship in pursuit of pre-existing intentions is also clearly 
expressed in David Pye’s definition of “good workmanship”. This is the nearest thing to a 
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discussion of what might more commonly be called craftsmanship that Pye offers. It is Pye’s 
version of how things can be made well.  
‘Good workmanship’ writes Pye, ‘is that which carries out or improves upon the intended 
design. Bad workmanship is that which fails to do so and thwarts the design.’ (1968, p.30). 
In The Nature and Art of Workmanship, Pye demonstrates how such a definition accounts 
for the good workmanship he finds both in the regularity of mass-produced drinks cans and 
the quickly carved relief of the expert woodworker. Eager to account for all such instances 
of what he considers good workmanship, Pye defines the quality of workmanship not with 
reference to the means of production (and the degree to which they rely on manual 
dexterity), but by the accuracy with which results match design intentions. This is part of 
Pye’s argument against the valorisation of handwork. Pye’s idea of good workmanship—as 
that which realises or improves upon design intention—brings a straightforwardness to 
matters of production. If something was meant to be smooth and it is smooth, that’s good 
workmanship. And if it was meant to be rough and it is, that’s good too. It does not matter 
how such results are achieved, only that workmanship has been successfully applied in the 
pursuit of a pre-existing design. To judge workmanship against design intent is to use a 
method of assessment that can account for both the qualities of mass production and the 
intentionally irregular results of hand work. 
The common-sense appeal of this definition is inarguable. Such an understanding is key to 
industrial quality assurance practices (Garvin 1984) and the everyday assessments people 
make of goods (see, for example, Forslund et al. 2013). There are also circumstances that are 
commonly agreed to be the result of poor workmanship. If we return, for example, to the 
case of French hammer marks described at the start of this chapter, the bruising of timber 
around a pin head is acknowledged as an unwanted consequence of poor hammer technique. 
A lack of dexterity, or the lack of care taken to use a nail set, results in a lasting impression. 
Whilst there must be very few, if any, occasions when French hammer marks can harm the 
practical efficacy of a piece of woodwork, it is nonetheless widely regarded as evidence of 
poor workmanship. The judgement of workmanship here is based on the inference that the 
hammer blows were not intended to bruise the timber. The workmanship may be judged to 
be bad because there is a conflict between the intended and actual results of hammering2. 
                                                      
 
2 In this definition of good workmanship, we see how Pye takes a hylomorphic model of 
how things are made and develops it into a definition of how things are made well. I find 
philosopher Andrew Harrison to offer an interesting alternative, perhaps more aligned to the 
opposing understanding of production from the previous chapter; ‘[A] bad maker of 
something is one who does not quite know what he is doing, sometimes, but not always in 
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4.1.8. The Separation of Workmanship from Design 
David Pye’s observations on skill and good workmanship provide an insight into the 
foundations of his account of designing and making. The technical clarity to which Pye 
aspires in his definitions is, as design and craft theorists Christopher Frayling and Helen 
Snowdon describe, made possible only by a separation of the processes of design from those 
of workmanship (1982, see p.19). In order to describe the risk or certainty with which tools 
may achieve a predetermined objective, to understand skill as the mechanical constraint of 
movement, or to judge workmanship exclusively with reference to intentions, it is necessary 
for Pye to divorce the techniques of making from any role in processes of design. This 
account of production divides designing and making along the same lines as many other 
scholars (as seen in the previous chapter). And it is perhaps made most obvious in Pye’s 
work by the division of these subjects into two separate books. 
David Pye’s The Nature and Art of Workmanship was preceded by his book The Nature of 
Design. These two books were intended by Pye to compliment one another, describing what 
he understood to be the two facets of the human-made environment—the design of things 
and their manufacture. As Frayling and Snowdon discuss (1982), by the time Pye had 
revised and republished The Nature of Design (as The Nature and Aesthetics of Design in 
1978), he had made firm his decision about the concept of skill and its application in matters 
of production. If dividing the discussion of design and workmanship into two separate books 
wasn’t enough, Pye affirms that it is ‘necessary to differentiate between skill as the 
exercising of constraint on movement and “skill” as know-how, for know-how, in making, is 
design. Thus according to the terms of this book one should say that anybody has skill 
enough to build a good dry-stone wall but that few know how to design one, for the placing 
of the stones is a matter of knowledge and judgement, not of dexterity’ (1978, p.52). Pye 
would rather not discuss dry-stone walling as a skilled activity, because it does not demand a 
high degree of physical dexterity. If someone can lift and place a stone, then, with 
instruction, they should be able to make a good wall. Dry-stone walling demands a kind of 
knowledge that can be described in words, and, for Pye, this kind of knowledge is a matter 
of design. 
4.1.9. Pye’s Pragmatic Understanding of Action 
David Pye’s descriptions of the workmanship of risk and certainty, and good workmanship 
have an everyday validity. As discussed above, they offer an enduringly relevant means of 
                                                                                                                                                          
the sense that he does not know what he is setting out to achieve, but always in the sense that 
he is not paying attention to what he is doing.’ (1978, p.190) 
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analysing physical procedures. But I now aim to demonstrate that his account of production 
is not as comprehensive as it might seem. This argument rests on Pye’s failure to see the 
potential for making practice, and action more generally, to operate in anything other than a 
pragmatic way. That is to say that Pye assumes all action to be intended to move a 
practitioner towards a goal. 
In Pye’s account of dry-stone walling, for example, the critical type of knowledge is mental 
know-how, as divorced from the relatively straightforward action of picking up and placing 
stones. It is assumed that these actions are employed to enact instructions sent out from an 
internal world of thought. In practice, however, action is not only used in this way. It is not 
only part of a one-directional path from an internal idea towards a pre-determined external 
result. In the previous chapter’s example of jigsaw assembly (which we could consider 
analogous to the work of dry-stone wall building), Andy Clark has observed that one does 
not sit staring at puzzle pieces in an effort to develop a plan of action (1997, see p.36) (see 
3.2.2). No one imagines that it is possible to consider all the required moves and piece 
rotations in your head and then enact them with successful results. What the successful 
jigsaw player must do is pick pieces up, spin them around, and try things out for fit. The 
completion of a jigsaw in the real-world proceeds by way of step-by-step transformations, 
which give both pragmatic results (the correct fitting of a piece) and an improved 
understanding of the task (as in the grouping of similarly coloured pieces). Even if we 
assume that the dry-stone wall builder has a clear vision of the ultimate outcome (just as 
there is only one correct solution to a jigsaw puzzle), they must still use action to both build 
the wall and improve their understanding of the task. Actions like sensing the weight of a 
stone, rotating it to assess its suitability, physically sorting stones into types, or checking 
their balance as they are placed can all be considered epistemic in their nature. It is under 
this kind of interrogation that the sharply demarcated boundary between design and 
workmanship, thinking and doing, or know-how and skill, begins to falter. Upon the dualist 
foundation of Pye’s definitions, there is no room for epistemic action.  
4.2. Pragmatic and Epistemic Actions 
4.2.1. Epistemic Action 
Epistemic action is a term introduced by David Kirsh and Paul Maglio, in order to 
distinguish between two types of actions—those that aim to change the state of the world to 
accomplish a goal (pragmatic actions), and those that aim to change the state of the world in 
order to support cognition (epistemic actions). Epistemic actions are those taken ‘to change 
the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task’ (1994, p.513). In an influential 
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paper, Kirsh and Maglio propose the concept of epistemic action to redress what they saw as 
a failure in their field of cognitive science. Kirsh and Maglio aimed to challenge planning-
based approaches to cognition, which see action as fundamentally pragmatic, and where the 
‘only reason to act was for advancement in the physical world’ (Ibid., p.526). In this view, 
thinking always proceeds action and action can, at best, lead someone to re-evaluate their 
conclusions. Crucially, and herein lies Kirsh and Maglio’s main criticism, in solely 
pragmatic accounts of human behaviour, action is never undertaken ‘in order to alter the way 
cognition proceeds […,] cognition is logically prior: Cognition is necessary for intelligent 
action, but action is never necessary for intelligent cognition’ (Ibid., p.526). The tendency to 
prioritise cognition over action, therefore assuming every action to be pragmatic, can be 
understood as a consequence of the folk model of cognition discussed in the previous 
chapter (3.2.1). And it is the same tendency we find in David Pye’s writing above. 
Kirsh and Maglio supported their definition of pragmatic and epistemic action by reporting 
on a study of expert Tetris players, which showed how rotating puzzle pieces on a video 
game screen aids cognition and decision making (Figure 4.10). In Kirsh and Maglio’s study, 
piece rotations and movements during experts’ games show evidence of actions being used 
not to advance towards the game’s goal directly, but to aid the decision-making ability of 
players. As soon as a zoid comes into partial view at the top of the screen, experts made 
seemingly unnecessary rotations and lateral movements. Kirsh and Maglio observed that 
these apparently needless transformations are in fact employed as useful strategies that allow 
players to quickly determine the type of zoid in play and consider how it might be fitted to 
the existing stack. Another common sequence of epistemic action also sees zoids moved to 
the edge of the screen and then moved back again, to help confirm their horizontal position. 
In expert Tetris play then, rotating and moving a piece on screen is not always done to 
advance towards the goals of the game, but can be used to test potential means of action, 
speed up decision making and reduce errors. ‘The point of [epistemic] actions’, conclude 
Kirsh and Maglio, ‘is not for the effect they have on the environment as much as for the 
effect they have on the agent’ (Ibid., p.546). 
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Although it has been widely cited as a valuable contribution to work on extended and 
distributed cognition, it should be noted that Kirsh and Maglio’s ideas were not without 
precedent. In, for example philosopher John Dewey’s concept of “doing for the sake of 
knowing”, we find a similar idea (1929, see p.84-5)3. 
4.2.2. The Significance of Epistemic Action & Extended Mind to this study 
The laboratory-like example of Tetris gameplay found in Kirsh and Maglio’s original study 
is profoundly rule-bound (the idea of advancement in the physical world being easily 
determinable with reference to the task’s objectives). In situations where the results are less 
absolutely prescribed (such as in the open-ended problems of designing and making), 
however, I suggest that epistemic action has an equally, if not more, important role. Indeed, 
in practices aimed towards working out what things should be like, the whole exercise can 
be understood as one of discovery.  
                                                      
 
3 Unfortunately for the present discussion, Dewey is associated with the philosophy of 
pragmatism, but this should not be confused with the less specialist application of the word 
“pragmatic” here. 
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Figure 4. 10 Tetris on the Gameboy 
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In the remainder of this chapter, I begin to consider epistemic action and theories of 
extended mind in the context of workshop practice. Throughout the chapter thus far, I have 
used David Pye’s writing as an exemplar of the pragmatic assumptions prevalent in design 
and making theory. Alternative accounts such as Henrik Gedenryd’s (see 3.2.1) have gone 
someway to demonstrating the insight that might come from challenging these assumptions. 
Once understood as an integral part of cognitive systems, the manipulation of the world can 
be understood not just in pragmatic terms, as a way to impose fully formed ideas upon 
materials, but as a means of working things out. Through studying the tools and techniques 
of making practice in detail, and bestowing them with “epsitemic credit”, I now aim to 
develop a novel and useful description of techniques as simultaneously pragmatic and 
epistemic. This description will then become the foundation for the rest of the thesis’ 
investigation of epistemic character. 
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4.3. What’s a Hammer For?: Tool Use is Both Pragmatic and Epistemic 
In an effort to demonstrate how my criticism of Pye and the above discussion of epistemic 
actions is relevant to designing and making practice, I conclude this chapter by returning to 
the subject of hammer use. The aim is to complement Pye’s useful, but wholly pragmatic, 
account of human production with an examination of the epistemic nature of tool use. 
Ultimately, I suggest that the tools and techniques of designing and making may be 
understood not only by the degree of certainty with which they may achieve pre-conceived 
ends, but by the ways in which the support epistemic action. Before introducing the hammer, 
however, I first revisit a subject that Pye preferred to avoid - the nature of skill.  Through 
studying skill in more detail, I aim to develop a description of tool use that, inspired by the 
notion of epistemic action, captures its simultaneously epistemic and pragmatic nature. 
The inspiration for this investigation comes from neurophysiologist Nikolai Bernstein’s 
classic account of the development of dexterity, On Dexterity and Its Development (1996). 
By considering the nature of skill (or dexterity—having adopted Pye’s physical 
interpretation, I now treat the terms as equivalent throughout this chapter) and its 
development in more detail, I hope to demonstrate that epistemic action occurs at every 
occasion of tool use.  
This section of the chapter concludes by me addressing the question ‘what is a hammer 
for?’. Based upon Bernstein’s account of dexterity, I aim to show that hammers 
simultaneously support both epistemic and pragmatic actions. Whilst the hammer becomes 
an archetypal tool upon which to base this investigation, the intention is that this analysis 
can also be applied more generally. This more general account of the epistemic character of 
tool use is developed in the next chapter. 
4.3.1. The Development of Dexterity 
The control of movement required for David Pye’s workmanship of risk is the kind 
developed over time and through experience. The woodworker hammering a pin does so 
with precision only because they have spent time rehearsing similar actions on past jobs. It is 
uncontroversial to say that all skilled work, or all workmanship of the risky kind, requires 
practice and repetition. Returning to the risk profile of hammering a pin introduced above, 
when we overlay the profile of an expert woodworker and a novice (Figure 4.9), we can see 
that, whilst the shape of the curve might remain constant as the phases of higher risk are 
similarly located, the degree of this risk is lessened with practice. In David Pye’s 
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interpretation, this would be because the expert woodworker has developed a dexterity that 
allows them to precisely control the movement of their hammer swing. How exactly this 
dexterity operates, or how the process of becoming dexterous occurs, however, were not 
questions which David Pye tackled directly. For a more detailed analysis of the nature of 
dexterity, I turn to neurophysiologist Nikolai Bernstein’s pioneering book, On Dexterity and 
Its Development. Written in the 1920s, but only published posthumously in 1996, On 
Dexterity and Its Development has become a classic text for the subject of skill acquisition. 
4.3.2. Nikolai Bernstein on Dexterity 
Nikolai Bernstein challenged the common assumption that learning involves repetition in 
order to fix a set pattern of movement in memory. The traditional theory that Bernstein 
disputed understood skilful action to be the result of fixed commands, sent out from the 
central nervous centre and enacted by the muscles. In this model, the repetition of action 
necessary for the development of skill was a repetition of these commands, until a ‘specific 
neural pathway is well established’ (Reed and Bril 1996, p.436). As Bernstein pointed out, 
however, there is a failing to this logic. People begin learning skills because they can’t do 
them—at the beginning of this process ‘the only thing available for imprinting is wrong, 
clumsy movements’ (Bernstein 1996, p.204).  
Bernstein’s work offered an alternative, more nuanced account of motor control and skill 
acquisition. Rather than understanding the control of movement to be dominated by learned 
commands sent out from motor control systems to the muscles, Bernstein proposed that the 
key requirement of dexterous activity lies in a responsiveness to feedback from sensory 
systems (ibid., see p.25-44). It is not pre-learned motor control signals that guide skilful 
action, argued Bernstein, but continual corrective movements made in response to sensory 
awareness. The important observation that helped Bernstein arrive at this insight is that, 
unlike the pre-determined motion of mechanical equipment, human movement is difficult to 
control in a predictable way. Because of the multiple degrees of freedom of human limbs 
and the elasticity of muscles, identical control signals would not guarantee identical results4. 
The only way to overcome such unpredictability, observed Bernstein, is to develop an ability 
to respond to sensory inputs throughout a task. 
Bernstein finds an everyday example of sensory feedback guiding dexterous work in knot 
tying. Whilst under normal conditions knots are easily tied by practiced individuals, if the 
same movements are attempted with cold hands, it becomes more difficult. This is not, notes 
                                                      
 
4 See also van lngen Schenau and van Soest (1996) 
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Bernstein, due to any loss of muscular strength. At the temperatures where knot tying 
becomes more difficult, the muscles controlling the hands’ movements can still deliver the 
same maximum force. The problems are caused by the reduction in the ‘tactile sensitivity in 
hands and fingers’ (1996, p.43). The lack of feedback from cold hands hinders the ability to 
make accurate movements. This, concludes Bernstein, is because accurate movements are 
not the result of fixed patterns of motor control, but are made in response to a sensitivity to 
the conditions of an emergent task. 
4.3.3. Repetition without repetition 
What then, do people repeat when they practice to become skilled? If not “beating a neural 
pathway” to help guarantee a predictable movement, what is the repetition for? Bernstein 
proposed that the repetition required of skill development ‘is necessary in order to solve a 
motor problem many times (better and better) and to find the best ways of solving it’ (ibid., 
p.176, emphases in original). This is what Bernstein termed ‘repetition without repetition’ 
(ibid., p.205) and it is the key to his theory of skill development. Rather than repeating the 
‘means for solving’ a motor problem, skilled practice relies on the repetition of the process 
of finding the solution (ibid., p.206). Solving the same problem again and again, in the 
context of variable external (environmental) and internal (e.g. with respect to muscle 
elasticity) states allows practitioners to develop an enhanced awareness to sensory feedback 
during action, and learn how to correct their movement accordingly. 
4.3.4. Bernstein and The Blacksmith’s Hammer 
In an interesting overlapping of interests, both David Pye and Nickolai Bernstein considered 
the dexterity of a blacksmith. Bernstein chose to study the technique of expert blacksmiths 
in order to gain insight into how exactly this skill is developed (Gurfinkel and Cordo 1998). 
Using the then novel technique of high speed photography, Bernstein tracked the movement 
of experienced blacksmiths’ arms and their hammers whilst they repeatedly hit the same 
point on an anvil (Figure 4.11).  
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Figure 4. 11 The trajectory of a blacksmith's swing 
 
Plotting the trajectories of the arm joints and the face of the hammer, Bernstein identified 
that, although the movement of the hammerhead was highly consistent across multiple 
strikes, the arrangement of the arm joints varied each time. The outcome of the blacksmith’s 
action was repeatable, even though the means by which this solution was arrived at changed 
with every strike. This was evidence to Bernstein that the smith had not become skilled by 
internalising a repeatable programme for their hammer swing. The years spent developing 
precise hammering skill were not, it appeared, used to develop a specific pattern of muscle 
and joint movement. The blacksmiths of Bernstein’s experiment were instead experts at 
solving the problem of delivering the hammer face to exactly the same point, despite the 
variable elasticity of their muscles and the unpredictable recoil of the tool. At first, this 
seems a strange paradox—how can it be the motion of the hammer that is reproducible, 
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rather than the motion of the blacksmith’s arm itself (Ingold 2001, see p.21; Latash 1996, 
see p.286)? But if, as Bernstein describes, the essence of dexterity lies in a sensitivity to ever 
changing, emergent and unpredictable internal and external states, the repetition without 
repetition witnessed in the study of blacksmiths is a necessary condition of skilled activity. 
The consequence of this repeated solving is an enhanced sensitivity to the progress of an 
emergent task and, therefore, an improved ability to apply force with precision. 
4.3.5. The Sweet Spot of a Hammer 
Reflecting more recently on the legacy and relevance of Bernstein’s work on dexterity, 
physiologist Mark Latash has introduced the idea of the working point as a way of 
describing the parts of motor systems which are ‘most important’ throughout a task (1996, 
p.287). This idea helps to illuminate Bernstein’s discussion of how practitioners are able to 
consistently control the movement of one point, whilst the means by which this movement is 
achieved may vary. As a practitioner tunes their senses to a particular task, suggests Latash, 
the motion of the working point becomes the focus throughout the action. 
In the example of hammering a pin, we can define the working point to be the hammer’s 
centre of percussion. This is the ‘sweet spot’ on the hammer’s face which, when used to 
strike an object, provides practitioners with the ‘satisfying feeling’ (Carello et al. 1998, 
p.307) of the tool working most efficiently. If the face of the hammer impacts the pinhead in 
just the right way, the ‘haptic subsystem of dynamic touch’ (Turvey and Carello 1995, 
p.401; see also, Gibson 1979) informs the practitioner that the sweet spot has been utilised. 
As the hammer’s face and the pinhead then travel together for the duration of the impact, the 
movement may be sensed, so that the next swing and strike can be adjusted accordingly. If 
the pin seems to be veering one way or the other, it can be corrected with the next blow. 
4.3.6. Tool use is both epistemic and pragmatic 
I hope now to make clear the parallels between Bernstein’s discussion of skilled activity and 
Kirsh and Maglio’s description of epistemic action. In both, we find criticisms of one-way 
interpretations of action. Bernstein refutes the idea that skilled hammer movements are the 
result of fixed, repeatable patterns sent outwards from the nervous system to the muscles. 
And Kirsh and Maglio demonstrate that expert Tetris players do not work out solutions in 
their head and then input those solutions into the game. In both Bernstein’s study of 
hammering and Kirsh and Maglio’s analysis of Tetris then, responding to sensory feedback 
is key to the tasks’ success. Throughout a game of Tetris, players use action not just to 
complete the game’s objectives, but also to help work out the best moves. The rotation and 
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lateral movement of zoids is used both to generate sensory feedback (to help cognition) and 
to achieve success in the game. Similarly, throughout the process of hammering, with every 
swing and strike, a practitioner must be continually alert and perceptive to feedback. The 
strike of the hammer, in addition to achieving a pragmatic result in the world, provides 
sensorial feedback. As it is shaping metal, knocking in nails, or fracturing rocks, the hammer 
also reports on the progress of these tasks. In both Tetris gameplay and skilled hammer use, 
we find what Tim Ingold calls a ‘coupling of perception and action’ (2011, p.58). It is this 
coupling that erodes the boundary between thought and action, or, as theorists of the 
extended mind would argue, between mind and world. And, as I now go on to argue, it 
offers a useful insight into the nature of tool use as simultaneously pragmatic and epistemic. 
4.3.7. The Function of a Hammer 
The question, ‘what is a hammer for?’ prompts us to understand the object teleologically. 
Teleological reasoning, or asking what things are for, is the result of a tendency to assume 
that objects exist for a purpose (Kelemen 1999). Whilst sensible in the context of human 
made tools, psychologist Deborah Kelemen describes how this kind of reasoning is often 
over-privileged by children, who are ‘prone to a “promiscuous teleology”, in which artefacts 
and natural objects of all types are viewed as existing for a function’ (ibid. p.461). 
Pioneering child psychologist Georges Henri Luquet’s offers an anecdote of a child 
describing objects not by their name, but by what they do. A chair thus becomes ‘for sitting 
on’, a plate ‘for eating on’ and so on. In an attempt to catch the child out, Luquet asked what 
a slug was for, and was ‘left feeling completely sheepish when she said that it was for 
squashing’ (1913, quoted in Knappett 2005, p.44). 
Although adults might generally have a more nuanced understanding of function than the 
slug-squishing child of Luquet’s example, I hope to show that the epistemic nature of tool 
use introduced above might allow us to develop an even richer account of the function of 
hammers. In short, I wish to argue that a hammer, just as it might usually be considered for 
achieving pragmatic results (knocking in a nail etc.), is also for reporting on the progress of 
the task of hammering. In addressing the question ‘what is a hammer for?’ I aim to 
demonstrate the simultaneously pragmatic and epistemic nature of tool use.  
Bernstein’s observations on dexterity are fundamental to this description of the function of 
tools. If we are to ignore Bernstein’s contribution and assume hammering to be the enacting 
of a pre-programmed, learned sequence of movement, then the effectiveness of a hammer 
would depend little upon the quality of feedback it provides throughout the process. The best 
hammer might simply be the one that gets the job done as quickly as possible. But if we 
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acknowledge the requirement of a hammer user to be continually aware of, and respondent 
to, the sensory feedback of their tool, then the quality of that feedback is critical to success. 
This point is perhaps obvious to experienced users of tools, where the feeling of working a 
material can be tangibly deadened by, for example, even a subtly dulled cutting edge.  
Observing the tendency to rely on simplistic accounts of tool function, Lars Spuybroek 
writes that ‘[t]ools have persistently been misrepresented through the notion of use, which 
defines action as fixed purpose’ (2011, p.49). Such limited, ‘design-centric’ attitudes to 
function follow, as Theodora Vardouli observes, a ‘long intellectual tradition of functionalist 
theory’ (2015, p.140), wherein the function of things are determined by the designer(s) in 
advance of their production and use. Functions, like the action about which Spuybroek 
writes, are thus fixed, well-defined and ‘have little to do with the actual use of the object’ 
(2015, p.141; see also Preston 1998; Houkes and Vermaas 2006).  
4.3.8. Proper Functions and System Functions 
Different types of hammers are intended for different purposes—claw hammers drive and 
pull nails, geology hammers split rocks and ball-pein hammers work metal. These 
descriptions are what philosopher of material culture Beth Preston would call proper 
functions (1998). They are the purposes for which the objects are reproduced—sensible 
answers made in the mode of teleological reasoning. And that might be the end of the story, 
were it not for the fact that, whatever functions we have in mind whilst designing tools, they 
almost always perform a number of other functions that we do not ask of them.  
Hammers, for example, make a noise when hammering. It would not be considered a proper 
function of hammers to make noise, but if brought into use as a door knocker, a hammer’s 
propensity to make a noise might be repurposed as its primary function. Preston believes 
there is a distinction to made, however, between this occasional use of objects in non-
standard ways and those uses for which they are reproduced. Accompanying her concept of 
proper function, then, comes the complementary idea of system function. A system function 
is a function that an object can be used for as part of a system of other objects, but it is not 
the function for which something is reproduced.  
The existence of system functions highlights the limitations of teleological reasoning and the 
design-centric accounts of function criticised by Vardouli (2015). All things may be brought 
into use in ways that were not anticipated in advance of their production. To describe a chair 
as “for sitting on”, for example, does not account for it being brought into use as a step upon 
which to stand when changing a light bulb. In the language of cognitive scientist and design 
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theorist Don Norman, it can be said that system functions are a result of things ‘affording’ 
(1998) a variety of potential uses (see 5.1 for more on this idea). Owing to their size, weight, 
shape or other properties, new system functions may be discovered throughout the life of an 
artefact.  
4.3.9. What are Tools for? 
Returning to the example of the hammer, we may now consider what it is for in more detail. 
The proper function of the Warrington pattern hammer studied above is to drive pins into 
wood. Because of its thin cross peen, the Warrington is particularly adept at setting small 
pins whilst avoiding hitting your thumb. And its polished, convex face makes it appropriate 
for highly finished work, where there is a desire not to mark the timber. Until we consider 
the Warrington’s ability to be used as a door knocker, the fact that the hammer makes a 
noise, might not be considered part of its useful, proper, function. But in the real world, 
during the practices of tool use, it’s often very difficult to identify which properties, or 
affordances, of objects are useful and which aren’t. When hitting things with a hammer, the 
sound it is making is extremely useful—it offers the practitioner valuable feedback on the 
task.  The skilled practitioner listens attentively to the sound of the hammer, adjusting their 
technique accordingly. So, whilst tool designers might agree that the ‘proper’ function of a 
hammer is not to make a noise, during skilled hammer use, the sound provides an important 
kind of feedback. This sound must, therefore be considered as a part of the hammer’s 
function. As the tool is skilfully brought into use amongst a system of other things—
including the pin, the workbench, pieces of timber, and the practitioner themselves—any 
description of a hammer’s function must take into account both its pragmatic effects and its 
epistemic potential. The function of a hammer lies not only in its efficacy at achieving goals, 
but also in the feedback it offers, as an instrument to measure the progress of those goals. 
The hammer must simultaneously support both pragmatic action (as part of the effort to 
drive the pin into the timber) and epistemic action (by providing a report on how the task is 
going). From this observation on the specifics of hammer use, we could extrapolate more 
generally, and state that tools are at once for doing things and also instruments for sensing 
how those things are going. 
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4.4. Summary  
The aim of this chapter has been to continue the exploration of extended mind theory, and 
begin to apply the idea that epistemic credit should be shared across the tools and techniques 
of workshop practice. Beginning with a critique of David Pye’s writing on the nature of 
workmanship, I suggested that, despite his enduring relevance across disciplines, Pye’s work 
is reliant upon the same flawed assumptions found in the previous chapter. I have used Pye’s 
approach as an exemplar of a general tendency in theory on designing and making to assume 
all action to be goal-directed. I introduced the idea of epistemic actions in order to both 
highlight this tendency and to demonstrate what might be gained by a more nuanced 
understanding of making practice, as simultaneously epistemic and pragmatic. Fundamental 
to this understanding is an account of tools as simultaneously for doing things and also for 
finding out how those things are going. It is this point which forms the basis for the next 
chapter’s investigation of epistemic character, throughout which I suggest we supplement 
David Pye’s account of the risk or certainty with which tools and techniques achieve results, 
with a description of how they support epistemic action. Just as techniques may have 
variously risky and certain characters, I aim to show that they may also be considered 
according to their differing epistemic characters. 
Ultimately, I hope to demonstrate how my account of workshop practice might complement 
David Pye’s analyses. In particular, I am eager to show how an appreciation of the epistemic 
character of workshop practice can remain consistent with Pye’s determination that there 
should be no unwarranted valorising of ‘hand’ over ‘machine’ work. Whilst the discussion 
of hammer use throughout this chapter might appear to prioritise what, in Pye’s terminology, 
can be considered a riskier technique of production, I do this only to offer what I consider an 
easily-understood instance of epistemic action in practice. I do not intend to reinstate the 
primacy of handwork dismissed by Pye. 
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5. The Epistemic Character of Techniques 
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the idea that tools are simultaneously for achieving 
things and for finding out how those things are going. The concept of epistemic action 
helped to frame making practice not just as a way of realizing antecedent ideas, but as a way 
of working out what things should be like.  In this chapter, I continue on this theme by 
investigating the idea that, in addition to their pragmatic capacity to complete tasks, tools 
and their associated techniques have an epistemic character. In what follows, I aim to 
describe what I mean by epistemic character, and suggest ways in which we might begin to 
identify the epistemic character of the techniques.  
The chapter is structured around three questions that might be asked in order to interrogate a 
technique’s epistemic character. These questions are: What questions does the technique 
pose?; What is the ‘step-character’ of the technique?; and What is the nature of the 
emergent result throughout the technique? For each of these questions, I present a study of 
techniques, in order to show how they may be asked in specific contexts.  
The underlying motivation for this chapter is the idea that techniques might be more or less 
suited to working things out. Or, they might structure decision making in such a way as to 
promote certain considerations and neglect others. Whilst this chapter begins my discussion 
of these issues, they are further explored in Chapters 6 and 7. 
I have developed the ideas in this chapter through using the techniques described first-hand 
(according to the method outlined in 2.6) and combining my reflections on their use with the 
writing of others. I therefore describe the three questions of epistemic character with 
continual reference to other literature: the investigation of techniques posing questions 
draws on the idea of a “conversation with materials” (Schön 1983, 1994; Link 1975; 
Gedenryd 1998); the question of step-character looks to literature on the temporal 
arrangement of techniques (Ingold 2011; Malafouris 2013); and I discuss the nature of an 
emergent result with reference to the idea of “material agency” and Andrew Pickering’s 
contrast of the “performative” and “representational” idioms (1995; 2008). I believe linking 
these ideas to the specifics of practice helps to illustrate their relevance to the concept of 
epistemic character, and design theory more generally. 
The techniques described in this chapter are drawn from the practice of using rulers and 
dividers, carving a wooden spoon, and making paper planes. I have chosen these examples 
for three reasons: 1) they are (like the previous study of hammer use) relatively simple to 
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describe, and may be readily understood from a position of unfamiliarity; 2) I am myself 
familiar with the techniques; and 3) owing to their careful selection, they help to illustrate 
the specific interests of each of the three questions.  
This last point is important. It follows from this “targeted” approach to technique selection 
that I am not suggesting that these questions will be equally valuable when interrogating the 
epistemic character of any and all techniques. It might be that one of the three questions 
proves to be either highly valuable or largely redundant in the context of a particular 
technique. Indeed, the reason I present these ideas as “questions”, rather than “features” or 
“elements” is to clarify that I am not presenting a detailed anatomy of epistemic character, 
but an investigation of it. This is to acknowledge that the ideas below are proposed as a 
starting point, from which a more comprehensive exploration of the subject could follow. 
Whilst my examples are focused on the specifics of particular techniques then, I hope they 
might serve as examples of the kinds of investigations that could be performed more 
generally. 
Although the detailed features of epistemic character might remain in a nascent state, I have 
nonetheless (as previously described in 2.6.14) developed a definition that it will be useful 
to repeat before going further: 
Epistemic character is a property of a technique. It structures the process of working things 
out whilst using the technique. 
I use the verb “to structure” because it may apply to both the temporal and physical 
arrangement of the technique, and alludes to the structure of a cognitive (“working out”) 
system. The three questions below are all intended to investigate how processes are 
structured, by bestowing techniques with “epistemic credit”. 
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5.1. What are the Questions Posed by a Technique? 
In the first of three questions to be asked of epistemic character, I suggest that we can try 
identify what the questions posed by a technique are, and how they influence the process of 
working things out. 
5.1.1. Affordances and Conversations 
Whilst I believe the idea of techniques posing questions to be a novel one, it is not without 
similar precedents. It is not unrelated, for example, to the notion of affordances. The noun 
“affordance” was introduced by ecological psychologist James Gibson, to describe features 
of the environment that provided possibilities for action (1979). In his appropriation of 
Gibson’s work from a product design perspective, Donald Norman has presented 
affordances as an enlightening lens through which to think about product interaction, 
especially in the context of software design (1998; see also, Flach, Stappers and Voorhorst 
2017; Baber 2003). Norman develops the idea of affordance by opposing it with the notion 
of ‘constraints’ (1998, p.82). Where affordances offer a range of possibilities, constraints set 
the limits on these possibilities. To borrow from Norman’s example of Lego parts (ibid., see 
p.85), we can say that the bricks afford a variety of spacing and arrangement options, but 
these options are limited by the constraints of their alignment mechanism (the interlocking 
pegs and holes). 
Although I acknowledge that techniques could be studied with reference to their 
affordances, I consider the idea of affordance to be too passive for my purposes. I regard 
Norman’s coupling of affordances with constraints to be a means of redressing this 
underlying passivity. I suggest that the notion of techniques posing questions, rather than 
affording possibilities, promotes their more active role in the kinds of “actively extrenalised” 
cognitive systems described in Chapter 3 (see 3.2.3)1. 
The conversational metaphor I employ (of questions and answers) also has its precedents, 
perhaps most famously in Donald Schön’s description of design practice as a conversation 
with materials (1983, 1994; see also Gedenryd 1998 for discussion of Schön’s work). In 
addition, I have found the idea of the conversational character of techniques in Carole Link’s 
PhD study, of cabinetmaking as a “dynamic system of decisions and interactions” (1975). 
And there is a similar theme underlying Andrew Pickering’s ‘dialectic of resistance and 
accommodation’ (1995, p.39, as discussed in 3.2.4). It is these, more interactive approaches, 
                                                      
 
1 I refer here to Clark and Chalmers’ “active externalism” (1998). 
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which I hope to channel in the following comparison of rulers (Figure 5.1) and dividers 
(Figure 5.2).  
Figure 5. 1 A six-inch ruler 
 
Figure 5. 2 A pair of dividers 
 
5.1.2. Rulers and Dividers 
Rulers and dividers enable the discovery and definition of distances. Both tools may be used 
as instruments with which to design, in order to determine the dimensions of a nascent 
artefact. Whilst similar in their capabilities however, there is a fundamental difference in the 
nature of the two tools. A ruler may be used to specify distances according to standardised 
systems of measurement (millimetres or inches, for example), whereas dividers are used to 
step out proportional relationships. In what follows, I compare these alternative techniques 
of layout, and consider how they ask us to conceive of an emergent design in very different 
terms. 
This is a comparison that first requires reflection on the role of measurement systems in 
design practice. I begin, therefore, with a brief history of these systems. I aim to clarify that, 
despite their ubiquity throughout contemporary practice, standardised units of measure are 
not a prerequisite of design work. I discuss pre-industrial methods of designing and making 
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to both demonstrate this and, for those unfamiliar with divider use, introduce how 
proportional systems of layout work.  
5.1.3. Systems of Measurement 
The earliest known systems of measurement saw ancient builders lay out dimensions using 
distances found on their body. The convenience of having such measures (quite literally) to 
hand meant that distances like the cubit, which was the distance between the point of the 
elbow and the tip of the middle finger, were in widespread use across many cultures 
(Williams 2014, see p.1-6).  Using dimensions defined by arms, feet, fingers and hands, the 
designers and makers of antiquity were able to develop, remember and share the information 
required to lay out their work. Variation inevitably existed between distances measured by 
different individuals, but these discrepancies were not considered problematic. Accuracy in 
the joints of woodworkers, masons or metalsmiths relied on their ability to fit one 
component to another according to the specifics of an individual circumstance, rather than 
precise adherence to a universal system of measurement (Turnbull 1993). In contrast to the 
contemporary scenario of distributed labour, production lines, and outsourced components, 
exact definitions of distance offered few advantages when parts were made to fit locally. 
Beyond the convenience of being readily available on any job site, distances found on the 
human body also provided ancient builders with a collection of dimensions that had useful 
proportional relationships. For example, the cubit was divided into six palm widths (Figure 
5.3). A measurement made using the thumb could be multiplied 12 times to approximate the 
length of a foot. The distance between the tip of the nose and the fingertips of an 
outstretched hand equalled three feet, and an arm span was twice this length (Williams 2014, 
see p.1-6).  Again, although such distances would vary between individuals, these 
proportional relationships across the same person’s body were usefully consistent. Using 
simple divisions and multiplications of these measures, artisans were able to discover 
structurally sound and beautiful proportions, as they designed and made artifacts of lasting 
appeal. 
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Figure 5. 3 An Egyptian cubit and its subdivisions of six palms 
 
In their book, By Hand & Eye, woodwork instructors and theorists George Walker and Jim 
Tolpin refer to these methods of design and production as ‘artisan geometry’ (Walker & 
Tolpin 2013, p.97). Their investigation of the subject leads them to study the tools and 
techniques used by the artisans of what they call the ‘pre-industrial’ age (ibid.). With just a 
pair of dividers, a straightedge, string and a mark-making tool, and without any recourse to 
complex mathematics, Walker and Tolpin show how designers and makers were able to 
accurately lay out all the angles, curves and shapes they needed. Rather than being specified 
by standardized units of distance or degrees of angles, these designs were made with 
reference only to proportional relationships. Instead of asking, ‘How high is this base 
dimension in inches?’ when making a piece of furniture, pre-industrial artisans would have 
asked, ‘How tall is this base in proportion to the case above it? How wide is this leg in 
proportion to its height? How much does this leg taper in proportion to its width at the 
widest part?’ (ibid., p.11). Very often, the first dimension of a design was fixed according to 
the designer or maker’s own body. For example, a chair seat could typically be set to two 
hand spans high (ibid., p.165).  With their dividers set to the width of a hand span, or simple 
whole number divisions of this dimension, designers could then determine the sizes of the 
chair’s other elements (Figure 5.4). In this mode of working, a system of measurement is 
developed alongside each design, unique to the demands of the task. Designing in this way 
focuses attention on the association of parts and wholes. 
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Figure 5. 4 “The Round One” Chair by Hans J. Wegner, with modules overlaid, where one 
module is roughly equivalent to a hand span 
 
Only with the advent of industrialized production did shared units of measurement become 
valuable. When component parts began to be made in multiples, to be assembled later along 
a production line, their sizes needed to be closely controlled. Although we see some 
evidence of rudimentary standardization in pre-industrialized society (e.g. cubit rods made 
of wood or stone were used in ancient Egypt), the need for precisely defined, shared units of 
measurement grew only with the demands of mechanized production. Walker and Tolpin 
explain that ‘as cutting tools were bolted to machine fixtures rather than guided by hands 
[…] we began needing numbers to feed machines’ (ibid., p.10). Figure 5.5 illustrates one 
example of this development, in a table saw interface.  
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Figure 5. 5 A table saw interface 
 
My interest here is not to argue against the obvious usefulness of standardized measurement 
systems and the associated tools and techniques that use them. Conceiving of how modern 
production processes could work without shared measures is impossible. However, despite 
their contemporary ubiquity, the methods of pre-industrialized production demonstrate that 
standardized and precise units of measurement are not a prerequisite of design practice. As 
happened throughout antiquity, working without these units is certainly possible—until they 
are required to be fed into a machine or specified on a drawing for third-party production. 
Throughout this discussion then, I do not present dividers and the associated use of 
proportional layout systems as a relic of bygone artisanal techniques. In many situations of 
design practice, they can be understood as an alternative to drawing freehand or using a ruler 
or any other method. In comparing the use of dividers and rulers, the topic of interest is not 
the limits of their capacities, or what they can and cannot be used for. I compare the tools 
not to suggest that they are interchangeable or of equivalent function, but as a means to 
explore how these alternative methods of discovering and defining distances structure the 
process of design.  
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5.1.4. Using Rulers and Dividers 
Rulers and dividers are multi-purpose tools. Generally, they can be used in one of two ways: 
to discover the dimensions or proportions of existing things or to help lay out designs on a 
surface. Very often, a task requires rulers or dividers to be used in each of these modes—
both as instruments of discovery and as tools for marking new features. Here, I describe a 
simple task that combines these two purposes to illustrate a fundamental difference between 
the tools. 
Imagine we would like to divide a line into thirds along its length. Using dividers, the first 
task is to approximate a third of the distance and set the points of the tool to this dimension. 
The distance can then be “stepped out” to check the approximation. Any inaccuracy in this 
first attempt can be revealed by “walking” the dividers from one end of the line toward the 
other. If the final step under- or overshoots the endpoint of the line, a third of this dimension 
should be added or removed, respectively (Figure 5.6). With practice, designers might 
achieve a successful division into thirds on this second attempt. If not, they can repeat the 
process until the even thirds are discovered. After the dividers are correctly set, they can be 
used to mark the divisions into a substrate’s surface, by applying more pressure to the points 
throughout another series of steps.  
Figure 5. 6 Dividing a line with dividers 
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Performing the same task with a ruler, we would first measure the length of the line. This 
numerical dimension can then be divided by three (Figure 5.7). The calculation can be done 
mentally, on paper or using a calculator. The resulting dimensions of the thirds are then 
marked using a pen, pencil or knife alongside the ruler’s edge. 
Figure 5. 7 Dividing a line with a ruler 
 
Using either the ruler or the dividers, an identical result can be achieved: the line can be 
accurately divided into three lengths. This exercise, then, does not expose the varying 
capacities of these two layout tools, nor is it an instance of using them in search of an as-yet-
undetermined form. However, even this simple task introduces an important difference in 
the nature of these tools and their associated techniques. This difference lies in the ruler’s 
numerical system of measurement and the dividers’ proportional system. A ruler always 
must refer to the units of a standardized measurement system, where a pair of dividers 
attends to the relationships of physical, real world distances.  
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5.1.5. Using Dividers to Design: Questions of Proportion 
In the example of dividing a line, we see that the questions that might be resolved using a 
pair of dividers involve the relationships between different elements. In other words, we 
might say that dividers pose questions in terms of proportional relationships. This phrasing 
takes seriously the role that tools and techniques play as extensions of minds. Dividers 
structure action around the discovery and creation of proportional relationships. Moving on 
from dividing a line into thirds, this aspect of their character is most apparent if we consider 
the sequence in which they are used to design previously unspecified forms. 
Before dividers are used to mark any point, they first must be set to a particular distance. 
This distance should be one that is useful in creating the lines and shapes of a design. If it is 
too large, it does not allow us to mark the smaller dimensions of a design. If it is too small, 
stepping out long distances becomes unnecessarily laborious. This first task thus introduces 
a critical concern during the use of dividers: the length of the “module.” A module is a 
distance that can be divided or multiplied repeatedly to create the lines and shapes of a 
design (see Figure 5.4) (Walker and Tolpin 2013, see p.153).   
The module need not be specified in millimeters or inches; designing in this way defines the 
relationship between elements rather than their absolute dimensions. Unless we aim to create 
a layout that is the actual size of the finished artifact, the precise distance to which the 
dividers are set while designing is not critical. Any design created using a module-based 
approach can be easily scaled up or down at a later stage, by adjusting the actual dimension 
to which the module is equivalent. Thus, as we design a specific instance of an artifact, we 
are also creating what might be termed a generative sequence that can be followed to create 
the same artifact at differing sizes2. The scalability of divider-made designs was an 
advantage exploited by the designers and makers of the past. For example, when laying out a 
pointed arch, alternative sequences can be used to step out the spring and focal points to 
create arches that have different qualities (see Figure 5.8)3. That such sequences can be 
easily remembered, shared, and adapted to the particulars of individual circumstances made 
them highly valuable to the builders of antiquity (Turnbull 1993, see p.323).  
                                                      
 
2 For a discussion of how generative sequences can be employed throughout processes 
of designing and making, see Christopher Alexander (2002, p.301-2) 
3 Example taken from George R. Walker and Jim Tolpin (2015, p.117) 
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Figure 5. 8 How to draw a slender arch (left, with focal points outside the spring points) and 
how to draw a broader arch (right, with focal points inside the spring points) 
 
As a more contemporary example, using a pair of dividers in the practice of designing a 
chair (e.g., the one in Figure 5.4) requires us to continually reconsider the relationship of the 
module to the whole design as we work. Does this distance allow us to create the right kinds 
of proportions? Are the divisions simple to work with? For example, divisions of 12 (e.g., 
one-sixth, one-fourth, one-third, and one-half), like those found in the body part 
measurements of antiquity, offer more whole number fraction options than when using 
divisions of 10 (with just one-fifth and one-half).  Thus, right at the beginning of our design 
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process, setting and resetting the dividers becomes a key concern, as we continually 
reconsider the relationship between parts, as well as the appropriateness of the module and 
its divisions for the task. Frequent revision of this setting is often necessary, until a useful 
module emerges alongside the design work. As designers experiment with the tool, by 
tentatively stepping out the potential relationships, both the artifact and its own unique 
system of measurement begin to emerge. 
5.1.6. Using a ruler to design: Questions of Units 
When using a ruler to determine the distance between points, we begin by placing it on a 
surface so that it spans the two (or more) points we would like to define. Once one of the 
points has been marked, a ruler allows us to decide on the location of the other points by 
referring to the markings of a measurement system that run along its edge. These graduated 
markings are continuous, enabling us to choose any dimension that seems appropriate. Once 
the first set of points has been marked, the ruler is moved to span the next distance, and we 
again are required to decide on the dimension. 
To again take the extended mind argument seriously, and to consider tools to be an 
important part of cognitive systems, we might say that the ruler poses questions in terms of 
universal units of measure. Each time the ruler is repositioned, it physically retains no 
information about the previous decisions made, and we are free to choose any dimension 
along the continuous scale. Unlike setting and resetting a pair of dividers, the sequence of 
steps when using a ruler does not ask us to consider proportional relationships from the start. 
Instead, it allows us to define any feature of a design independently from the others; it 
allows, and even encourages, a dramatic shift in attention away from the proportional 
concerns prompted by a pair of dividers. 
Of course, making a design with the same proportional relationships using either a pair of 
dividers or a ruler would be possible. Indeed, if we disregard the importance of the external 
world in the process, we might argue that these decisions are always a matter for the internal 
cognitive capacities of the designer, regardless of what tools and techniques they are using. 
However, what is clear from the examination here is that a ruler does not structure the task 
in terms of proportion. We do not need to start by discovering a useful module, and we do 
not need to step off an emergent design to quickly determine proportional relationships. Any 
such relationships may be discovered only upon reflection, with reference to the units of 
measure and through the detour of mathematics.  
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5.1.7. Summary of Rulers and Dividers 
My study of rulers and dividers has aimed to uncover how these tools and their techniques 
structure processes of design differently, by prioritizing certain qualities over others. The 
evidence for these differences can be found in the physical and temporal arrangement of the 
techniques. A ruler is placed on a surface, allowing us to run or jump a pen, pencil, or knife 
between any of its gradated markings. A line’s start and end points must be linked by the 
tool before the line is drawn, or the marks are made. A pair of dividers walks across a 
surface, meaning that we cannot leap-frog from one point to another, but must arrive at an 
end point only having taken and considered each step according to the proportional system 
of measurement. In the analysis given here, I have framed this difference by focusing on the 
questions posed by the tools. The techniques of divider use require that we consider 
questions of proportion, and those of ruler use ask us to determine distances in the shared 
units of a measuring system. 
Throughout this study, I have tried to give a sober account of the differences between 
divider and ruler techniques, leaving to the reader decisions about the merits of designing 
while using different systems of measurement. Indeed, the real value of this kind of 
technology (to borrow Siguat’s phrase, see 5.6.3) is that it helps each of us to better identify 
the relationship between the techniques of design practice and the outcomes, and then to 
align them accordingly. From a historical perspective, this link between the tools of design 
and the resulting forms created is clearly seen. Dividers are emblematic of a time in which 
the study and creation of proportional relationships dominated scientific and artistic 
thought.4  
In contemporary design practice, proportions are usually given less consideration. Dividers 
are not as ubiquitous as they once were—and neither are rulers, for that matter, as computer-
aided design (CAD) software has taken an increasingly dominant role in much design 
development. On this point, we might consider the techniques associated with CAD. In most 
cases, as the first line is drawn in CAD software, the user is immediately asked how long 
that line should be, in either millimeters or inches (see figure CAD). Subsequent lines also 
are to be specified in these units because each element of a drawing can be considered 
                                                      
 
4 Such emphasis is clearly expressed, for example, in Luca Pacioli’s 1509 book De 
divina proportione (The Divine Proportion), which, inspired by the ancient ideas of 
Vitruvius, cites proportion as the most important architectural concept—see Kruft (1994, 
p.63). See also Walker and Tolpin, (2013, p.9-10). 
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without relation to those that have been created before5. In ruler-like fashion, then, the 
universal measurements required of modern manufacturing appear to have been transmitted 
from the tools and techniques of factories into the tools and techniques of design studios. 
We now feed numbers into the machines that sit on our desks.   
Figure 5. 9 CAD interface asking for the dimensions of a line 
 
As we examine the techniques associated with design tools like rulers, dividers, and CAD 
software, I suggest the usefulness of extended mind theory starts to become apparent. 
Without this perspective, we instead rely on what Gedenryd calls “intramental” (1998, p.7) 
accounts of cognition and infer that tools are mediators used to transcribe pre-existing ideas 
into reality. In this model, we are limited to discussing only the degrees of certainty with 
which our tools can achieve a prescribed result. However, by undertaking the kind of 
analysis demonstrated in the divider/ruler comparison, and by granting things the epistemic 
credit they deserve, designers can better see and discuss how tools and techniques influence 
processes of design, prioritizing some decisions over others and emphasizing certain 
qualities. I suggest the idea of techniques posing questions to be a useful metaphor with 
which to investigate this issue. This is a subject I return to in the next chapter. 
 
5.2. What is the Step-Character of a Technique? 
In the second of three questions that may be asked of epistemic character, I introduce the 
idea of step-character. This is perhaps the most significant question we may ask of a 
technique’s epistemic character, as it structures the distribution of occasions for questions to 
                                                      
 
5 To avoid falling into a trap discouraged by Sigaut (of using technological analyses 
without a proper understanding of techniques, see 2.6.4), I would note that designing 
parametrically in CAD software does create relationships between parts and wholes. 
Please specify line length:
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be asked (5.1), and the opportunities for emergent results to provide feedback (5.3). It 
therefore has a significant effect on the other two questions. 
Once I have discussed the theoretical influences on the idea of step-character, I demonstrate 
how we may pursue the question with reference to the techniques used in carving a wooden 
spoon. 
5.2.1. What is a ‘step’ of production? 
Understanding production as a step-by-step process is common across disciplines interested 
in designing and making (see, for example, the chaine opertoire or operational sequence in 
archaeology, 2.6.11). Despite this widespread use, however, it will be helpful to offer a 
clarification of what I mean by a step. I am using the phrase conventionally, to describe an 
incremental movement from one state to another. But there is an important point to be made 
in relation to how the steps of production may be delineated. Consider, for example, the 
action of sawing a board of timber as a step of production. In the sequence, 1. measure 
alcove, 2. saw timber, 3. screw shelf brackets to wall, 4. screw timber to shelf brackets, the 
step “saw timber” makes sense. We could, however, just as logically divide individual saw 
strokes into steps or, in the opposite direction, understand the fitting of a shelf as one step, 
before the subsequent steps of building the surrounding cupboard or painting can take place. 
In analyses of making practice, therefore, the steps of production may be defined arbitrarily. 
According to what suits the particular discussion, we could regard any part of a process as a 
single step.  
Throughout this section, I divide making techniques into finer delineations than is typical. 
Whilst we might often think of longer instances of tool use (i.e. hammering in a nail or 
chiselling a mortise) as the discrete steps of an operational sequence, I wish to emphasise 
that such actions are in fact made up of lots of smaller steps. This is in accord with Tim 
Ingold, who presents a study of sawing a board of timber in an effort to discuss the nature of 
tool use (2011, see p.51-62). Ingold takes an approach that divides the operation of sawing 
into multiple steps. Through a detailed description of the various phases of sawing, Ingold 
argues that to compress the subtle variations of technique and the adjustments that take place 
into one single step—saw the board—is to miss the journey-like nature of tool use. Rather 
than ‘leap-frogging the world’ (ibid., p.152) from one state of relative completion to another, 
Ingold claims that making practices progress by way of a ‘journey that proceeds from place 
to place’ (ibid., p.53) - ‘cutting a plank is more a walk than a step’ (ibid., p.57). Whilst the 
smaller, proximate steps Ingold describes (like nicking the edge of the board to start a cut, or 
changing from one rhythm of sawing to another) might appear to flow into one another 
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without any noticeable divisions, subsuming these steps into one longer step reinforces the 
hylomorphic assumption that ‘each stage in the process of making an artefact is completed 
at the point when the material outcome precisely matches the maker’s initial intention’ 
(ibid., p.55). For Ingold, collapsing making processes into longer operational steps like “saw 
timber” precludes any consideration of the adjustments and corrections that take place 
throughout such processes (this is an idea that corresponds with Fracois Sigaut’s discussion 
of technological studies, see 2.6.3).  
How we define the steps of a productive technique thus betrays assumptions made about the 
significance of that technique. The level of detail of a study is intertwined with its aims and 
theoretical foundation. Based upon the emergent understanding of production described in 
Chapter 3, and the epistemic nature of tool use described in the previous chapter, the 
position I take is that the small, incremental steps of a technique have a significant bearing 
on its epistemic character and are worthy of attention. 
The discussion of step-character presented here thus requires a fine-grained analysis of tools 
and techniques (see Malafouris 2013; see 2.6.12 on chrono-architectures). At this scale, the 
delineation of steps becomes enmeshed with the physical arrangement of tools, materials 
and the practitioner. Ingold’s analysis considers an individual saw stroke to constitute a 
“step”. Keller and Keller take a ‘heat’ as a unit of action in blacksmithing (1996, p.108). In 
the previous chapter, the analysis of hammer use was interested in each blow as a step. If we 
were to use a hand plane to thickness the sawn board, we could understand each pass of the 
plane as a step—with each shaving ejected from the plane’s mouth becoming the evidence 
of that step. And the steps of divider use, or the marks made alongside a ruler described 
above are taken to be steps of those techniques. Whilst I acknowledge that the steps of 
production may be defined arbitrarily in post hoc analyses then, this chapter finds steps such 
as these to be well-defined features of practice. I suggest that the steps of a process are 
defined, or punctuated, by opportunities for reflection and revision. These opportunities are, 
to borrow from Carol Link’s terminology (and also Donald Schön 1983, see p.78-9), the 
pauses in conversation between a practitioner and their material. In the study below, it is 
these kinds of steps—those small incremental advances that present themselves throughout 
practice—which I will be describing. 
5.2.2. Carving a Spoon 
Before discussing the step-character of the techniques involved in carving a spoon, it is 
important to define the emergent nature of the process. In the discussion of rulers and 
dividers, I described only the general nature of how such tools might be used to layout a 
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design. Because they are often used to create drawings, it is perhaps easier to understand 
rulers and dividers as tools of design practice. They can be readily understood as for 
“working things out”. As seen in the spoon example, however, I suggest we do not have to 
limit studies of epistemic character only to those techniques that create drawings. In the 
context of workshop practice, I suggest that all tools and techniques can be understood as 
means by which to work things out. 
With this development, however, comes a potential difficulty. Where in the case of ruler and 
divider use it might have been possible to suspend the usual assumption that a practitioner is 
realizing an idea that already exists in their head, this comes less naturally in the case of 
non-typical design tools. The experience of using a ruler to determine the dimension of an 
as-yet-imaginary object is quite common, even in an everyday context (when, for example, 
baking a cake). The experience of using a saw, axe or knife to work out the shape of a piece 
of wood is far less common. We are perhaps much more inclined to interpret such 
techniques in accordance with the linear model of thought and action criticised in Chapter 3 
(see 3.2). 
I believe the example of spoon-carving can help in this regard. Owing to the fibrous nature 
of wood, and the technical choices (of tools) I have made for this study, the outcome of the 
process is conspicuously emergent. In the phraseology of John Protevi, we must follow an 
artisanal approach (2001; see 3.3.1). But this itself raises a problem—how is this discussion, 
founded in a highly artisanal context, more broadly applicable? I would answer by 
reiterating the commitment made in Chapter 3, to a fundamentally emergent understanding 
of production, and the idea that design is always a plan-making activity (see 3.4). Whilst the 
wooden spoon completed throughout the process below is a “finished product”, the process 
of its production is analogous to the creation of any three-dimensional prototype, where the 
design and its realization emerge simultaneously. And the underlying concept, the question 
of a technique’s step-character, may be asked of any technique. 
In addition to its conspicuously emergent nature, I have also chosen the example of spoon 
carving for the following reasons; 
• It incorporates various tools and techniques, which have different step-characters, 
and therefore allows us to make convenient comparisons 
• It allows us to explore the relationship between techniques and the material being 
worked, and demonstrates that step-character is a result of this relationship (see, for 
instance, the differences in step-character when splitting or shaving wood using the 
same tool—an axe; see also 6.2.2) 
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• The process has been well-documented by others, providing reliable sources from 
which to justify my description 
The process of carving a spoon I describe below involves a small collection of tools and 
three methods of wasting wood—sawing, splitting and shaving. Although there are many 
technical choices available to the woodworker interested in spoon making, here I describe a 
typical process, which employs a saw, an axe, a knife and a hook knife (Figure 5.10). 
Figure 5. 10 An axe, bow saw, straight knife and hook knife 
 
This way of working is common in green woodwork (Sundqvist 1990), where the high 
moisture content of the wood allows these tools to cut and split easily6. The advantage of 
using greenwood and the axe, and the reason this process is popular with woodworkers, is 
that splitting spoon blanks (the piece of wood from which a spoon is to be carved) ensures 
that the spoon follows the curve of the grain (Figure 5.11). 
                                                      
 
6 Were a spoon to be made using dried timber, however, carving with an axe as 
described below would be difficult and likely replaced with coping or band saw cuts. 
 126 
Figure 5. 11 Spoon following curvature of grain. The dotted line represents where the log 
will be split 
 
With careful material selection, this enables a practitioner to create spoon forms with a 
greater curvature, without sacrificing strength. If the same parts were to be made from a 
straight-grained piece of timber (or sawn indiscriminately from any piece of timber) it would 
result in a spoon with grain ‘run-out’ (Figure 5.12, after Sundqvist’s: ibid., p.101) that is 
more likely to snap under stress. 
Figure 5. 12 A spoon that doesn't follow the grain 
 
5.2.3. Ways of Wasting Wood & Working with Grain 
The three techniques of wasting wood in the example below—using a saw, axe and knife—
each illustrate a different step-character. Before describing the techniques in more detail, it 
will be helpful to explain how each method of wasting wood interacts with the material. 
The techniques associated with saws, axes and knives have been developed to account for 
the behaviour of wood as a fibrous material. In order to consider these techniques in any 
detail, it is first necessary to understand this fibrous nature. A useful analogy offered by 
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woodwork writer Jeff Miller is to think of pieces of timber as composed of bundles of 
loosely connected straws (2012, p.12). The straws represent the fibres of a tree. When it is 
still standing, the straws transport water and sugars up and down the tree. Once harvested as 
timber, the straws become the grain of our piece of wood. 
Miller’s loose bundle of straws analogy is relevant here because it illustrates a key property 
of wood—individual wood fibres are stronger than the bonds between them. Whilst the 
straws themselves can break, the connections between them break much more readily.  For 
those designing structures to be made from timber, it is this property of the material that is 
exploited when aligning the grain along a part’s length, to maximize strength (Figure 5.13).  
Figure 5. 13 Aligning parts to the grain direction 
 
For the present discussion of using a saw, axe or knife, the bundle of straws model helps to 
explain how wood fibres behave when subjected to these techniques. The actions mediated 
by these tools can be placed into three categories—splitting, shaving and sawing, each of 
which is employed in the following example of spoon carving.  
Splitting Wood 
A piece of wood is split by driving a wedge into its end grain (the ends of the fibres) (Figure 
5.14). 
9 8
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Figure 5. 14 Splitting wood 
 
Owing to the weaker bonds between wood fibres, the wedge splits the piece of wood along 
these bonds. The split line thus follows the line of the fibres, resulting in split parts whose 
surfaces are rarely flat, and instead take on whatever curvature is in the grain. 
Shaving Wood 
When a piece of wood is shaved, a blade slices through its fibres. The wasted wood is 
removed as shavings, as in the continuous peeling often ejected from the throat of a bench 
plane. The angle at which the blade meets the fibres is a matter of concern for the 
woodworker, who will usually aim to shave with the grain. Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show how 
the direction of travel of a blade can be altered between shaving with the grain, or against 
the grain, respectively. 
Figure 5. 15 Shaving with the grain 
 
9
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Figure 5. 16 Shaving against the grain 
 
When shaving as in Figure 5.15, the blade slices through the fibres, leaving a smooth 
surface. When the direction is reversed, as in Figure 5.16, the blade hits the ends of the 
wood fibres and, rather than slicing through them, instead begins to split them apart. Once 
the split fibres curl back over on themselves, they usually snap off, leaving a rough, uneven 
surface. When planing a surface in an effort to make it smooth, this undesirable result is 
known as tear-out. Apart from in this instance, shaving does not follow the paths of fibres. 
Sawing Wood 
There are two types of saw cut when working with wood; rip cuts and cross cuts. Rip cuts 
are those made into end grain. The teeth of a saw making a rip cut act like a row of tiny 
chisels, breaking off the ends of fibres. Cross cuts are those made across the grain, as when 
sawing a board of timber to length (Sellers 2016, see p.321). Here the saw teeth cut through 
the fibres perpendicularly. Unlike pieces of wood that have been split, sawn parts typically 
have flat faces that do not follow the run of the grain. Saws cut through, rather than follow, 
the lines of fibres. This leaves surfaces patterned with the severed ends and beginnings of 
fiber lines that once ran through a larger piece of wood. It is these severed fiber lines that 
contribute to the grain patterns commonly found on the surfaces of furniture. 
5.2.4. The Steps of Wasting Wood 
In the following description of carving a spoon, I examine the epistemic character of saw, 
axe and knife techniques. Specifically, I want to consider the step-by-step nature of their 
progress. As described above, I have chosen these three tools for wasting wood because 
their associated techniques illustrate a variety of different step-characters.  
Part 1: Sawing a log to length 
Before splitting a log, it must be cut to length. Although it is possible to cut across the grain 
using an axe (as when felling a tree), the cuts can be made more cleanly (wasting less timber 
8
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either side) by using a saw. When working with greenwood, it is helpful to use a bow saw 
with a blade specially adapted for cutting timber with a high moisture content (Figure 5.17).  
Figure 5. 17 A bow saw 
 
Unlike the precision required when, for example, sawing the tenon of a mortise and tenon 
joint, the cuts we make to size the spoon blank are not dimensionally critical. The exact 
length does not matter at this stage—so long as the blank is slightly longer than we need, 
excess can easily be removed later on. Despite different saw cuts requiring different levels 
of precision, however, the main feature of sawing’s step-character is widely applicable 
across sawing operations—sawing generally lacks an emergent result that may be assessed 
and revised. Although the strokes of hand saw use have a rhythmic and incremental 
advance, the result of these strokes is revealed only at the end of the cut, when the waste is 
removed in one piece. The moment before starting a saw cut is thus one in which there must 
be certainty about its anticipated path. As the saying goes, measure twice, cut once. 
Despite the generous tolerance for precision when cutting a spoon blank to length, the 
moment before cutting still demands we address the same question—“is this cut in the right 
place?”. As part of the effort to exploit the shapes inherent in the grain of the wood, the 
section proposed to be cut should be carefully assessed. The shape should suit the eventual 
spoon type (Sundqvist 1990, see p.100). The resultant ends of the log should be close 
enough to parallel, so that it can stand up when being split. Any features (such as the traces 
of branches) identified on the bark, which might pose complications later in the process, 
should be identified and, if necessary, avoided. Whilst we might not be measuring twice 
before the saw cuts here, we are nonetheless required to decide upon an action that, once 
begun, will not give much opportunity for revision or alteration. Sawing thus has a step-
character where decisions are made in advance, rather than distributed throughout the 
process (this is idea, the distribution of decision making is the theme of the next chapter). 
Part 2: Splitting Out the Blank 
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Once sawn to length, the log needs to be split. Because the pith of the wood is unsuitable for 
use in a spoon, the log is usually split through this point. This allows the pith to be easily 
removed after splitting. The angle of the split across the end grain is chosen with reference 
to any curve in the log that would be useful for a spoon blank (Figure 5.18). Once this angle 
is determined, there are three potential techniques for driving the axe through it. All three 
require the log to be stood on end on a hard surface, usually a chopping block. 
Figure 5. 18 How to orientate the split for a spoon 
 
The first technique is to swing the axe at speed. This is the riskiest (and most impressive) of 
the three options, as it places demands on accuracy that can be hard to achieve. A more 
certain option is to rest the edge of the axe on the intended split line and, using the non-axe-
wielding hand to lift the log, raising the axe and log simultaneously, before swiftly throwing 
them back down onto the chopping block. Because the axe edge remains in place 
throughout, the accuracy of the split is more easily controlled using this technique. The third 
method requires a mallet. Here, the axe head is first placed as in the second technique and 
then stuck with a mallet, driving it into the end grain. Again, this technique reduces the risk 
of the split starting in an unintended position. 
Considering the step-character of the splitting technique, the most important feature of all 
the above strategies is that, once the axe starts to split apart wood fibres, the path of the 
whole split is immediately determined. As soon as a split has begun to travel down through 
the log, there is nothing that can be done to affect its course. Although a very different 
context to the factory machines that epitomise David Pye’s workmanship of certainty (see 
9 8
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4.1.3), the process of splitting wood is similarly predetermined. The determining system at 
play in this case, however, rather than being carefully managed by machine operators, is 
intrinsic to the piece of wood and unknowable until the split has been made. This gives the 
technique of splitting a log a step-character that, like sawing, sees decisions made in 
advance of the action, rather than throughout. 
Part 3: Shaping with the Axe 
Having split the log in two, the parts can be assessed for their suitability and work can begin 
to rough out the spoon shape with an axe. It is often possible to utilize both halves of the 
split log for spoon making (Sundqvist 1990, see p.101), in which case one might be 
temporarily stored in such a way as to minimize its moisture loss—from the moment of 
splitting, the pieces of wood start to dry, making carving more challenging. The process of 
shaping the spoon blank, therefore, normally follows soon after splitting. 
In comparison to sawing or splitting the log, the process of shaping with the axe involves 
episodes of action during which finer-grained decision making takes place. Decisions are 
made throughout, in response to the emergent result. During this phase of the process, the 
axe is used in two modes—both as a tool for splitting the wood, as before, but also as a tool 
for shaving (to slice through wood fibres). Although the shavings made by an axe are rarely 
of the wispy or curly variety as ejected by handplanes, the principle of how the blade is 
cutting, as described above, still holds true. 
Different practitioners are likely to use different sequences of action when shaping with an 
axe, and these sequences may be further adapted to the requirements of a particular spoon 
type, or a particularly characterful piece of wood. The universal validity of the sequence 
illustrated in Figure 5.19, however, is not of consequence. Similar sequences to the one 
shown have been documented by a variety of sources (for example, Sundqvist 1990, see 
p.101-123) and used by myself but, were the sequence to be reordered somehow, the 
discussion of the step-character of the techniques here would remain valid. 
 133 
Figure 5. 19 Sequence of shaping a spoon blank, using an axe 
 
The stages of Figure 5.19 that are most useful for the discussion of step-character are: 5 and 
6, where cross-grain cuts are made to determine the point at which the bowl joins the handle; 
and 7 and 8, which show how splits are made down to these cross-grain cuts to thin the 
handle. I will use these stages to illustrate how multi-step processes can be used to work 
things out in response to an emergent form.  
Establishing the Bowl and Handle 
An axe that strikes at right angles to wood fibres can only travel a limited distance. Where a 
crosscutting saw removes wasted wood as saw dust, an axe can only sever and compress, not 
remove, the fibres. As they are compressed by the faces of the axe head, the fibres soon halt 
its progress (Figure 5.20).  
1. 2. 3.
4. 5. 6.
7. 8. 9.
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Figure 5. 20 An axe edge compressing wood fibres 
 
Because of this, axe blows are usually delivered at alternating angles, so that they can 
simultaneously sever and split out waste wood (Figure 5.21). 
Figure 5. 21 Alternating axe blows 
 
It is these kinds of cuts that are used to establish the form seen in stages 5 and 6 of Figure 
5.19, where chops are made to determine the size and position of the spoon’s neck (the joint 
of the bowl and handle). It would be rare for just two alternating axe blows to be used to 
make these neck cuts. Usually, the depth and position of the neck must be determined 
through a series of chops. The first stage is to remove wood until the correct depth is 
reached on both sides. This leaves a result (Figure 5.22) that offers a good opportunity for 
reflection, where the relative proportion of the bowl to handle becomes visible, and the 
position of the neck can be moved to alter this important characteristic of the spoon. 
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Figure 5. 22 Starting to define the neck 
 
Figure 5.23 shows how further cuts can be used to move the neck closer to the bowl. 
Because adjustments can be made in this direction, it is advantageous to make the first cuts 
into the neck a little further up the handle than might be necessary, thereby avoiding making 
the bowl too small before assessing its size with the benefit of an emergent result.  
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Figure 5. 23 Adjusting the proportion of bowl to handle 
 
It should be noted that, before shaping with the axe, it is possible to mark guides onto the 
surface of the blank using pen or pencil. In the sequence illustrated here, a silhouette of the 
spoon could be marked onto the top face, as seen in the illustrations. Such markings can be 
useful to guide the axe work, but are not usually adhered to with absolute precision, for three 
reasons. First, lines drawn onto the surface are removed as wood is wasted so, whilst the 
silhouette can guide shaping in one dimension, as soon as work progresses to shape the top 
surface, the lines are lost. Secondly, as described in the next section, when wood is split, 
there is never absolute control over the split’s progress. Any curve discovered in the grain 
might be either incorporated into the form, or worked around. And third, during the 
translation from two to three-dimensional form, alternative shapes might present themselves. 
Because of this aspect of the process, the looser guidance of a centre line running the length 
of the spoon can be more useful than a more prescriptive layout (Sundqvist 1990, see p.108). 
If there is an ambition for symmetry about this line, as is common, such a center line can be 
very helpful through the shaping process. 
Splitting to Thin the Handle 
Having established the neck of the spoon, the excess at either side of the handle can be 
removed. The most efficient way to do this is to once again use the axe to split along the 
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grain. The cuts made to establish the neck allow these splits to be proceed without running 
on into the spoon’s bowl (Figure 5.24). 
Figure 5. 24 Splitting down to the neck 
 
Rather than aiming to split all the waste off in one piece, a better strategy is to make a test 
split approximately halfway between the edge of the blank, and the anticipated edge of the 
handle (Figure 5.25). 
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Figure 5. 25 A test split to check the run of the grain 
 
 
This test split allows us to check the run of the grain, to see if it travels in towards the handle 
or away towards the edge of the blank. In the case of the split travelling towards the handle, 
the final split used to define the handle’s edge should be started further out, so as not to end 
up splitting the handle itself (Figure 5.26). 
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Figure 5. 26 The potential hazard of not using a test split 
 
The test splits made when thinning the handle demonstrate a feature of step-character not yet 
discussed—by recognizing the step-character of a technique like splitting with an axe, 
practitioners can take action to create opportunities for revision, where there would 
otherwise be none. Where splitting the log in two, as above, uses the axe in a process with 
no opportunity for revision, this process adds additional steps in order to discover the run of 
the grain. To return to David Kirsh and Paul Maglio’s terminology introduced in the 
previous chapter (4.2), these steps can be considered more epistemic, than pragmatic, 
actions. They are introduced to find things out. This kind of tuning of step-character is a 
subject I return to in the following chapter (6.2.2). 
Part 4: Carving with the Knife and Hook Knife 
Shaping with the axe is followed by carving with the knife (Figure 5.27) and hook knife 
(Figure 5.28). The knife is used to carve any flat or convex surfaces and the hook knife is 
used in concave areas (typically just the inside of the bowl). Towards the end of the axe 
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work, shavings and splits become increasingly perilous, as we approach the more resolved 
spoon form. There comes a time when splitting parts of the spoon offers too little control, 
and leaves too rough a finish. Chair maker Peter Galbert is alert to these critical moments of 
transition, and suggests that, whilst risk might increase, so to do the potential rewards: ‘[o]ne 
recurring theme I’ve come across is that each tool, used in its proper place and to the 
maximum extent of its ability, will speed the process and leave less work for the next tool. 
Switching tools too early can make a job laborious’ (2015, p.xi). With experience, it is 
possible to go further with a coarser wasting technique, using a tool like the axe, before 
making this transition to a finer technique. Again, I believe such situations can be 
understood as a kind of tuning of step-character.  
Figure 5. 27 Carving with a knife 
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Figure 5. 28 Carving with a hook knife 
 
Where the process of shaping with an axe combines shaving and splitting methods, knife 
cuts are almost exclusively intended to shave wood and leave a smooth finish. The direction 
of these cuts is thus critical, so that they may slice wood fibres with the grain. To this end, 
spoon carving instructional texts (e.g. Sundqvist 1990) focus in detail on the variety of 
knife-holding methods that should be employed in different situations. These holds enable 
carvers to apply force safely at a variety of angles and trajectories. To achieve the smoothest 
possible finish, the last of these cuts can be delayed until the spoon’s surface has had time to 
dry out a little—although more force is required for the cuts, the less pliable fibres can be 
sliced more cleanly (ibid., see p.118). 
One of the most satisfying cuts to make on the spoon is at the back of the neck7, where the 
handle is blended into the back of the bowl. In a classic spoon design, the neck profile is 
narrow in plan and deep from the side (see cross-section B-B in Figure 5.29) (ibid., see 
p.96), to provide strength where it is required.  
                                                      
 
7 This pleasure is perhaps akin to ‘the elation felt by the violent exertion of a strength 
with which man measures himself against the overwhelming forces of the elements and 
which through the cunning invention of tools he knows how to multiply far beyond its 
natural measure’, as described by political philosopher Hannah Arendt (1958, p.140) 
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Figure 5. 29 A classic spoon design 
 
The intersection of this V-shaped profile sees the two sides of the neck meet at a ridge that 
runs down the spoon’s centre line. In order to cut smoothly with the grain, and enjoy the 
reward of creating an even, peeling shaving (Figure 5.30), these cuts are started at the back 
of the bowl, progress towards the handle and are stopped before they begin to tear, rather 
than cut, the fibres (see Figure 5.31 for the direction of cuts made with respect the grain). 
Repeated passes are used to peel off shavings. 
A A
B B
A-A
B-B
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Figure 5. 30 Defining the "V-shaped" profile. The dotted line represents the apex of the “V” 
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Figure 5. 31 The direction of cuts made with the grain 
 
To maintain symmetry about the centre line, and a consistent position for the ridge of the v-
shaped profile, these passes can alternate from one side to the other. Also to this end, the 
thickness of the peelings that result from symmetrical knife cuts can be monitored for 
consistency. In such instances, the emergent result of the technique exists not just as the 
object of our endeavor, but also in the material wasted8. By monitoring the peelings that 
result from knife cuts and feeling changes in resistance, we can make fine adjustments to the 
depth of cut. These adjustments demonstrate a significant difference between the knife’s 
step-character and that of the other techniques throughout the spoon carving process. Whilst 
using the knife, such adjustments can be made continually, during the cuts, rather than being 
                                                      
 
8 This is a feature of shavings also exploited in other areas of woodwork—when 
assessing the set (depth of cut) of a hand plane, for example, if a less-than-full-width 
shaving is ejected from only one side of the plane’s throat, it indicates that the blade is set 
deeper on that side.  
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limited to the intervals between action. Although there are intervals between knife cuts to 
assess and reconsider the emergent spoon (and these are frequent and fine-grained), there is 
also much more opportunity to steer the result throughout the action.  
5.2.5. Summary of the Step-Character of Carving a Spoon 
In the example of carving a spoon, we discover how the various techniques offer different 
opportunities for the evaluation and revision of an emergent result. I consider these 
opportunities to be the intervals of step-character. In the following chapter, I explore how 
the step-character of a technique is thus linked to the questions posed throughout. The 
relationship between these two aspects of epistemic character, I suggest, plays an important 
role in structuring practice.  
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5.3. What is the Nature of the Emergent Result? 
The last of this chapter’s three questions concerns the nature of emergent results. 
Throughout the example of spoon carving, I referred to the emergent result as it was 
presented throughout the step-by-step process. I now explore what I mean by an “emergent 
result” and offer a suggestion as to how its nature may be evaluated. 
5.3.1. What is an Emergent Result? 
In the previous chapter, I introduced neurophysiologist Nikolai Bernstein’s study of skilled 
blacksmiths (see 4.3.2). Through experiments that employed an early form of motion 
capture photography, Bernstein investigated the nature of a smith’s dexterity. The key 
finding was that, despite the accuracy with which a smith could repeatedly strike the same 
point on an anvil, there was significant variability in the arrangement of their arm joints 
during each hammer swing. For Bernstein, this supported his argument that the essence of 
dexterity lies not in mechanically repeated, memorized movements, but in an ability to adapt 
to the emergent conditions of a task. In the experiment, the conditions to which the smiths 
responded were influenced by the inconsistent recoil of the hammer and the changeable 
elasticity of their muscles and ligaments. In real practice, however, the dexterity of 
blacksmiths is challenged to an even greater degree—by the additional variable of the ever-
changing piece of hot metal that they are hitting. Each blow from the hammer alters the 
shape of the work piece and, therefore, the target for the next. As the iron cools, it will 
deform less for the same force of hammer strike. There is an unpredictability to the outcome 
of every blow, necessitating the kind of dexterity Bernstein identified: an aptness for 
continual correction, made possible by a highly-tuned sensitivity to the emergent result. 
This is not to suggest that a blacksmith does not have a good understanding of what their 
completed forging will be like. In Charles and Janet Keller’s anthropological analysis of the 
craft, the ‘umbrella plan’ is used to describe both this conceptual representation of an 
artefact and the procedures envisaged for its creation (1996, see p.109; see 3.2.4). A smith’s 
umbrella plan helps to direct the making process but must, Keller and Keller argue, remain 
sufficiently vague and open to revision. The plan might be supported by a loose sketch, or 
single dimension to which one part of a forging should conform. To over-specify the result 
in advance, however, would be at odds with the emergent nature of the process, for ‘[e]ven 
the most thorough design and associated plan for action can never be sufficiently detailed, 
sufficiently precise to anticipate everything that can happen during production’ (ibid., p.118) 
(see also, Suchman 1987). Blacksmiths must be attentive to states of progress which are not 
knowable in advance, but emerge throughout the process. There is a call and response, or 
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back and forth, between a practitioner and the object of their work. Keller and Keller’s 
notion of the umbrella plan allows for this exchange, by ‘containing the expectation that 
further material and procedural details beyond those specified’ will become apparent 
throughout (1996, p.119). 
Whilst their study is rooted in the specifics of forging metal, Keller and Keller, as 
anthropologists of knowledge, are eager to extrapolate from this setting. They draw on other 
studies of craft, invention and industrial design (ibid., see p.118) to justify their claim that 
this emergent quality is not unique to blacksmithing, but also present in other creative fields. 
In practices that work things out along the way, and must respond to the unpredictability of 
the material world, emergent results are a common feature. This recalls Andrew Pickering’s 
treatment of scientific practice as a dance of agency (see 3.2.4), a subject I return to below.  
For now, I wish to think of emergent results as the answers to questions addressed 
throughout a technique. When deciding ‘how many divider steps should define this side?’, 
for example, the pattern of dots stepped out onto our paper is an answer to this question. It 
might not be the final answer, it might be tentative or temporary, but it is an answer—an 
emergent result, which may then be evaluated and revised if necessary. Emergent results 
need not be limited only to the visual realm—when carving a spoon, using a thumb and 
finger to assess the thickness of the bowl can provide valuable feedback. And in the waste 
created when carving with a knife, we also found that emergent results are not necessarily 
found in the object of our creative endeavor, but as an associated effect. This approach 
would allow us to expand the idea of emergent results to include things like the sound a 
hammer is making, or the smell of a saw cut. It is perhaps with reference to these aspects of 
production that the intimate link between perception and action, as promoted by critics of 
dualist, linear cognitive models (see Chapter 3), becomes most apparent. Whatever their 
nature, it should be noted that these answers don’t exist in advance of practice, before their 
material realisation. 
5.3.2. Agency and Emergence 
In acknowledging emergence, Keller and Keller are following ecological approaches to 
philosophy and anthropology (see, for a discussion, Malafouris 2013, p. 207) and theorists 
of situated action, by understanding creative practice to be akin to the ‘ripening of an idea’ 
(Bergson 1911, p. 360). This approach focusses on the behavior of the world (of materials) 
as much as that of the practitioner. As we found in Pickering’s metaphorical “dance” 
between people and the world (see 3.2.4), this behavior is often described in terms of 
“agency”. 
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To return to a passage that has been quoted by others to illuminate the character of 
emergence (see, for example, Malafouris 2013, p.217; and Ingold 2000, p.352-3), 
anthropologist Gregory Bateson asks us to ‘[c]onsider a man felling a tree with an axe. Each 
stroke of the axe is modified or corrected, according to the shape of the cut face of the tree 
left by the previous stroke. This self-corrective […] process is brought about by a total 
system, trees-eyes-brain-muscles-axe-stroke-tree’ (1973, p.318). Here, Bateson describes the 
back and forth between people and the world, in an effort to avoid anthropocentric 
interpretations of action. He regards the man-tree-axe system as an indivisible whole that is 
jointly responsible for the outcome of the task. This ecological account has parallels with the 
theory of extended mind, which is similarly committed to the idea of an indivisible 
relationship between people and their environment. The body, writes Andy Clark, is ‘just 
one element in a kind of equal-partners dance between brain, body, and world’ (2008, p.56-
7).  
For Lambros Malafouris, this equal-partners dance necessitates the ascription of agency 
across the constituents of a system (2008; 2013). In the studies of pottery that partly inform 
Malafouris’ work, the notion of agency is a means to account for the role of the clay, the 
wheel and the potter in a pot’s formation. Each of these elements is said to have its own 
agency. Whilst, as Malafouris observes, we are usually inclined to take sole responsibility 
for our efforts, and think that “I cut down the tree”, or “I made the pot” (2013, see p.218), in 
so doing, we ignore the resistance and accommodation of the world (Pickering 1995), and its 
influence on the task. In the case of tree felling, the fibrous nature of the tree and its 
predisposition to split in a particular way (see 5.2.3), will co-determine the outcome of each 
axe blow. In Malafouris’ pottery examples, the pot is formed by the system of clay, wheel 
and potter, with each element exerting a force throughout. Following this understanding, the 
results of creative practice are caused not by a pre-existing idea being impressed into inert 
materials, but by a coming together of different agencies.     
Although similarly averse to internalist accounts of creativity, Tim Ingold is critical of those 
invoking the idea of agency to describe the behavior of materials (2007). Ingold equates the 
attribution of agency to a sprinkling of ‘magical mind-dust’ (2010, p.28) across the non-
human elements of systems. His primary criticism of this approach9 is that it is only 
necessary if we make the mistake of thinking of materials as inert in the first place. Were 
we, as Ingold suggests, to focus on the history of a piece of clay or wood, we would find that 
                                                      
 
9 In addition, Ingold believes agency to suggest a somewhat absurd symmetry between a 
highly skilled organism, like a potter, and a lump of clay (see Ingold 2010, p.94) 
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it has undergone a life of continual change, ‘forged in ongoing relations with surroundings 
that may or may not include human beings and much else besides’ (2010, p.31). The point at 
which a piece of clay is thrown into a pot, or a piece of wood is cut to length, is just one 
more transformation in this history. If we appreciate that materials are already alive, in that 
they are both susceptibility to, and the cause of, continual change, Ingold argues that we 
would no longer need magical dust to bring them back to life.  
I’m sympathetic to Ingold’s criticism, and would prefer to avoid introducing jargon like 
“agency” wherever possible, but I believe the term to have a useful corrective force in fields 
that might otherwise cast materials, and the techniques for working them, as inert (as 
described in Chapter 3). In studies of craft practice, like the ones offered by Ingold, 
Malafouris and Keller & Keller, perhaps there is less need for such correction—the idea of 
“working with materials”, accommodating their heterogeneity and anticipating 
unpredictability is already well acknowledged (Sennett 2008). It is in less obviously 
materially-engaged settings like those described by Pickering (see 3.2.4), however, that I 
suggest the notion of agency can be more helpful. For the present study, I am eager to 
demonstrate that emergence is not only a feature of workmanship of the risky kind, but 
present throughout any designing and making practice wherein things must be worked out 
along the way. In this effort, the idea of material agency, understood as a capacity to resist 
or accommodate certain forms, provides a useful concept.  
5.3.3. The Performative and Representational Idioms 
Underlying Pickering’s analysis of science practice is a contrast between what he calls the 
performative and the representational idioms for understanding the discipline. Pickering 
claims the established position is to see scientific practice as representational. This ‘casts 
science as, above all, an activity that seeks to represent nature, to produce knowledge that 
maps, mirrors, or corresponds to how the world really is’ (1995, p.5). The alternative, 
performative stance, is what Pickering tries to capture through his description of science as a 
dance of agency. This is to ‘start with the idea that the world is filled not, in the first 
instance, with facts and observations but with agency. The world, I want to say, is 
continually doing things, things that bear upon us not as observation statements upon 
disembodied intellects but as forces upon material beings’ (1995, p.6, emphases in original). 
A fundamental aspect of scientific practice illuminated by this story, and one which is not 
adequately explained in the representational idiom, is its temporally emergent nature. In a 
performance that relies upon both parties (as in the dance of agency between people and the 
world), we are never quite sure what might happen. Rather than hold on to fixed goals, 
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Pickering’s studies demonstrate how emergence forces scientists to tune both their 
equipment and their expectations. There is always the potential for learning and surprise. 
In the case of science, practitioners must tune their approach in an effort to find out what 
things are like. The goal is usually to develop descriptions of the world10. Design practice, I 
suggest, is instead an effort to find out what things could or should be like. The tuning made 
in response to emergence throughout the techniques of designing and making is an effort 
steer the result in a favourable direction.  
It is important to be clear that I’m not just describing what might be considered the 
“practical” consequences of emergence—the high winds that make a bridge wobble, or the 
reflective skyscraper that focusses the sun’s rays onto a footpath. I’m also describing the 
judgements made throughout a process that might be of little utilitarian consequence, but are 
nonetheless vital to the success of the outcome. A sensitivity to the subtleties of an artefact’s 
properties is a key feature of design practice (Chamberlain and Roddis 2003), and one, as 
described in the following quote by architect Christopher Alexander, that is often best 
supported through a performative approach.  
‘The truth is that no one can tell what the three-dimensional reality of the building is 
going to be based on a few pencil strokes or a few lines on a computer screen. [It 
does not enable us to make architectural decisions based upon what] the light is like, 
what the view is like, where the plants will grow, where you feel like walking, 
where you feel like sitting, what natural intuitive response a group of people will 
have to a particular room (if it is too high, too low, too wide, too narrow, too 
strangely shaped, too distant in feeling from the garden or from the room next door), 
where the sun is going to shine on the floor in winter, whether one can hear sounds 
from one room to the next, and so on—a thousand things.’ (2002, p.245)  
For architecture—a discipline that has, since Alberti’s era, been founded on the principle 
that such planning is possible—Alexander is obviously a controversial figure11. I introduce 
his work here, however, because it serves to illustrate what might be considered an 
insistently performative, and non-representational approach to design. Continuing on this 
theme, I now present this chapter’s last study of making. 
                                                      
 
10 Throughout The Mangle of Practice, Pickering acknowledges this continuing 
significance of representations, as the predominant outcome of science (he just aims to tell a 
more materially-engaged story of how they are arrived upon) 
11 I return to criticisms of his work in Chapter 7. 
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5.3.4. Two Methods for Making Paper Planes12 
Method 1. Take a single piece of A4 paper and, using no further equipment, fold, crease and 
(if necessary) tear it until you have created a plane. To ensure this task is non-routine, and 
thus analogous to a “real” design process, it is important to attempt to create a novel design 
(rather than following a pattern of folds used previously). 
Method 2. Using as many sheets of paper as you need, and any drawing equipment you like, 
design your plane. Following this method, you are not permitted to bend, fold, crease or tear 
any pieces of paper whilst designing. All paper must remain flat until such a time as you 
have completed the design. Then you must mark all necessary fold lines and instructions 
onto a sheet of A4 paper, before (strictly) following this guidance to create your plane. 
Again, to ensure this task is non-routine, it is important to attempt to create a novel design. 
This brief exercise allows us to consider the nature of two very different emergent results. 
Using Method 1, there is a back and forth between ourselves and the emergent result. We do 
something—make a fold, reverse a crease, tentatively bend a corner—and the resultant 
properties of the nascent plane present new information, questions or challenges. The 
emergent result helps us to evaluate how things are going. Decisions can be made, and 
adapted, throughout the process. In this way of working, action is not merely pragmatic (as 
in an effort to realise a predetermined goal), but also epistemic, in that it is directed towards 
improving our knowledge of the task and its possible outcomes (Kirsh and Maglio 1994). 
Each fold is thus a way of making the plane, and a step towards finding out how the plane 
should be made. Rather than maintaining an overall ambition for the plane’s design, 
attention is dedicated to a proximate idea for the next fold. After every step, we are 
presented with a new set of questions. I suggest the experimental nature of this process—its 
striving for, and generation of, both knowledge and a result—give it the quality of a dance 
of agency, and map onto the performative idiom. The plane is made in real-time, through a 
sequence of decisions that have not been collapsed in advance, within a model of reality. 
By the time we come to fold the plane designed through Method 2, the movements are no 
longer tentative, and the finished form has been almost completely predetermined. In this 
                                                      
 
12 The exercise described here is one I devised for three-dimensional design students. 
Having run the class on several occasions, I now find it best to have students swap their 
responses to the second method with one another, before folding them. This has the same 
effect of exchanging answer sheets in a quiz—it removes the temptation to cheat. The 
exercise finale—a competition to see who has made the plane that can fly the furthest—
usually provides good evidence for the limits of representation in the design process. 
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case, decisions about where folds should and shouldn’t be have been made with respect to a 
model. Through the sketches we make in advance of folding we create this model, and make 
best guesses as to the emergent form. Whilst the sketching process can be considered 
similarly epistemic (as described by Gedenryd 1998, see 3.2.1), it is limited by the nature of 
the emergent result. Our drawings do not pose the kinds of resistances encountered when 
actually folding a piece of paper. Nor do they accommodate the experimental aspects of 
tentative folding. They do not allow us to access information about our progress in the same 
way. Any surprise, affirmation or disappointment must be anticipated through the model. To 
be clear, I suggest that this way of working maps onto Pickering’s representational idiom, 
wherein all the important work takes place in a setting removed from the materials of 
practice. Through our sketches, we must imagine the agency of paper.  
It should be stated that it is probably not beyond the limits of singular human intelligence to 
plan all the folds required for a good paper plane in advance. But (and the frustrating 
contrivance of Method 2 is intended to raise this question) why would you want to? Why 
would you take a detour into representation when a performative approach is available? 
Here, we shift from the theme of Pickering’s earlier work (namely his efforts to study the 
nature of techno-scientific practice) towards his more recent emphasis, which is to explore 
the implications of his performative story and how, if we grasp its message about being in 
the world, we might act differently (2008; 2013; 2014). For Pickering, the dominance of the 
representational story brings with it a detour away from material engagement and towards 
abstracted knowledge. At every turn, Pickering identifies a tendency, across modernity, to 
make models of the world, make solutions with respect to those models, put the solutions 
back into the world and then expect them to behave as expected. The failings of this 
approach, as discussed by Christopher Alexander, is a topic I return to in Chapter 7. 
5.3.5. Summary of Emergent Results 
The difference between the two methods for making paper planes may be summarised by 
stating that Method 1 engages with real material agency and emergence, whereas Method 2 
models that material agency and emergence. I suggest that this identification, of the 
variously “performative” or “representational” nature of emergent results, may help to guide 
investigations of epistemic character.  
The example of paper plane making serves to demonstrate the extreme positions of the 
“performative” and “representational” approaches to practice. In doing so, I am wary of 
reinstating a design vs. craft dichotomy into the discussion. As described in Chapter 3, 
however, I remain insistent on the plan-making nature of design processes, and see no 
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reason to characterise any design practice as necessarily representational. As an educational 
exercise, for instance, I have used the paper plane task to introduce students to designing 
with sheet materials, in advance of a brief that requires them to design a folded pendant 
light. During this subsequent project, the performative, trial-and-error approach to making 
models of the lights remains far more productive than a sketchpad-based method. Central to 
this success, I believe, is the idea that the two approaches focus attention differently. As 
described above, when folding paper to design, attention is focussed not on maintaining an 
overall ambition for the whole design, but on a proximate idea for the next fold. After every 
step, we are presented with a new set of questions. This is in sharp contrast to the technique 
of drawing a design for a pendant light, wherein our attention would not be structured in the 
same way. 
This feature of performative practice—the way an emergent result directs and informs 
decision making along the way—suggests that we should pay attention not just to the 
qualities of a finished emergent result, but its influence throughout a technique13. This is a 
subject I return to when comparing three-dimensional furniture prototyping methods with 
two-dimensional drawing techniques (6.5.4). 
The question for design practice is how to capture the agency and emergence of material-
engagement throughout these techniques. How can we avoid collapsing decision making 
into a period of time in advance of emergence, and instead employ techniques that structure 
decision making around rich engagement with the world? How can our modelling become 
performative? 
5.4. Summary 
In the above examples, I have introduced how investigations of epistemic character may be 
pursued, through the three questions: What are the questions posed by a technique?; What is 
the step-character of a technique?; and, What is the nature of an emergent result? Although 
I have discussed these questions individually, whilst focusing on particular techniques, it 
should be noted that they are all related. We could even say that step-character presents the 
opportunities for questions to be posed and answered with reference to the emergent result. 
This is why step-character has come, for me, to be the most significant of the three 
                                                      
 
13 This is a point I feel is often missed by studies of the techniques of design 
“representations” (e.g. Goel 1995; Pei, Campbell & Evans 2011; Self 2011; Self, Dalke and 
Evans 2009) 
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questions—it provides the “structure” of epistemic character. In the next chapter, I consider 
the relationship between the questions posed and step-character in more detail. 
I fear that to go too far with an attempt at a conclusive narrative of epistemic character 
would, however, be premature. As described in my introduction to this chapter, I have 
presented the above topics as questions to avoid suggesting a declarative anatomy. 
Although, as I have argued elsewhere, (Luscombe 2018), I believe the idea of epistemic 
character to have much potential, I recognise that the ideas presented here are, in their own 
way, emergent.  
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6. Making Things Up  
 
I have so far presented a descriptive account of three questions we may ask of epistemic 
character, without going too far to suggest what preferable answers to those questions might 
be. This chapter, however, is an opportunity to discuss how the epistemic character of 
techniques may support, or potentially compromise, design processes. I will once again do 
this with reference to the specifics of particular occasions of workshop practice. This is an 
effort to both draw out generalities, and give further examples of how investigations of 
epistemic character may be pursued.  
The main theme of my discussion centres on the question of how techniques distribute 
decision making throughout a process. This is an idea that combines the interests both of the 
theoretical foundation of the research, and the subsequent descriptions of practice. It takes 
influence from the claims made in Chapters 3 and 4 about how we use the world to support 
cognition, and applies them to a suggestion of how we should aspire to utilise techniques 
throughout design processes.  
To summarise the topic at issue throughout this chapter, it can be understood with reference 
to the following quote. In his instructional account of wood carving techniques, Wille 
Sundqvist presents two technical choices for roughing out a spoon blank. The first of these 
describes how a bandsaw may be used to cut the shape from a log, and the second describes 
the alternative approach of using an axe (as I detailed in the previous chapter, see 5.2). On 
the subject of axe use, Sundqvist writes; 
‘Roughing out a spoon blank with an axe requires some practice to do well, but it is 
not dangerous if you follow proper procedures, and it does give you very direct 
control of the shaping process. A sense of design that comes from using simple tools 
cannot be had from machines’ (1990, p.106) 
Sundqvist leaves his point there, moving straight back into a discussion of what kind of axe 
to use, and how to avoid cutting off your thumb. By the end of this chapter, however, I hope 
to have examined the concept underlying Sundqvist’s claim that “a sense of design that 
comes from using simple tools cannot be had from machines”. I argue that the notion of 
epistemic character can offer a new insight into such an idea. My ambition, however, is not 
to reinforce the kind of dichotomy between machine and hand tools that Sundqvist’s 
somewhat mysterious quote leads us to infer. It is instead to suggest that there is a more 
fundamental distinction than those between hand and machine, or craft and industry (as were 
dissected and found wanting by David Pye, see 4.1). I argue that a more valuable distinction 
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can be made between processes through which things emerge step-by-step, and processes 
through which things are planned in advance of their execution. In the first of these models, 
finer-grained decisions are distributed throughout the process (Gedenryd 1998, see p.131), 
with reference to an emergent result. In the second model, coarser-grained decisions are 
required to be made in advance of their material realisation. I begin with architect 
Christopher Alexander’s analogy, “The 30 Coin Experiment”. As will become clear, 
Alexander, who I discuss in more detail in the following chapter, is an advocate of step-by-
step processes in all creative practice.  
6.1. The 30 Coin Experiment 
In a simple illustration of the merits of ‘step-by-step adaptation’ during the design and 
construction of buildings, Alexander asks us to imagine a system with 30 variables (2002, 
p.236). Each variable is represented by a flipped coin, which is considered to be successfully 
adapted when it lands on heads, and unsuccessfully adapted when it is tails. With the goal of 
tossing all 30 coins so they lie in the heads position, Alexander proposes two possible 
approaches. The first “all-or-nothing” method is to toss all the coins at once, in the hope that 
they land as heads simultaneously. If even one coin lands on tails following this approach, 
the procedure must be started again. The laboriousness and time-consuming nature of such a 
method is demonstrated by Alexander’s calculation that, if the all-or-nothing method was 
employed at a rate of once a second, the probability is that it would take three hundred years 
to land on 30 heads at once. The second strategy introduced by Alexander is the step-by-step 
approach. Following this method, each coin is tossed individually, until it lands as heads. 
Then the next of the 30 coins is tossed, and so on. Alexander estimates that this step-by-step 
approach would take two seconds per coin, and one minute in total.  
For Alexander, the variables represented by the coins are analogous to the decisions taken 
throughout the process of design and making buildings. It follows, claims Alexander, that 
from large scale decisions like how best to arrange a city, down to the minutiae of, for 
example, the height of a windowsill, the step-by-step approach will be more successful. The 
point made by the coin experiment is thus at the heart of Alexander’s thesis on the art of 
building. It demonstrates what is wrong with contemporary building practices and their 
prioritisation of the creation and adherence to plans, over and above “empirical” full-scale 
prototyping and improvisation. In trying to correctly define the thousands of variables found 
in any building in advance of its production, Alexander believes that we set ourselves an 
impossible task. Instead, Alexander claims, ‘to make things come out right in the built 
environment […] there is a simple condition that must be met. The process must go 
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gradually, in a way that allows assessments, corrections, and improvements to be made [..] 
throughout the structure, at all scales and at all levels’ (ibid. p.237). 
As is obvious, Alexander’s position is at odds with the processes followed by almost all 
contemporary architects. I return to criticisms of his approach in the next chapter. 
Nonetheless, the coin flipping analogy helps to introduce the theme of this chapter, and 
suggests (albeit in a polarised way) the potential significance of the distribution of decision 
making. 
6.2. Selecting a Hammer 
In Chapter 4, I developed an account of the simultaneously epistemic and pragmatic nature 
of tool use at the most basic level. This was built around the example of hammering. I now 
aim to show how a choice between two different hammers reveals something fundamental 
about the distribution of decision making throughout productive processes. This is a study 
that considers step-character and the questions posed by a technique.  Whilst this is not an 
example involving what would usually be considered “design decisions”, it nonetheless 
provides a useful illustration of how the opportunities for reflection and revision can be 
distributed differently. Later in this chapter, I go on to consider techniques where more 
significant decision making takes place, during the prototyping of furniture (see 6.5). 
6.2.1. The Frequency of Opportunities for Revision 
Imagine choosing between two different hammers (Figure 6.1) to knock a panel pin into a 
piece of timber. Both hammers share the same Warrington pattern studied in Chapter 4 (see 
4.1), which is adept at both setting pins (using the cross peen) and driving them home (using 
the round face). The difference between the hammers lies in the size and weight of their 
heads, and the length of their handles. Whilst it would be possible to accomplish the task of 
knocking in the panel pin using either hammer, there remains something to be said for the 
differences in their use.  
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Figure 6. 1 Two warrington hammers 
 
Using the largest, 14oz hammer, it should be possible, with practiced technique, to drive the 
pin home using fewer blows than with the 10oz hammer. Owing to its greater weight, the 
14oz hammer has the potential to deliver a more forceful strike. Exaggerating this 
distinction, it might even be possible, given a large enough hammerhead, to deliver all the 
requisite force in just one blow. The problem with this, however, would be the difficulty of 
delivering the single blow with accuracy, so as not to bend the pin or glance its head. The 
repeated strikes that we commonly associate with the action of hammering can thus be 
understood not just as necessary steps towards a goal, but also as opportunities for sensing 
progress and revising our approach (see 4.4). In Figures 6.2 and 6.3, I illustrate these 
differences in the steps taken with each tool. 
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Figure 6. 2 The progress of a pin when driven with a 10oz (above) and 14oz (below) 
hammer 
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Figure 6. 3 The progress of pins as line graphs. 10oz above and 14oz below. 
 
The diagrams show the distance travelled by the pin for each strike. The 14oz hammer 
drives the pin using fewer blows of greater distance, and so offers fewer opportunities for 
revision. If we read these two diagrams as line graphs (Figure 6.3), where the heads of the 
pins form the points, we find the 10oz hammer creates a longer, shallower line—the process 
of knocking in the pin involves more steps of a smaller distance. It is a smoother journey 
filled with opportunities for revision. The heavier hammer, by contrast, offers fewer chances 
to sense progress and adjust our approach. 
The example of two hammers is an illustration of how a technical choice between two tools 
may influence the step-character of a technique. I suggest that the repeated strikes of 
hammering are analogous to the opportunities for assessing an emergent result during other 
techniques. Throughout this chapter’s theme of distributed decision making, step-character 
thus plays an important role. 
Before pursuing this idea in the context of other techniques, I first wish to clarify two points 
from this example. First, I note that the step-character of the different hammers should not 
(contrary to the simplified account just offered) be considered as properties of the two 
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tools—a practitioner may tune the step-character by varying their technique. Second, I 
consider what “decisions” are being made in this example, and show how they vary in 
significance. This is to return to the idea of techniques posing questions (see 5.1). 
Importantly for the topic of distributed decision making, I suggest that these questions may 
vary throughout a technique, in both their nature and significance for design practice. 
6.2.2. Tuning the Behaviour of a Tool to Modify Its Step-Character 
If they chose to do so, a practitioner may use the 14oz hammer to deliver blows of less 
force—they could adjust their technique so as to take a greater number of strikes to complete 
the task. It must be stated then, that the step-character of a process is not only determined by 
the tool itself—it is a result of the whole system of the tool, the material being worked and 
the practitioner (see 2.6.3). The size and weight of the hammer does, however, have an 
important influence upon both the speed with which a pin may be driven, and the 
opportunities for revision throughout the process. Alternative hammers encourage and 
support different approaches to a task. By selecting a hammer appropriate to the size of the 
pin, and with respect to personal preference, a practitioner tunes the whole system to work in 
their favour. The fact that even similarly intentioned hammers, such as the two Warringtons 
here, are routinely produced in increments of 2oz is evidence of the importance of this 
tuning1. During techniques that demand a practitioner’s dexterity, such tuning is 
commonplace. As tools are used both to complete a task and provide feedback on its 
progress, being able to modify the frequency of this feedback is an important advantage.  
6.2.3. The Variable Decisions of Hammering 
As a hammered pin begins to travel into a piece of timber, its position is increasingly 
determined by the surrounding wood fibres (see 4.1.1). The “decisions” made after the first 
few hammer blows are, therefore, relatively insignificant. For clarity on this point, we can 
look to the questions posed by the technique at various times. Just before our first few 
hammer taps, we are asked to confirm the location and angle of the pin. We must be sure 
that the pin will join the parts we intend to be joined, and not burst out of the side or back of 
                                                      
1 The tuning does not end with the selection of the tool. Once a hammer has been 
selected for a job, its behaviour can be altered by adjusting where we grip the handle (Sellers 
2016, see p.471). Holding the hammer close to its head offers greater sensitivity and control, 
but less power. Holding the handle further away from the head allows a greater force to be 
employed, but to the detriment of sensitivity and control. These fine adjustments made using 
alternative grips demonstrate how the step-character of a technique may be subtly tuned 
throughout practice This is the same idea encountered in section 5.2.4, where test cuts could 
be made with the axe, to determine the run of the grain. 
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the timber. These are relatively significant questions. Once the pin’s eventual location is 
increasingly determined however, the questions posed are less significant. Each strike at this 
stage is a call and response between the practitioner and the emergent result, focussed 
around the question of how not to bend the pin, or how not to bruise the timber. Unless a 
non-routine event such as these does occur, we are not tasked with any more significant 
questions. Just as the risk of a technique varies throughout then (see 4.1.2), so too does the 
nature and the significance of questions posed. 
6.2.4. Refining ‘Step-Character’ and ‘Questions Posed’ 
In the previous chapter, I identified that step-character determines the frequency of 
opportunities for the assessment and revision of an emergent result, and the questions posed 
by a technique focus attention and priorities during techniques. I now suggest the example of 
choosing between two hammers develops our description of these aspects of epistemic 
character in the following ways; 
• Step-character is not a static property of a technique or its elements (the practitioner, 
tool or material); it may be tuned by the practitioner.   
• The questions posed by a technique vary throughout. These questions influence the 
nature and significance of the decisions to be made at different times. 
Both of these qualifications acknowledge the dynamic nature of epistemic character. It is the 
last point in particular, regarding the variable nature of questions asked throughout a 
process, that is critical to this chapter’s investigation of distributed decision making. 
6.3. Wayfaring and Transport 
Before studying further instances of tool use, I return to Tim Ingold’s observations on the 
nature of sawing (2010, see p.51-62), as discussed in Chapter 5 (5.2.1). Comparing his 
“processional” account of hand saw use to the experience of using a guided power saw, 
Ingold associates these different techniques with his concepts of ‘wayfaring’ and ‘transport’ 
(ibid., p.59). I outline Ingold’s discussion here because I believe the distinction he draws 
between wayfaring and transport can be helpfully applied (with some modification) to my 
consideration of the distribution of decision making throughout techniques. 
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6.3.1. The Wayfaring Handsaw 
Figure 6. 4 A panel saw 
 
Ingold describes the nature of panel saw use in detail (Figure 6.4). In a fine-grained analysis 
of sawing through a board, we read about how the first ‘staccato’ (ibid., p.55) strokes give 
way to a slower rhythm as progress is made, before the cut must be finished with care, so as 
not to split the last few fibres of wood. Sawing, claims Ingold, is akin to a journey where 
‘every step is a development of the one before and a preparation for the one following’ 
(ibid., p.53). 
Ingold then contrasts the process of sawing a board by hand with that of using a radial arm 
crosscut saw (Figure 6.5). Where the processional quality of hand saw use necessitates many 
smaller steps be made throughout the cut, machine cutting reduces the rhythmic back-and-
forth of the hand saw to a single slice. Rather than attending to the progress of a cut 
throughout, and making subtle adjustments to correct or incorporate errors, the 
predetermined operation of the crosscut saw sees practitioners ‘intervene solely in the 
intervals between stopping and starting’ (ibid., p.61). For the crosscut operator, these are the 
periods when ‘all the significant action takes place: when plans are laid, instruments reset 
and materials assembled’ (ibid., p.59). 
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Figure 6. 5 A radial arm crosscut saw 
 
Reflecting on this difference between the rhythmic strokes of handsaw use, and the rotary 
pass of the crosscut saw, Ingold makes an association with his distinction of wayfaring and 
transport. The exploration of these two modes of movement forms part of Ingold’s wider 
anthropological project2. With a slight shift in their application, I hope to show how this 
distinction can helpfully illuminate this chapter’s theme. I believe the concepts of wayfaring 
and transport can illustrate the difference between processes that distribute decisions 
throughout, and those that require them to be made in advance. 
For Ingold, the critical difference between these two metaphors is that transport emphasises 
the connection of discrete points, whereas wayfaring emphasises a ‘continual engagement 
with the field of practice’ (ibid., p.59). The nature of transport is essentially ‘destination-
orientated’ (ibid., p.150). As idealised in the straight lines of a city’s subway map, the 
aspiration is to link destinations as directly as possible. Between our stations of departure 
and arrival, we may “switch-off”, reassured that the network will carry us to where we want 
to be. This ‘decoupling [of] perception and motility’ (ibid., p.152), argues Ingold, promotes 
a model of movement that would, in an ideal world, be instantaneous. It is what happens at 
                                                      
2 As part of Ingold’s effort to study the world and its inhabitants by ‘tracing the multiple 
paths of becoming’ (2010, p.14), the nature of movement is one of his fundamental themes. 
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our destinations that matters, not what occurs along the way. Wayfaring, by contrast, is a 
model in which we must pay attention to our surroundings throughout a journey, as the 
environment continually presents us with alternative paths and destinations.  
According to Ingold, wayfaring is thus akin to the processional quality of dexterous tool-use, 
where steps flow into one another and revisions and accommodations are made throughout. 
The nature of transport, by contrast, has its parallel in machine operation. In Ingold’s 
description of cutting timber, this takes the form of the crosscut saw.  
6.3.2. An Appropriation of Wayfaring and Transport 
I believe the metaphors of wayfaring and transport can be usefully applied to describe how 
decisions are distributed throughout workshop practice. My application of these concepts, 
however, is different to Ingold’s. In my analysis of using a hand saw or crosscut saw, for 
example, both techniques are more closely related to the model of transportation than 
wayfaring.  
This divergence is because of my emphasis on a technique’s epistemic character—
specifically, how it structures the process of working things out. I interpret the steps (or 
destinations) of a technique as opportunities for the assessment and revision of an emergent 
design. Because the questions posed by a technique varies throughout these steps, I 
recognise that they do not present equally significant decision-making opportunities. Once a 
handsaw cut has been started, for example, its destination is well-defined3. The first phase of 
strokes set it on a course. Once the saw becomes guided by its own kerf, the subsequent 
steps and their associated questions are far less consequential. Because I am interested in 
those questions that prompt significant decisions to be made about the emergent design, this 
is an important distinction. 
Regarding the operation of sawing a board of timber across its width then, I suggest that, 
whether it is performed using panel saw or crosscut saw, the significant decisions are 
concentrated in the very first steps. When discussing the moment in advance of using a 
handsaw, Ingold himself is alert the importance of this time. He observes that the Greeks 
even had a special word, kairos, for just the right moment to begin (ibid., see p.54). 
Although Ingold doesn’t say so, I suggest we may presume that the machine operator 
experiences a similar moment, just as they are about to switch on the crosscut saw. As 
                                                      
3 Here I refer specifically to the panel saw of Ingold’s example. This is not necessarily 
true of all types of saws. See, for example, the coping saw described in section 6.6.1. 
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discussed in the previous chapter, the maxim of measure twice, cut once captures the 
significance of this time. 
6.3.3. A More Certain Hammer 
Further to this point, we can return to my previous example of hammer use. In the context of 
hammering, the equivalent of Ingold’s crosscut saw might be a hammer that could sink a 
panel pin in just one blow. In order to avoid spoiling the job, such a hammer would need to 
be guided along a pre-determined path, towards a panel pin held in an exact position. Rather 
than the rhythmic strikes of repeated hammer blows, we would see a single, undeviating 
blow, just as in the single pass of a powered saw. There would be no opportunity for 
revision throughout. A practitioner would intervene only in the periods between each 
hammer strike. And, rather than the multiple blows made with the 10oz and 14oz hammers, 
the single-hit hammer could drive home the pin so quickly as to be apparently instantaneous. 
In fact, we need not think of this hammer as an imaginary tool. Whilst it might look 
dissimilar to the Warrington pattern, such a machine does exist—the powered nail gun 
drives pins in this way (Figure 6.6). And the experience of using a nail gun is indeed one of 
speed, as pins are punched almost effortlessly, with attention paid only to positioning the pin 
and then moving to the next point. Just as Ingold’s hand saw has its mechanical counterpart 
in the rotary crosscut, the nail gun is a mechanised hammer. It replaces the repeated strikes 
of the human-powered tool, and the sequence of occasions at which a practitioner must 
sense the progress of the task, with a single blow. Under Ingold’s analysis, we see the 
wayfaring-like quality of hammer use replaced by a transport-like pre-determination. 
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Figure 6. 6 A nail gun 
 
As in the example of sawing, however, I consider both methods of driving a pin, whether 
hand or machine powered, to be more akin to the model of transportation than wayfaring. In 
both cases, the significant decisions are made early on. We are first asked to make sure that 
we locate the pin in the right place and at the right angle. The mechanical equivalent of those 
tentative taps with a hammer is a period focussed on siting the gun correctly. Once the 
trigger is pulled, of course, the determining mechanism takes over and the subsequent 
phases of hammering are collapsed into an instant. The outcome of the process becomes 
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certain. But this is only in symmetry with the increasingly determined travel of the hand-
hammered pin, as it works its way into the timber4. 
6.3.4. The Dynamics of Risk and Wayfaring 
For Ingold, the distinction of wayfaring and transport is ‘precisely parallel’ to David Pye’s 
workmanships of risk and certainty (ibid., Chapter 4, note 1, p.246): wayfaring is risky and 
transportation certain. Whilst I appreciate the reasoning behind Ingold’s equivalence, I 
believe this treatment of the subject misses both the dynamic nature of risk, and the 
changeable inevitability of the destinations of practice. Both of these features can be found 
in the example of sawing. 
The risk of sawing a board lessens as the saw becomes guided by its own trajectory. As the 
plate of the saw settles into the emergent kerf, it is inclined to continue along the same path. 
Once held in this jig of its own making, only minor adjustments can be made to the saw’s 
direction. The destination of Ingold’s wayfaring sawyer thus becomes ever more fixed.  
To return to the subway trains of the transportation metaphor, at this stage, the practitioner 
finds themselves on a fixed track. Although they might be driving the train, rather than 
mindlessly sitting in the carriages, they are nonetheless on their way to a well-defined 
destination. I believe Ingold’s static categorisation of hand saw use as both an instance of the 
workmanship of risk, and a model of wayfaring, ignores this shifting dynamic.  
Just as the workmanships of risk and certainty should not be considered discrete categories 
into which techniques may be placed, I suggest we might locate the concepts of wayfaring 
and transport as the poles of a continuum. In the same way that a technique’s risk varies over 
time, so too does the fixity of its destination. And with this changing fixity comes a variation 
in the nature and significance of the questions it asks. To properly appreciate the distribution 
of decision making throughout a technique, I believe we must be alert to the dynamics of 
these questions.  
                                                      
4 Here I am starting my analysis of both the hammer and nail gun just before the 
“action” begins (with the first hammer strike, or the trigger pull). Whilst this might blur a 
boundary between design and workmanship that Pye would rather leave intact, I do so here 
in accord with Malafouris’ suggestion to ‘carefully define the portion of time encapsulating 
the event we want to describe […], if we want our account of the causal hierarchy of events 
not to trivialize the complexities of their cognitive ecology’ (2013, p.223), as discussed in 
2.6.14. 
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6.3.5. Summary of Wayfaring and Transport 
I believe that Ingold’s distinction between wayfaring and transport can be usefully applied to 
the present discussion of epistemic character, but only in a modified form. This is a 
modification made according to my interest in the influence techniques have on decision 
making. I suggest that; 
The metaphor of transport can be applied to occasions that require us to decide upon a goal 
without reference to incremental feedback. Our destination is specified in advance and our 
journey could be collapsed in time, without affecting the result. 
The metaphor of wayfaring can be applied to occasions that enable us to make decisions 
along the way, with reference to incremental feedback. We progress step-by-step, from one 
proximate destination to another.  
My focus on technique sees me associate epistemic character with the dynamic of a 
technique, rather than as a property of tools. And, crucially, I also suggest we recognise that 
the wayfaring or transport-like nature of a technique need not be a static characteristic. Like 
risk, it may change over time.  
6.4. Distributed Decisions in Workshop Practice 
I now consider how other techniques distribute decisions in workshop practice. I begin with 
a short comparison between two metal-wasting techniques; hand filing and belt linishing. 
This builds on the example of hammer use, offering a context in which different step-
characters distribute (potentially more significant) decision making. The next example 
compares two woodworking techniques; using a thicknesser and a hand plane to waste the 
surface of a board. Here I return to the ideas of wayfaring and transport and look at the link 
between dexterity and wayfaring. This enables me to develop a novel interpretation of the 
value of dexterity in making processes. In the following section, I look beyond these more 
isolated studies of technique, to study a range of techniques used when prototyping and 
making furniture. This enables me to demonstrate how the micro-level analysis of epistemic 
character can be transferred into a broader context.  
6.4.1. The File and The Belt Linisher 
When using a hand file in a forward motion (a technique known as cross filing) the teeth of 
the file travel roughly perpendicular to its motion, cutting away material as the tool is 
pushed away from the practitioner. Repeated passes are used to progressively remove 
material. The file’s teeth cut only in this forward direction so, to avoid prematurely dulling 
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their edge, the file is raised at the end of each pass and returned to the starting point (Figure 
6.7). As the file is pushed, lifted and retracted, the back and forth of the tool presents regular 
opportunities to see the emergent result. In the rhythm of practice, it is typical to make 
multiple passes with the file, glimpsing the result between each one, before pausing for a 
longer period to study the result in more detail. Typically, file strokes are bundled into bursts 
of action, with longer pauses between. 
Figure 6. 7 Cross filing with a hand file 
 
Because the file teeth will only cut to their own depth, there is a threshold level of 
downward pressure that, once exceeded, will make no difference to the amount of material 
removed by the file (this is a characteristic shared with many hand tools, e.g. saws and 
bench planes). If the same length of pass and a level of downward pressure beyond this 
threshold are used, the file removes the same amount of material with each cut. For this 
reason, we can be assured that each set of, for example, ten passes will allow us to reliably 
predict what the next ten passes might achieve.  
A belt linisher, or belt grinder, can be fixed to a bench or freestanding. It uses an electric 
motor to drive a belt of abrasive emery cloth around two pulleys. When wasting metal with a 
linisher, we offer the work to the rotating belt, which removes material through abrasion 
(Figure 6.8). The belt is driven at a constant speed, and consistently removes material for as 
long as we hold the work in place. In contrast to the bursts of rhythmic action employed 
when filing, the continuous pass of the linishing belt could, theoretically, waste as much 
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material as required from a face in one go, without the work piece being removed from the 
machine5. 
Figure 6. 8 Using a belt linisher 
 
The step-character of linishing does not, therefore, share filing’s rhythmic nature. The only 
interruptions to the otherwise continuous nature of the technique come about if the work 
piece, subject to the friction of the abrasive belt, becomes too hot to hold and must be 
quenched; or if the practitioner chooses to check the progress of the job. There are no routine 
pauses in progress—the correct time for these checks must be determined by a practitioner’s 
own judgement. Linishing thus has a step-character that does not include regular intervals 
for the evaluation of an emergent result. Contrasted with the rhythmic back and forth of 
hand filing, the step character of linishing does not distribute decision making in regular, 
step-by-step intervals. 
                                                      
5 A further observation about these two techniques relates to our engagement with the 
emergent result throughout. When filing, the work piece is typically held firm in a vice and 
we file a face that we can see. The emergent result is frequently visible throughout the 
action. When abrading a part on the belt linisher, the face we are working is not visible 
through the action, as we present it towards the belt, and away from ourselves. The physical 
arrangement of these two techniques thus differs in the access it offers to the emergent 
result. 
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6.4.2. The Bench Plane and The Thicknesser 
Having introduced the relationship between step-character and the distribution of decisions, 
I now aim to demonstrate how it may be illuminated with reference to the models of 
wayfaring and transport.  
A bench plane (plane) (Figure 6.9) and a thicknesser (Figure 6.10) can both be used to waste 
wood from a surface. Usually, these tools would be used once a piece of wood has been 
resawn to slightly larger than its eventual thickness6. A plane or thicknesser can then be used 
to remove the rough surface left by sawing, and finish a piece of timber with more control 
than the saw offers. 
Figure 6. 9 Using a bench plane 
 
                                                      
6 Resawing is a type of rip cut, where the saw blade cuts parallel to longest face of the 
board. It is a cut that makes a board of timber thinner. 
 173 
Figure 6. 10 A thicknesser 
 
Depending on the required quality of the finished surface, it might be that a practitioner 
would always choose to work the board with a bench plane. In cases where tear-out would 
be unacceptable, the advantage of using a plane is that it can be readily adjusted, and its 
direction of attack varied to allow for inconsistencies in the grain direction. A bench plane 
thus enables a finer finish to be achieved more consistently than when using a thicknesser. 
This capacity can be understood as a practical reason why, despite the ease, speed and 
accuracy with which a powered thicknesser can dimension a board of timber, bench planes 
remain useful pieces of equipment7. 
Having identified these relative merits of the tools, however, it is important to note that this 
kind of reasoning is not relevant for the current consideration of their epistemic character. 
Whist it might be an important component of a practitioner’s knowledge, the ability to create 
a tear-out free surface has little to do with how techniques distribute decision-making 
throughout a process. My investigation of these two techniques, therefore, looks not at the 
results that can be achieved, but at the questions asked along the way. 
I interpret the epistemic character of the plane and the thicknesser with reference to Ingold’s 
distinction of wayfaring and transport. In order to clarify the reasoning behind this 
                                                      
7 It is quite common to combine the two tools in an operational sequence—by wasting 
the majority of the surface using a thicknesser, before finishing it with a bench plane. 
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interpretation, I first present a flawed attempt at this kind of analysis. I believe the second, 
more successful approach, then opens up an interesting area of enquiry, regarding the 
influence of “dexterous wayfaring” on the distribution of decisions.  
A Flawed Attempt 
The thicknesser asks us to specify a dimension (in mm or inches), before feeding our full 
board of timber into the machine (Figure 6.11). The bottom face of the board is pushed 
down onto the machine bed, as a rotating blade removes wood from the whole width of the 
top face. This makes the two faces parallel. Once the board has been ejected from the rear of 
the machine, we can check the result. If we wish to remove more material, the dimension is 
reset and the board fed through again. The amount of material it is possible to remove with 
each pass depends on the species of timber being worked, the width of the board, and the 
sharpness of the machine’s blade. A typical amount for the kind of machine shown in Figure 
x would be 1-2mm per pass. 
Figure 6. 11 Thicknesser adjustment interface 
 
Using a bench place, we are not asked to specify the dimensions of a result before we begin. 
We may work without a specific destination, taking shavings and evaluating the result with 
each pass. If we aim to remove a large amount of material (≈1mm), we can start by working 
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diagonally across the grain. Cuts in this direction break the weaker bonds between wood 
fibres, so that the plane can be set to take a deeper cut, without getting stuck. Although this 
strategy results in a rough, often undulating surface, a subsequent phase of shallower cuts 
made parallel to the grain can be used to smooth it out. At all stages, each pass of the plane 
is made in response to the emergent result. With experience, it is even possible to distinguish 
between the sound of a plane cutting with, or against, the grain. The direction of travel and 
the skew of the tool is continually adjusted, to reduce effort and control the quality of the 
surface finish. 
On the basis of this information, we might infer that the character of the thicknesser aligns to 
the model of transportation, and the bench plane to wayfaring. Each pass through the 
thicknesser asks us specify our destination in advance. Each pass with the plane is a step 
towards a destination, but there is no requirement for this to be determined in advance of 
practice. The question, “how thick would you like this to be?”, as posed by the thicknesser, 
could be interpreted as a transport-like insistence on pre-determination. And the comparative 
lack of such a question when using the plane, could be seen to characterise it as a tool of the 
wayfarer. 
On reflection, however, I find this to be relatively weak justification for characterising the 
processes in this way. I suggest we may interpret the technique of a thicknesser differently. 
Although we are asked to specify a dimension with each pass, it does not necessarily follow 
that we must know the ultimate thickness in advance. We are given the opportunity to assess 
the result after each cut. We could, therefore, work not towards a pre-determined size, but 
incrementally, according to an evaluation of the emergent result. Although it collapses the 
rhythmic progression made with a bench plane into a single (almost instantaneous) pass, the 
step-character of the thicknesser does offers chances for assessment along the way. The 
technique is, therefore, not entirely transport-like. 
6.4.3. The Dexterous Wayfarer 
Moving beyond this first attempt at a characterisation of the techniques, I suggest there is 
more to be said. Although the previous investigation is indecisive, I believe there are other 
features of these two techniques that do cast them, more surely, into the modes of wayfaring 
or transportation. These become apparent as we consider some of the other questions posed 
by the tools. And, as I hope to show, their discussion offers an insight into the broader 
subject of the value of “dexterous” tool use. 
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Before asking us to specify the dimension of our board in millimetres, the thicknesser has 
already asked a series of other questions; “Is that board long enough? I’ll only accept it if its 
longer than the distance between my two rollers, otherwise it will get stuck”; “Is that board 
narrow enough? I’ll only accept it if it’s less than the width of my blade.”; “If you’re trying 
to thickness a glued assembly of multiple pieces of wood, does all the grain run in the same 
direction? And is it all flat to a surface? If not, I can’t help you.”8. 
It is with reference to questions such as these that we see the more significant influence the 
thicknesser has on the distribution of decision making. The certainty and pre-determination 
associated with a machine like a thicknesser are made possible only by concentrating 
decision-making into a specific point in time. We can only use the machine to thickness 
pieces of timber when they are long enough and narrow enough. If we are working with an 
assembly, all parts must lie flat to a surface, and their grain must run parallel (as in, for 
example, a table top). If these conditions are not met, there is no action (and therefore no 
thinking) that can be supported by the thicknesser. 
The bench plane, by contrast, can be used to waste the surface of an emergent result in many 
more situations. The only prerequisite of plane use is that the work can be held firm, either 
in a vice, or by another means. With a bench plane wielded in mid-air—unconstrained by 
the determining arrangement of a machine tool—no surface need ever be considered 
“finished”. “Would you like to take a shaving off that?”, “How about a chamfer on that 
edge?”, “Do you think that leg should be tapered?” These are decisions that could be made 
at any stage of production (or even later on, throughout an artefact’s life). 
This characteristic of the bench plane brings us back into line with Ingold’s account of 
wayfaring. ‘[T]he wayfarer’, he writes, ‘has no final destination, for wherever he is, and so 
long as life goes on, there is somewhere further he can go’ (p.150). I suggest this aspect of 
wayfaring offers a useful insight into the epistemic character of dexterous tool use.  
Take, for example, the hand saw of Ingold’s study. When cutting across a board, the result 
becomes determined after just a few strokes. Comparing the same operation, as performed 
using the powered crosscut saw, I have suggested that we find little difference in the 
distribution of decision-making. But, looking at the technique of hand saw use more 
generally, we find the same characteristic as with the bench plane. Even a fully-assembled 
                                                      
8 I appreciate this anthropomorphic approach to a machine tool is quite odd. In my 
defence, I defer to other examples, previously discussed, that use the metaphor of 
“conversation”. Or, if it helps, these questions could also be understood as affordances (see 
5.1.1). 
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furniture prototype could be modified. “Are the legs a bit long?”, “Should that bit be cut 
flush to the others?”, “Could we get away with less of an overhang?” The value of dexterity 
to the wayfarer is that it distributes decisions so that they can be made over a longer period, 
with reference to an emergent result. Things can be finely adapted. We can work in mid-air. 
6.5. Prototyping Staked Furniture 
In this final study of distributed decision making, I build out from the localised study of 
techniques, by looking into the context of furniture prototyping. 
As defined by woodworking writer Christopher Schwarz, “staked” furniture is ‘made up of a 
thick platform of wood that is pierced by its feet’ (2016, p.29). Whilst historically used to 
make all kinds of furniture—including tables, desks, beds, stools, and workbenches (ibid., 
p.19)—staked construction techniques are today most often seen in Windsor chairs. The seat 
of a Windsor chair is pierced by the legs from below, and by the backrest, spindles and arms 
from above. The structural integrity of the chair relies on the thickness of the seat, and the fit 
of the joints used to attach the “stakes”. 
Whilst the joints of staked furniture can be made with straight-sided cylindrical tenons, it is 
more common to use a tapered (conical) mortice and tenon (Figure 6.12). This increases the 
strength of the joint and makes assembly easier (Galbert 2015, see  p.18). The tapered 
mortice and tenon also plays a key role, as I describe below, in the distribution of decision 
making throughout the design and construction of staked furniture. 
 178 
Figure 6. 12 Windsor chair with tapered mortice and tenon detail 
 
6.5.1. How to Make a Tapered Mortice and Tenon 
To make a tapered mortice, we first drill a hole with a straight drill bit (Figure 6.13), before 
using a reamer to taper the walls of the hole (Figure 6.14).  
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Figure 6. 13 Drilling a mortice 
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Figure 6. 14 Reaming a mortice 
 
The corresponding tapered tenon may be turned on a lathe, shaped by hand using a 
spokeshave, or (perhaps most conveniently) created using a dedicated taper tenon cutter 
(Figure 6.15). This is like using a large pencil sharpener. The angle created by the tenon 
cutter should correspond to the angle of the reamer used to taper the mortice.  
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Figure 6. 15 Using a taper tenon cutter 
 
Before describing how the tapered mortice and tenon helps to distribute decision making 
throughout the design and production of furniture, I introduce some prototyping techniques. 
This should help to illustrate some of the considerations influencing the design of staked 
furniture. 
6.5.2. Wire Models 
The legs of staked furniture are usually angled in both the horizontal and vertical plane. This 
ensures the mortices can be drilled well inside the edges of the seat (or other “platform”), 
whilst still creating a stable footprint at ground level. In chair making, the angles of the legs 
are known as the ‘rake and splay’ (Schwarz 2016, p.44). The rake is the angle of the legs to 
the seat when looking at the chair from the side, and the splay is the angle of the legs when 
looking at the chair from the front (Figure 6.16). Because neither the rake or splay of a 
typical piece of staked furniture is 90°, the legs usually meet the seat at a compound angle. 
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Figure 6. 16 The rake and splay angles of a Windsor chair 
 
Dealing with compound angles in joinery can be difficult. Cutting or drilling at a single 
angle relative to the edge of a workpiece (like when cutting a mitre at 45° for a picture 
frame) is relatively straightforward. If that cut needs to also be angled in the other plane, 
however, it becomes more challenging. In the context of designing staked furniture, this 
means that the transition from two-dimensional drawings (like Figure 6.16), to a three-
dimensional prototype is more complicated than it would be with non-compound joinery. 
The key to overcoming this challenge is to find the ‘resultant angle’ and its associated 
‘sightline’ for each leg (ibid., p.47). Through working out the resultant angle and its 
sightline, we effectively turn our compound angle into a single angle. This is achieved by 
finding the viewpoint from which the leg appears to be vertical—a process best described 
using illustrations (Figure 6.17).  
RAKE SPLAY
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Figure 6. 17 Rotating a chair to find the sightline 
 
In Figures 6.17 we see the undercarriage of an upside-down, completed chair. As the leg and 
seat are rotated throughout the series of illustrations, we see the leg come into alignment 
with the vertical. At this point we are looking at the leg along our sightline (Figure 6.18). 
The resultant angle is the angle of the leg, as measured along this sightline (Figure 6.19). 
1. 2.
3. 4.
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Figure 6. 18 The sightline from above the upside-down chair 
 
Figure 6. 19 Measuring the resultant angle 
 
If we were working on an uncompleted chair, this process of discovering the sightline and 
resultant angle relies on us manipulating and measuring a three-dimensional model. Whilst it 
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is possible, as described by chair maker Peter Galbert, to calculate sightlines and resultant 
angles from the rake and splay angles of two-dimensional drawings, (2015, see p.356), 
Schwarz recommends the use of wire scale models (approx. 1/5 scale) throughout this 
process (2016, p.48). This allows us to evaluate the compound angle in three-dimensions, 
and quickly reposition the malleable wire to make amendments. Once happy with the angles 
of the model, we can then find its sightlines following the process described above, before 
measuring the resultant angles with a sliding bevel. Sliding bevels can be locked to match 
these resultant angles, and then used as a guide to drill the mortices of a full-sized prototype 
(Figure 6.20). Despite the apparently complex compound joinery achieved throughout this 
method, Schwarz describes a design process that can be performed without any reference to 
numbers. 
Figure 6. 20 Drilling the resultant angle 
 
6.5.3. String and Cardboard Tubes 
Further to Schwarz’s model-making approach to staked furniture design, I now discuss 
another two prototyping strategies I have developed. 
One of these strategies is to use string and brown tape to decide upon the number of spindles 
in a chair back, and their spacing (Figure 6.21). The convenience of using string in this way 
is that it does not need to be cut to an exact length (excess can just be taped up), and it can 
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be readily repositioned when evaluating alternatives. The string, like the wire of Schwarz’s 
models, is representative of what will become a part of much larger diameter. Its use is 
directed towards deciding upon the general arrangement of the spindles. The diameter and 
form (be they tapered, straight or otherwise) of the spindles, is a decision to be made later, 
perhaps with reference to cardboard strips, cut out to create a silhouette and taped to the 
string. This is a relatively straightforward instance of “incremental decision making” being 
supported by techniques. 
Figure 6. 21 Using string to work out the spindle arrangement 
 
Another strategy I have developed is to use one inch (25.4mm) diameter cardboard tubes to 
test designs for the undercarriage of a chair. Combined with a collection of tapered wooden 
inserts (Figure 6.22), these tubes enable the kind of experimentation Schwarz performs with 
his wire models, but at full-scale. The wooden ends are made to fit tightly into the ends of 
the cardboard tubes, and can be taped in place for reinforcement. By cutting up lengths of 
tube, and adding the tapered ends, we can quickly create four legs of any length. 
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Figure 6. 22 Cardboard tube and tenon insert 
 
A board of plywood, MDF or scrap wood can then be cut to the anticipated shape of our seat 
and drilled from underneath, to accommodate the tapered legs (Figure 6.23). For a tenon that 
tapers from 12mm at its point, up to a diameter of 19mm, a drill size of roughly 15mm 
would be appropriate.  
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Figure 6. 23 Cardboard tube legs and a prototype seat 
 
It is once these holes are drilled that the advantage of the tapered ends becomes apparent. In 
our temporary seat, we do not need to ream the drilled holes to match the taper of the tenon. 
Whist it is important to drill the holes at (roughly) the correct angle, the taper will centre 
itself in the hole, whether it is reamed or not. We won’t be gluing the tenon in the hole, so 
we do not need to be concerned by the lack of contact area inside the joint. This method also 
gives a little play in the joint—enough for us to wiggle the tenon and adjust the angle by a 
degree or two, so that we may evaluate fine adjustments to the rake and splay.  
If we are unsatisfied by the position of the legs, it is very convenient to drill some new holes 
under the same seat. If we are happy with the legs’ position, but not their angle (even once 
wiggled), we may use the reamer to modify the angle of the hole (Figure 6.24). Just a few 
turns can be used to adjust the angle—it is best to proceed cautiously, checking progress 
regularly by replacing the cardboard leg. A variety of leg positions and angles can be 
quickly trialled in this way.  
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Figure 6. 24 Modifying a mortice angle with the reamer 
 
Once the legs are in position, we may turn to our attention to the stretchers—the parts that 
run between the legs. These can also be created using cardboard tubes and wooden ends. 
Before committing to drilling the holes in the cardboard legs, we can use string (as when 
thinking about the spindles) to determine their position (Figure 6.25). The string then acts as 
a visual guide to drill the hole in the correct place (Figure 6.26). Once drilled, the cardboard 
stretcher can be cut to length9 and slotted into place. 
                                                      
9 By sliding the wooden ends of the stretcher in and out of the tube, we can adjust its 
length slightly. The length that the stretcher tubes are cut to is thus non-critical. 
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Figure 6. 25 Using string to work out the stretchers 
 
Figure 6. 26 Drilling in alignment with string 
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6.5.4. Cardboard and Drawings 
It should be noted that prototyping furniture using the techniques described here is quite 
different to designing furniture through drawing. And this is not simply related to the 
differences in evaluating a paper or screen-based result vs. evaluating a three-dimensional 
one. It can also be considered in terms of how the prototyping techniques distribute 
decisions. 
Through the production of our cardboard tube models, just like when folding a paper plane 
(see 5.3.4), we are making decisions about proximate goals, not overall ones. Our attention 
is always focussed on the technique in hand. When taping up the string “spindles” we are 
concerned with their spacing. When cutting out the cardboard “spindle silhouettes”, we are 
thinking about their form. When working out the stretchers, we have already determined the 
legs. We are, to borrow Alexander’s metaphor, flipping one coin at a time.  
In the practice of designing a chair through drawing, the process is not structured in the 
same way. We need not work in any particular order, or have our attention focussed on any 
particular features. With each sketch, we are free to flip as many coins as we like. I 
appreciate that this aspect of representational practice can have its rewards. Chief amongst 
these, according to the literature, is the ability to make ‘lateral transformations’ (Goel 1995, 
p.119) between different ideas whilst making a ‘relatively unstructured and ambiguous 
sketch […] early in the process’ (Purcell and Gero 1998, p.389). In the later, less explorative 
and more experimental10 stages of design practice, however, I would suggest, along with 
Alexander, that some techniques can structure the decision-making process in a positive 
way.  
6.5.5. A Model of Distribution 
I developed these strategies for prototyping staked furniture because they are useful in their 
own right11. But using these techniques, and subsequently making the furniture that was 
prototyped, has also made me aware of the inherently distributed character of designing and 
making using the tapered mortice and tenon joint. As described above, it is a joint that 
allows for revision and adaptation throughout the prototyping process. I suggest it distributes 
                                                      
10 I take this distinction, between exploration and experiment, from Gedenryd (1998, 
p.123-30). 
11 I have found these strategies particularly useful when working with students to help 
them develop designs. 
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decision making in the following ways, whether making a prototype or a “real” piece of 
furniture; 
• The taper is self-tightening, allowing even an unglued piece of furniture be tested. 
When designing and making a chair, for example, we can sit on it, decide upon 
revisions, dismantle the assembly and make those changes.   
• As in the cardboard tube prototyping process described above, there is an 
opportunity for revision between drilling the straight hole of our mortice and then 
reaming it. Even at a late stage in production, the angle of the legs can be adjusted. 
• It is a simple and convenient task to shorten any of the legs or stretchers, by wasting 
more material from the tenon, using the taper tenon cutter (the “pencil sharpener”). 
This is unlike re-cutting a conventional tenon (with sawn cheeks and shoulders), 
which would be a time-consuming job. 
• The process of laying out and fitting the stretchers is both technically easier and 
better supported with reference to the emergent result if it is done after the legs have 
been dry-fitted. We are therefore asked to distribute these decisions throughout the 
process.  
I suggest that this adaptability and distributed decision making is what makes the Windsor 
form particularly suited to the use of green wood, when produced in low-volumes. Where 
other furniture making techniques would struggle to accommodate the lively characteristics 
of wood with a high moisture content, chair makers like Peter Galbert are able to exploit the 
favourable properties of green wood to significant advantage12. 
Critical to this effort is the possibility for adaptation in response to the emergent result. As 
described by Galbert, strict adherence to a prior specification would risk ‘telegraphing’ 
errors throughout the chair (2015, p.16). ‘Instead of trying to make each part fit numbers on 
a drawing’, he writes, ‘I make it to fit the chair’ (ibid., p.17). This is an approach made 
possible by the techniques of Windsor joinery. 
Before moving on, there is one additional advantage to the tapered mortice and tenon. 
Making a chair to the high standards of Galbert’s work obviously requires a great deal of 
experience. But where our joints fall short in their accuracy, Schwarz advises us, on the 
                                                      
12 By splitting out parts from a log, for example, Windsor chair makers are able to create 
spindles that follow the grain. Because they are not weakened by any grain run-out (see 
5.2.2), these spindles may be thinner (more “spindly”) than non-green alternatives, 
contributing to a lightweight chair (both physically and visually). 
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evidence of historical examples, to ‘[t]ake a little comfort from the fact that even imperfect 
conical joints can last for centuries’ (2016, p.66).  
6.6. Sundqvist’s Simple Tools 
Having discussed examples of how epistemic character influences the distribution of 
decision making, I now return to the claim made by Wille Sundqvist; 
‘A sense of design that comes from using simple tools cannot be had from 
machines’ (1990, p.106) 
Whilst I agree that there is a validity to Sundqvist’s claim that different tools (and their 
associated techniques) might affect our “sense of design”, I suggest that the dichotomy he 
describes between “simple tools” and “machines” is misguided. And I offer one more short 
comparison to help interrogate Sundqvist’s position. Both techniques could reasonably be 
used in spoon making. 
6.6.1. The Spokeshave and The Coping Saw 
I suggest that both a spokeshave (Figure 6.27) and a coping saw (Figure 6.28) could, along 
with the axe of Sundqvist’s quote, be considered “simple” tools. It would be unusual to 
describe either tool as a “machine”13. But, despite both employing “simple” tools, the 
techniques of spokeshaving and coping sawing distribute decision making very differently 
throughout a process. 
Figure 6. 27 Using a spokeshave 
 
                                                      
13 Both tools are, for example, included in Aldren Watson’s book Hand Tools: Their 
Ways and Workings (1982). 
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Figure 6. 28 Using a coping saw 
 
The epistemic character of coping sawing, I suggest, has more in common with using a 
powered band saw than it does with using an axe. As I discussed with reference to Ingold’s 
handsaw, the technique of sawing asks us to concentrate decision making in advance, 
without reference to incremental feedback. We might draw a line on the timber in advance, 
or make the cut without any guidance. Either way, the result only emerges with the last 
stroke, as all the waste wood is removed simultaneously.  
Using a spokeshave by contrast, wasting can proceed by small steps, in increments 
determined by the maximum thickness of shaving the tool can take. The nature of 
spokeshave use thus sees a woodworker presented with the emergent form after each pass 
with the tool. We may pause to check the result and make adjustments if required. When 
making a spoon, like Sundqvist, or a handle of any sort (as I have described elsewhere 
(Luscombe 2017)), the spokeshave’s incremental character allows us to refine the result 
until the handle becomes pleasing to hold.  
To return to the distinction between transport and wayfaring, the technique of using a saw 
asks us to specify our destination (the eventual shape of the cut) in advance. Using the 
spokeshave is more akin to the experience of wayfaring. 
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I suggest that the “sense of design” that Sundqvist values is not a result of the relative 
simplicity of his axe, but of the way the technique of shaping with an axe structures the 
process of designing and making. It forces us to proceed incrementally towards a form, 
where the bandsaw asks us to determine it in advance. This is not a character inherent to the 
tool itself. As we have seen when splitting a piece of timber with an axe (see 5.2.4), the 
result is predetermined as soon as the split begins, according to the grain running through the 
wood. In this case, the same tool does not offer the same sense of design.  
6.7. Summary 
Philosopher Beth Preston considers the modern obsession with planning to be a ‘false ideal’ 
(2013, p.43). Despite the obvious failings of what she calls the ‘centralised control model’ 
(ibid., p.30) of behaviour, Preston wonders, why are we ‘constantly prompted to do more 
and better planning in every area of endeavour from the personal to the public?’ (ibid., p.43). 
This is, I suggest, the same sentiment we find expressed in Christopher Alexander’s 30 coin 
experiment. Alexander presents a fundamentally performative approach to designing and 
making. I return to his work in the following chapter’s “discursive contribution”, and 
examine how, if we subscribe to his understanding of creative practice, the concept of 
epistemic character is highly significant. 
For those less enamoured, or more skeptical, of Alexander’s performative ideals, however, I 
believe this chapter still makes a valuable contribution to the thinking on the subject of 
designing and making. First, it helps to clarify the dynamic nature of risk and decision 
making throughout a technique. The appropriation of Tim Ingold’s models of wayfaring and 
transport offers a novel means of describing the distribution of decision making throughout 
techniques. We have seen how these might be applied to practical examples and, in the 
discussion of prototyping furniture, shifted focus from localised instances of tool use, to 
consider epistemic character at a macro-level. The idea of “dexterous wayfaring” contributes 
a valuable perspective on the role of dexterity in creative practice. And, in the closing 
discussion of Sundqvist’s concept of simple tools, we see how the idea of epistemic 
character offers a position from which we may critique long-held opinions about the 
difference in hand or machine tools. 
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7. Discussion 
 
In this closing chapter, I first restate my contributions, alongside a brief description of where 
I believe they are evidenced throughout the thesis. This is followed by a section discussing 
the limitations of research, and possible future work. I then go on to offer an additional 
“discursive contribution”. This is an extension of the ideas introduced in the last chapter. 
Drawing on the work of Christopher Alexander, I suggest that the ways in which techniques 
distribute decision making might have an important impact on the quality of our 
environment. I describe this as a “discursive contribution” because it is suggestive of what I 
believe to be the full value of my research, but I recognise it is not yet comprehensively 
argued. In summary, I identify Alexander as an “artisanal architect”—someone who takes 
the ideas of emergence and performativity not just as ways of describing practice, but as best 
practice. The “30 coin experiment” of the previous chapter introduced this approach. I 
describe his work here in more detail, in order to discuss its potential affinity with my 
concept of epistemic character. I then end by returning to the work of David Pye. I hope to 
show how Alexander’s thinking, combined with the idea of epistemic character, can help to 
usefully re-evaluate Pye’s concept of “diversity”. 
7.1. Restatement of Contributions 
1. I have presented an argument that recasts the making process as a means of thinking, 
rather than merely transcribing antecedent ideas. I have drawn on literature from 
disciplines where this argument has been well-rehearsed, and contributed a novel 
synthesis of existing ideas in terms relevant to design studies and practice.   
This idea is fundamental to the whole thesis. Whilst I developed this theoretical commitment 
chiefly throughout Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I believe the subsequent studies in Chapters 5 and 6 
can be seen to reinforce its relevance, significance and novelty. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I described how similar arguments have already been developed in 
other disciplines. And, in Henrik Gedenryd’s work, I found an application of the same 
thinking in the context of design studies (see 3.2). The novelty of this contribution comes 
not from the content of the argument then, but in how I have woven together previously 
separate ideas to develop a useful foundation for the specifics of my study. In isolation, the 
points I make in Chapter 3 have already been made in a range of other sources. But taken as 
part of my thesis as a whole, I believe the notion of ‘making as thinking’ has been elaborated 
in a novel and valuable way. 
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2. I have presented an analysis of techniques that describes their simultaneously 
epistemic and pragmatic nature; I have defined techniques as a means by which to 
find out about the world and change it simultaneously. 
In Chapter 4, I discussed Kirsh and Maglio’s notion of epistemic action, with reference to 
the technique of hammering in a pin. I focused on the nature of dexterity in order to develop 
a foundational account of the simultaneously epistemic and pragmatic nature of tool use.  
Although the term “epistemic action” was developed in the mid 1990s, and the idea of doing 
as a kind of thinking goes back as least as far as the philosophy of Dewey (1929), I claim 
that my application of this concept, to the tools and techniques of designing and making, is a 
novel contribution.  
As I discussed later on in Chapter 6 (see 6.2), the technique of hammering does not provide 
an example wherein significant design decisions are being made throughout. But by 
recasting tools more generally as both means for getting the job done, and for sensing the 
progress of a task, it was in Chapter 4 that I laid the ground for the subsequent studies of 
epistemic character. I therefore see this idea as a transition from the theoretical concerns of 
the previous chapters, towards a discussion of how this understanding may be applied to 
practice. 
3. I have presented a novel critique of the work of David Pye, according to the 
theoretical foundation developed in contributions 1 & 2. 
Alongside my discussion of hammering and epistemic action, Chapter 4 also saw me 
develop a critique of the work of David Pye. This was an opportunity for me to expose some 
of the assumptions of Pye’s work, with reference to the alternative theories described in 
Chapter 3. Although, as I hope this thesis makes clear, I remain an admirer of Pye’s writing, 
I believe my criticisms are valid and, owing to Pye’s continuing legacy, a valuable 
contribution to both design and craft theory. 
Where Chapter 3 developed a general, broad-based discussion of non-dualist approaches to 
designing and making, my specific discussion of Pye’s work was intended to present the 
case in a more digestible and relevant format (and therefore aligns with contribution 7, 
below). I have presented this critique of Pye in an abridged form in my paper, ‘What’s a 
Mallet For?: A Woodworker’s Critique of The Workmanship of Risk’ (Luscombe 2017), but 
would be eager to develop this topic into a more comprehensive publication through future 
work. 
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4. I have introduced the term ‘epistemic character’ in order to frame a new subject of 
interest—how techniques structure design processes. I have argued that we may 
investigate the epistemic character of techniques, and I have provided examples of 
how such investigations may be pursued. 
 
5. I have introduced three questions that may be asked of a technique’s epistemic 
character: What are the questions posed by a technique?; What is its step-
character?; and what is the nature of the emergent result?  
I believe contributions 4 and 5 to be potentially the most significant of this thesis. I think the 
notion of epistemic character could become a useful subject of investigation for both design 
theorists and practitioners. In Chapter 5, I hope to have clearly demonstrated three questions 
of epistemic character that may inform future studies. These were developed out of my own 
reflections on practice, and also according to the ideas of others (see 5.1.1., 5.2.1., and 
5.3.1). They thus tie together some of the literature explored while developing Chapters 3 
and 4, with my own practical investigations. 
It should be noted that the concept of epistemic character relies on the preceding 
methodological contributions of this thesis. Where I have already published the idea of 
epistemic character therefore (see Luscombe 2018), I have devoted a sizable portion of the 
text to setting out this theoretical foundation. I believe future work in this area would need to 
continue in this vein—by both making the case for the general role of techniques as 
“extensions of minds”, and analysising the epistemic character of specific techniques. 
In my paper, ‘Rulers and Dividers: A Technology of Design’ (Luscombe 2018), I have 
suggested, following François Sigaut (see 2.6.3), that analysing epistemic character could 
become the role of a “technology of design”. This technology would acknowledge that every 
technique has its own epistemic character—a character that influences how we work things 
out and, therefore, what those things will be like. Uncovering the nature of this character 
would, I suggest, help to inform our selection of the techniques that offer the greatest 
promise for a given task. 
6. I have provided a discussion of how the features of epistemic character influence the 
distribution of decision making throughout design processes. This has offered a 
novel insight into historic dichotomies of hand and machine tools, as I have 
suggested there is a more fundamental distinction to be made, between processes 
throughout which things emerge step-by-step, and processes in which things are 
planned in advance of their execution. 
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In Chapter 6, I explored what I believe to be one of the most significant themes that results 
from investigations epistemic character—that we may address the question of how 
techniques distribute decision making throughout design processes. Here I developed a 
novel appropriation of Tim Ingold’s contrast of wayfaring and transportation, as metaphors 
for thinking about the subject (see 6.3). 
As I discuss below, in an additional “discursive contribution”, the idea of distributing 
decision making has long-since inspired and motivated my research. This discursive 
contribution may be considered a more speculative extrapolation of my work, which is 
suggestive of a future direction for the research. I hope it may serve to clarify what I believe 
is the ultimate significance of the concept of epistemic character. I return to the work of two 
important figures throughout my PhD journey—Christopher Alexander and David Pye—in 
order to discuss why the distribution of decisions might play a crucial role in the quality of 
our environment. Although I hope to have gone some way to addressing the “so what?” 
question in Chapters 5 and 6, this additional contribution may offer further insight.  
7. Through a distinctive, designerly subject of interest (the detailed study of design and 
making techniques), I have developed a means of communicating and promoting 
extra-disciplinary theoretical ideas in a way that is relevant for design practice. 
This last contribution is supplementary to the other, more targeted contributions. I suggest 
the way my text and illustrations link studies of technique and theory presents the ideas of 
this thesis in a way that is appealing and relevant to design practitioners. Inspired by the 
straightforward prose and illustrative style of how-to guides (see 2.6.5), I have sought to 
ground my theoretical discussions in practical concerns. As I discuss in Chapter 1 (1.3), this 
ambition was one of the factors that influenced the unconventional structure of the thesis, 
which introduces ideas from other literature throughout the practice-based studies, rather 
than in advance. Whilst this approach has presented disadvantages (most obviously that the 
document and the key components of PhD research are less easy to navigate), being at the 
stage of now looking to publish parts of this work (or similarly themed new work), I am 
pleased to have experimented with this means of writing simultaneously about “practice” 
and “theory”. In one paper informed by this PhD (Luscombe 2018), for example, I use the 
comparison of dividers and rulers presented in Chapter 5 (5.1) to discuss the theory of 
extended mind and the potential value of studies of epistemic character. Having found a way 
throughout the writing of this thesis to jump between the details of techniques and more 
theoretical concerns, I feel well prepared to communicate such work with the efficiency 
required of a journal or conference paper. I also believe that building these discussions 
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around the specifics of techniques serves to convince of their disciplinary relevance, and 
improves the experience of both reading and writing them. 
7.2. Limitations and Future Work 
As described in Chapter 2 (see especially 2.6.11), the context for this research was closely 
focussed on the interaction between a sole practitioner and the tools and materials of 
practice. Whilst successful as an attempt to develop a detailed understanding of the ways in 
which techniques structure design processes, this methodology nonetheless excludes an 
important aspect of much design practice—collaboration. Having engaged with techniques 
at the very local level, it is now worth noting how the kinds of studies I present here might 
inform those performed in more complex, collaborative contexts. I also reflect on my 
ambitions for future work with different kinds of techniques, the increased demands that 
these new contexts would place upon recording methods, and the pedagogic potential of this 
research. 
7.2.1 Collaboration 
The kinds of operations studied throughout this thesis (e.g. carving a spoon, making a paper 
aeroplane, knocking in a pin) are of a sort typically accomplished by an individual. To 
effectively study collaborative practice, I expect the complexity of these tasks would need to 
be increased, to ensure the collaboration is purposeful. Following the lead of scholars like 
Edwin Hutchins (1996; see 3.2.4), it would perhaps be more appropriate to investigate a pre-
existing context (e.g. a design studio, or collaborative making project), instead of creating an 
artificial setting and task.  
Of those scholars influential during the course of this PhD, it is in Andrew Pickering’s 
accounts of scientific practice that I find the most promising model of interactivity between 
things and people in collaborative contexts (see 1995; 2008; see 3.2.4 and 5.3.3). Though he 
does not adopt the micro-level perspective on techniques that I have, in Pickering’s work, I 
see a positive example of how things (most often scientific instruments) can be integrated 
into analyses of broader contexts. In Pickering’s words, the things are bestowed with 
agency. They do not drift into the background as props supporting human action—they resist 
and behave unexpectedly. Pickering himself has been inspired by the actor-network theory 
of Bruno Latour (2005) (see Pickering 1995, p.11), and it is perhaps Latour’s insight into the 
importance of nonhuman actors (2005, see p.71-2) in social settings that could provide the 
most effective grounding to future studies of epistemic character in collaborative contexts. 
 202 
In the terminology of actor-network theory, the work of this thesis suggests that techniques 
(or the collection of tools and materials that are brought together through techniques) would 
be more likely interpreted as ‘mediators’, rather than ‘intermediaries’ (ibid. p.37-40). In 
Latour’s work, an intermediary ‘transports meaning or force [or, we could say, a design] 
without transformation: defining its inputs is enough to define its outputs’ (ibid. p.39) A 
mediator, however, has the potential to ‘transform, translate, distort, and modify’ a force 
(ibid.). In the context of techniques, considering them as mediators would be to insist on 
their influence upon practice. In an effort to maintain the vitality of tools and techniques in 
and amongst a more populous setting, actor-network theory might thus provide a helpful 
basis for studies of collaboration.  
Such an extension of the research would, however, present significant new challenges. With 
my one-to-one study of a practitioner and a technique, it was quite straightforward to 
interpret the back and forth between the two parties. The risk of attempting larger-scale, 
more complex studies would be that the epistemic character of a technique is obscured, or 
drowned out, in the crowd. It might also be that the kinds of detailed investigations 
presented in this thesis have a granularity that is at odds with the scale of the context. A 
possible solution to this latter point would, following the guidance of actor-network theory, 
be to avoid setting out with a ‘choice of a privileged locus where action is said to be more 
abundant’ (ibid. p.61-2) and instead ‘follow the actors themselves’ (ibid. p.61). This 
approach might see the unit of analysis shift. Instead of investigating the epistemic character 
of techniques, for example, it might be more appropriate to study the epistemic character of 
environments. Refocussing the analysis in this way would leave us with potentially valuable 
questions such as: What questions does the environment pose?; What is the ‘step-character’ 
of the environment?; and What is the nature of the emergent result throughout the 
environment? Whilst the study of environments is nothing new (see Hutchins 1995; Keller 
and Keller 1996), I suggest that attempts to determine their epistemic character might offer a 
valuable new perspective on collaborative design practice. 
The role of the researcher in this sort of research would inevitably be very different. Where I 
have adopted the perspective of a reflective practitioner, here the researcher would be 
involved in a task of ethnography, with new demands placed on their recording methods (see 
7.2.3) and strategies for analysis. Unlike my individual interrogation of techniques, in 
collaborative contexts the understanding of epistemic character might have to be built 
collaboratively, informed by each participant’s understanding. 
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7.2.2 Alternative Contexts 
Throughout this PhD, I consider the development and discussion of epistemic character to 
have benefitted from the varied range of techniques studied. One of the intended strengths of 
the concept is that is broadly applicable. It may, for example, be applied both to techniques 
normally considered as “design techniques” (e.g. using dividers, see 5.1.5) and techniques 
normally considered as “making techniques” (e.g. using a belt linisher, see 6.4.1). This is 
part of an ambition, informed by the theoretical grounding of this research, to insist on the 
simultaneously epistemic and pragmatic potential of tool use.  
In order to explore epistemic character in the studies presented here, I have relied on the 
three questions discussed in Chapter 5: What questions does the technique pose?; What is 
the ‘step-character’ of the technique?; and What is the nature of the emergent result 
throughout the technique? To further evaluate the usefulness of these questions, future 
studies could look to alternative contexts, be they more collaborative (as discussed in 7.2.1), 
or involving different forms of material engagement1. Although it is expected that the 
appropriateness of each question will vary with different techniques (see 5.), trying to apply 
them more widely would help to refine and extend their usefulness. 
As described in 2.6.6, I have made sure I feel competent in the practice of a technique before 
attempting to study its epistemic character. This prerequisite would be harder to maintain 
with an expanded survey. It seems necessary, therefore, that further studies would need to be 
performed alongside a competent practitioner. Having discovered throughout this research 
the wealth of information available on techniques (from online sources, to more traditional 
how-to books), however, I would suggest that a researcher need not embark on these studies 
of practice from an uninformed perspective. As I discuss in 2.6.9, the body of ‘interactional 
knowledge’ (Collins, 2004) associated with a practice can offer an extremely valuable 
understanding. To take an example from my own interest in woodwork, I suggest it is 
possible to learn all the principles of working “with the grain” (see 5.2.3) from just ten 
minutes’ reading (see, for example, Sundqvist 1990). I believe developing this kind of 
interactional expertise before trying to study techniques would be highly beneficial. 
                                                      
 
1 A notable absence from the studies in this thesis is the consideration of digital 
techniques. Either in the techniques of digital designing (e.g. creating drawings and models 
within software), or digitally-controlled manufacturing techniques (e.g. laser cutters or 3D 
printers), I believe these alternative contexts would provide a diverse testing ground to 
explore how the idea of epistemic character may be extended. 
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From a personal perspective, I would be eager to conduct further studies of epistemic 
character in pursuit of a deeper insight into opposing philosophies of design (see 3.3 and De 
Landa 2001)2. As I discuss in my ‘discursive contribution’ (7.3), I believe the full 
significance of this thesis lies in the perspective it offers on the relationship between 
techniques and the qualities of their outcomes. For example, I consider the distribution of 
decisions throughout practice (as influenced by techniques) to have serious consequences for 
the quality of our artefacts and environments. According to this interest, I see great merit in 
studying the epistemic character of techniques that lead to favourable qualities, and 
comparing this to the epistemic character of those that do not. Although this kind of work 
would inevitably engage with the polemics of aesthetics, I also believe future studies could 
have less controversial purposes—for example in relation to design and craft pedagogy (see 
7.2.4; Luscombe 2018). 
7.2.3 Recording Methods 
As described in 2.6.6 and 2.6.7, I have studied techniques that could be repeated very easily, 
to allow multiple attempts (e.g. hammering a pin). Documenting and reflecting on these 
studies by taking notes provided a satisfactory means of interrogating their epistemic 
character. If I needed to refine my thinking on a technique, I could easily repeat the 
operation and reconsider it according to my developing understanding of the research. 
Throughout the more idiosyncratic, temporary (non-repeatable) and less well-documented 
techniques that would likely be encountered in different contexts, however, the demands on 
recording methods would be increased. If, as suggested above, these contexts include 
collaboration between people (7.2.1), and a researcher not necessarily acquainted first-hand 
with the techniques (7.2.2), a richer record of events would have to be created throughout. I 
suggest the most appropriate, and least obtrusive, methods for this would be to make video 
and audio recordings. This would also have the added benefit of creating data that could be 
shared with others, for confirmation or reinterpretation. 
7.2.4 The Pedagogic Potential of this Research 
One of the contributions to knowledge claimed by this thesis is the way in which it 
communicates extra-disciplinary theoretical ideas in a way that is relevant for design 
practice (see 7.1, point no.7). This was motivated by an aspiration for the research to be read 
                                                      
 
2 Having developed an ever-growing interest in the history and practice of woodwork 
throughout the course of this PhD, one of my specific ambitions is to consider how the 
different techniques within the craft correspond to particular philosophies of design.  
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by designers and craftspeople, and students of these fields. It follows, therefore, that I 
believe the content of this research could have important implications for the practice and 
teaching of design. 
Reflecting on my experience as a tutor of three-dimensional design, I can offer a personal 
account of this potential. I have found one of the persistent challenges faced by students is to 
develop an efficient and thoughtful approach to prototyping. Owing perhaps to the long-
standing theoretical division of designing and making (see Chapter 3), it can be difficult to 
explain the nature and value of an empirical, step-by-step approach to the making of designs. 
It is often clear at the end of a student project that those who employed means by which to 
test their ideas along the way are much more satisfied with the outcomes than those who 
optimistically leapt from the “idea” to the “finished thing”. 
I have found the discussion of epistemic character to be an effective way into this subject. 
By comparing, for example, the use of a spokeshave and coping saw to shape a piece of 
wood (see 6.6.1.), I try to provide an insight into how these techniques distribute decision 
making differently. The saw asks us to concentrate decision making in advance, and cut a 
line without reference to incremental feedback. The spokeshave enables us to advance 
incrementally, with continual reference to an emergent form. Even without any further 
elaboration on “epistemic character”, or the “theory of extended mind”, I find this 
observation has a useful effect—it demonstrates the idea that saws, spokeshaves and any 
other tool can be conceived as instruments of design, rather than just a means to make a pre-
determined idea. My intention is to reframe all aspects of “making” as potential design 
techniques, and thus encourage a much more thorough engagement with prototyping. 
More generally, this PhD has had a significant impact upon my teaching practice. Having 
become fascinated by the literature discussed throughout this thesis, I am more committed 
than ever to the idea of “thinking through making”. And, having thought long and hard 
about what that phrase actually means, I feel much better placed to try and teach my subject. 
By publishing more sections of this thesis, whilst further refining their content, I hope to 
turn this insight into a value contribution for design and craft pedagogy. 
7.3. A Discursive Contribution 
In the final section of this thesis, I expand on my sixth contribution from above—the idea 
that some techniques distribute decisions throughout practice, and some concentrate decision 
making in advance. As discussed, I offer this in a more speculative spirit, in order to 
communicate what I believe to be the full significance of my prior contributions, without 
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compromising the rigour of my previous claims. Whilst a thesis might typically close by 
pulling together points already made, this section is intended to suggest a potential future 
direction for further research. It concerns how I might try to articulate an issue that has been 
bubbling away beneath the surface of the research, as I saw links between disparate pieces of 
work and my own. The subject of this discussion is the aesthetics of diversity. 
7.3.1. The Nature of Order 
On reflection, I can trace the origin of my ideas on the distribution of decision making back 
to my first, serendipitous encounter with Christopher Alexander’s four volume book The 
Nature of Order (2002). Browsing the shelves of the library one day, I picked out one of the 
volumes on a whim. 
This would have been when I was between stages 2 and 3 of my T-shaped transformation 
(see 2.5.2). I was therefore in a state of open-mindedness, eagerly searching out as many 
new ideas as possible. This, and the fact that I had time enough to browse library shelves (an 
enviable luxury, from the perspective of someone trying to finish their PhD thesis), led me 
to sit with The Nature of Order for the rest of the afternoon. 
In Alexander’s work I found what I consider to be a practical application of a non-
hylomorphic (see 3.3.1) approach to designing and making. Where the concepts of 
emergence and morphogenesis were, for most of the other authors I’d been reading, models 
by which to interpret the world, Alexander treats them as ways of acting. Here was someone 
following Andrew Pickering’s suggestion to take the “performative idiom” (see 5.3.3) not 
just as a means of describing practice, but as an inspiration for how we should act in the 
world (2008; 2014). Pickering argues that our practices should ‘emphasise a much more 
symmetric interplay of the human and the nonhuman […] in an open-ended, forward-
looking, trial and error search process’ (ibid., p.2). Within that first afternoon of reading, I 
began to see The Nature of Order as an account of how this idea might be pursued in design 
and making practice. In his straightforward descriptions of mocking up the steps of a porch, 
or using stakes and flags to generate floorplans on-site, Alexander demonstrated how his 
morphogenetic ideals informed his buildings. 
Alexander makes no reference to Andrew Pickering’s work, or indeed any of the authors 
with which I began to associate his writing. The majority of Alexander’s arguments are 
substantiated through reference to his own architectural practice and intuition. He acts, as 
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architecture critic Robert Campbell warm-heartedly observes, as if he ‘has never read a 
book’ (2012)3. 
Having made an early retreat from the field of design science (see 3.1.4), claiming it to be 
too little concerned with practice4, Alexander has instead devoted his attention to the 
question of how to make good buildings. From The Timeless Way of Building (1979), to his 
most recent book, Battle for the Life and Beauty of The Earth (2012) Alexander has 
simultaneously sought to define “goodness” as a property of the environment, and discover 
how it may be created. The conflict suggested by the “battle” of Alexander’s recent work is 
a reference to the contrast at the heart of his theories; between modern approaches to design 
and construction, and the “timeless” way of building. 
I interpret Alexander’s battle as set out along the same lines as Pickering’s comparison 
between a modern ontology of domination, and an alternative “ontology of becoming” 
(2009). Both Pickering and Alexander stress the failings of the modern paradigm, and the 
value of working with emergence, rather than trying to suppress it. They both promote back-
and-forth experimentation in the world, instead of representational projects that seek to 
enframe and control it5. In one of many passages that typifies this approach, Alexander 
writes; 
[T]he 20th century mainstream view of building was goal-orientated and 
mechanistic, aimed mainly at end-results, not on the inner good of processes. 
Building was viewed as a necessary way to achieve a certain end-result. The design 
drawn by the architect—the master plan drawn by the planner—was the purpose, 
these were the goals of the art. The process of getting to the goal was thought to be 
of little importance in itself, except insofar as it attained (or failed to attain) the 
desired goal. 
The mechanistic view of architecture we have learned to accept in our era is crippled 
by this overly-simple, goal-orientated approach. In the mechanistic view of 
architecture we think mainly of design as the desired end-state of a building, and far 
                                                      
 
3 Robert Campbell made this remark at a ceremony to award Alexander the 2009 
Vincent Scully Prize for architecture. Whilst at odds with prevailing thought in his discipline 
then, Alexander is not completely without allies. See 47 minutes into the video for the quote.  
4 In 1971 Alexander said ‘there is so little in what is called “design methods” that has 
anything useful to say about how to design buildings that I never even read the literature any 
more. […] I would say forget it, forget the whole thing. Period. Until those people who talk 
about design methods are actually engaged in the problem of creating buildings and actually 
trying to create buildings, I wouldn’t give a penny for their efforts.’ (1971) 
5 Pickering borrows the concept of ‘enframing’ from Martin Heidegger (1977), to 
describe a process that seeks to dominate nature by putting it at our disposal, whilst ‘at the 
same time, we enframe ourselves, becoming parts of a posthuman assemblage of production 
and consumption’ (2009, p.469). 
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too little of the way or process of making a building as something inherently 
beautiful in itself. But, most important of all, the background underpinning of this 
goal-orientated view—a static world almost without process—just is not a truthful 
picture. As a conception of the world, it roundly fails to describe things as they are. 
It exerts a crippling effect on our view of architecture and planning because it fails 
to be true to ordinary, everyday fact. For in fact, everything is constantly changing, 
growing, evolving.’ (2002, p.11-12, emphases in original)6 
Throughout The Nature of Order, Alexander repeatedly challenges the dominant approach to 
design and construction in this way. With the ability to predict and determine the qualities of 
a building in advance of its construction being a central tenet of architectural practice7, 
however, Alexander’s work strikes a heretical tone8. Alexander himself remains 
unapologetic about the controversial aspects of his work, describing this presumed ability to 
make successful decisions according to the feedback of drawn lines or computer models as a 
‘polite fiction’ (2002, p.245). 
For all its heresy, however, a notable feature of Alexander’s work is how old-fashioned the 
processes he promotes are. The timeless way of building was, at one time, the typical way of 
building. In David Turnbull (1993) and Lars Spuybroek’s (2011) accounts of Gothic 
ontology, with their laboratory-like, empirical experimentation, we find that Alexander’s 
brand of morphogenesis was ubiquitous. Indeed, for Alexander, the Gothic masterpiece 
Chartres represents a magnificent architectural achievement. This is a success he assigns to 
the emergent nature of its design. Given this, and the other historic examples he draws on, it 
is perhaps only from the perspective of a modern ontology of ‘detachment and domination’ 
(Pickering 2008, p.3) that Alexander’s work appears at all controversial. 
Despite Alexander’s admiration for the built environment of previous eras, he still provides 
examples within the modern era that point towards what an alternative paradigm might offer. 
Alexander’s examples include customized trucks or motorbikes that have been ‘imbued with 
love and attention by their makers or their owners’ (2002, p.146); the ‘unfolded’ character of 
Lower Manhattan Island (ibid., p.142-3); high-speed trains aerodynamically shaped in 
                                                      
 
6 On this point, Stewart Brand’s book How Buildings Learn: What Happens to Them 
After They’re Built (1994) provides a practical insight into the ever-changing nature of 
buildings. 
7 Anthropologist Wendy Gunn (2002), in her doctoral study of the influence of CAD 
software on architectural practice, describes that the ability to conceive the correct solution 
in advance of its being built is considered a key criterion of competence.  
8 See the 1982 debate with Peter Eisenman (Alexander and Eisenman 1983), for an 
example of the negative reception Alexander’s work has received amongst other architects. 
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computer models and therefore ‘generated by a dynamic process in an evolutionary way’ 
(ibid., p.152); and the art of Matisse.  
One of the most striking characteristics of Alexander’s work is the seriousness with which 
he treats his subject. As demonstrated by his early dismissal of an abstracted approach to 
design science, Alexander is not motivated to create theory for its own sake. The Nature of 
Order is the work of a reflective practitioner looking to make explicit his ongoing struggle 
to understand the world, and how it could and should be worked by humans. Any theoretical 
contributions seem to almost fall out of Alexander’s architecture. It is as if his architectural 
practice is itself a method of scientific investigation, continually trying to answer the 
question of how we can make beautiful places. Central to this effort is the way Alexander 
treats the quality of our environment as a vital concern. For Alexander, the quality of our 
surroundings is too important a subject to subscribe to the dispassionate post-modern idea 
that anything goes. Alexander does not believe that we should operate on the understanding 
that there are a range of equally valid opinions about what our built environment should look 
and feel like. This, he argues, has only ‘provided justification, validation, and therefore an 
intensification’ of developments that are ‘at odds with the organic harmony of towns and 
land’ (ibid., p.135). 
Despite this commitment to the idea of an objective “goodness” to which our buildings 
should aspire, Alexander does not insist on stylistic homogenization. Unlike, for example, 
Ruskin’s admiration for Gothic architecture, he does not look for answers in the results of an 
“ideal” material culture. Although highly attuned to the physical facts of their success, what 
Alexander finds in his positive examples is not a style to emulate, but a process. In different 
times and places, Alexander acknowledges that there will be a variety of outcomes. But what 
he finds in successful cities, buildings and artefacts is an underlying sequence of design that 
was essentially step-by-step. Decisions were made along the way, with respect to the 
emergent result. 
Perhaps inspired by the way his work on pattern languages has been adopted by software 
developers, Alexander argues that this same step-by-step character is essential to success in 
all creative endeavours. From the scale of making a single wall tile or painting, up to making 
an entire city, Alexander claims that step-by-step processes are always a pre-requisite of 
good results. The majority of Alexander’s examples, however, are taken from his experience 
of making buildings. In a description typical of his work, Alexander documents the process 
used to design the arrangement of panes in a window frame, when building a house. At this 
stage, the rooms of the house had already been built, and the size and position of the window 
determined (also via an on-site sequence of decision making).  
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‘In my experience,’ Alexander writes, ‘this is always torture. It seems easy, but is actually 
hellishly hard. We usually do it with surveyor’s tape, pinned or stapled to the window 
frames, so we can look at the effect of different patterns on the building, from inside and out. 
It takes days, sometimes even weeks.’ (2002, p.617). In this one example, we find both 
evidence of Alexander’s commitment to full-scale prototyping, throughout the building 
process, and the justification for such an approach. Following this method allows Alexander 
and his team to evaluate what the window is like from both the outside and the inside. This 
is a simple reason for not making the decision via representations, in advance of building. 
For Alexander, being able to stand inside and look out of the window is a crucial strategy for 
success.  
Alexander attributes the difficulty of these decision to the fact that the preferred solution as 
generated from inside each room might result in an external appearance of disharmony 
between the different windows. If he was drawing the façade of the building, having not 
been inside the rooms, the harmony of the windows from outside might be much more easily 
realised. But this would almost certainly be to the detriment of the experience of being in the 
rooms. That this process can take days or weeks is a result of the significance Alexander 
attaches to the decision. It also allows for the fact that the light entering a room changes with 
the time of day, or in different weather conditions. And that, having left the prototype frames 
in place as the team move around the site, working on other parts of the building, new 
solutions might present themselves over time. 
Some might argue that virtual reality models would enable the same experience of standing 
inside a building, via a computer-simulated representational approach. You could accelerate 
the motion of the computerised sun’s path through the sky, to test the design at different 
times of day. And using haptic gloves or a stapler-like peripheral, we could even model the 
technique of applying surveyor’s tape, to redesign the window in real-time. I would contend, 
however, that these ideas express an almost absurd commitment to prioritizing planning and 
representation over first-hand experimentation in the real world. Is it not simpler to organize 
the whole process, as Alexander demonstrates, so that decision making can be 
accommodated throughout the building process? On this point, I return to Andrew Pickering, 
who would characterize our imagined effort towards hyper-representation as a “detour” 
symptomatic of the modern paradigm’s techno-scientific tendencies (2008; see 5.3.4). 
Rather than adopting a performative, materially-engaged approach that makes use of the way 
things are, we instead go via vastly expensive detours in an effort to model, predict and 
control the world. It would, I suggest, be better to apply an idea from the theory of extended 
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mind—when the world is its own best model, why bother to make a representation (Clark 
1997, see p.29)? 
7.3.2. Zooming in on The Nature of Practice 
As documented throughout this thesis, my research has been inspired by a variety of 
scholars from a range of disciplines. Perhaps the most influential motivation however, has 
come from the idea that I have been developing a complementary, “zoomed-in” account of 
Alexander’s step-by-step theory, at the scale of workshop practice. Throughout my research, 
I have been encouraged by the consequentiality Alexander attaches to his work. In contrast 
to the majority of design theory I have read, which rarely takes a strong stance on what 
might be preferred outcomes, Alexander is fully committed to his vision of better world, and 
the idea of step-by-step process as a means of achieving it. In times of doubt, I have been 
reassured of my topic’s significance by reading pages at random from The Nature of Order. 
Even the shortest snippets of the book serve to remind me that 1) the quality of the human-
made world is vitally important and, 2) our techniques of designing and making are directly 
responsible for this quality. 
My adoption of Alexander’s work has, however, been tempered by its relatively unscholarly 
approach. Where Pickering and the other thinkers I associate Alexander’s work with set out 
their philosophical precedents and publish via peer-review, Alexander himself is somewhat 
of a lone wolf. And, whilst his earlier work is widely-cited across a range of disciplines, The 
Nature of Order seems to have generated little academic attention. It is in accordance with 
my commitment to scholarly rigour then (see 2.4), that I present this section as a “discursive 
contribution”—as a topic for discussion rather than what I would consider a substantive 
argument.   
Caveats aside, I believe aligning my research to Alexander’s work on step-by-step processes 
is the key to unlocking its full significance. If we accept the central theme of Alexander’s 
work—that the distribution of decisions is fundamental to the quality of creative processes—
I believe the concept of ‘epistemic character’ would be of great value. In addition, I believe 
my research can help to refine aspects of Alexander’s theories. My discussion of how 
techniques distribute decision making, for example, is closely related to Alexander’s 
contrast of the modern and traditional architectural paradigms. Where Alexander presents a 
polarized caricature of processes being either step-by-step (good) or planned in advance 
(bad) however, I believe my appropriation of Tim Ingold’s models of wayfaring and 
transport offers a richer evaluative scheme (see 6.3). Through further studies of epistemic 
character, I would be eager to pursue these links between my research, Alexander’s work 
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and the wider theoretical foundation I have developed throughout this research. It is in this 
spirit that I have developed the following, final topic of this thesis. 
7.3.3. David Pye and Diversity 
I end this chapter, and the thesis, with a discussion of one more theme from David Pye’s 
work. I hope to show how the concept of epistemic character, and Alexander’s work, can 
help us to re-evaluate Pye’s discussion of “diversity”—an aesthetic quality of the human-
made world that he most admired.  
Pye presents a series of photographs to help define his concept of diversity. The 
accompanying descriptions show Pye, for all his scientific allusions, to be deeply sensitive 
to artistic concerns. A thirteenth century stone stature ‘is a masterly demonstration of the 
principle of diversity [wherein] small elements barely at the threshold of recognition are 
capable of intensifying the character of the larger forms which underlie them’ (1968, p.74). 
A well-worn tobacco box ‘is beautifully diversified in a way typical of much silver, through 
the shading and reflections created by its pebble-like shape, through the quality of the 
engraved line, and through the quality of the soft faint mesh of dents and scratches in the 
metal’ (ibid., p.69). And a contemporary building is ‘of an austere design yet it has an 
attractive dignity and calm about it. The stonework of the pillars is of moderately free 
workmanship, and this, with the character of the stone surfaces and their fossils, has lent it a 
diversity which prevents it from being forbidding’ (ibid., p.78). 
A key element to Pye’s principle of diversity is formal interest at different scales. The 
diversity lent to the building by the texture of the stonework, for example, becomes apparent 
only as we draw near. Although he also describes a kind of ‘medium-scale diversity’ 
(cobbled paving, or brickwork are two examples) (ibid., p.63), it is the finer textures of 
surfaces with which Pye is most concerned. And it is for this reason that workmanship is 
such a critical subject;  
‘[W]orkmanship provides formal elements, and important ones, which are outside 
the control of design: of what, for practical purposes, can be conveyed by words or 
drawing. These are, of course, short-range elements. Most of them are still at, or 
little above, the threshold of recognition at those close ranges at which we normally 
see the components of our environment when we are using them: in a room, in a 
vehicle, in a street, on a bench or table, in our hand. For most of your life the parts 
of your environment which you are looking at are likely to be at close ranges of that 
sort; not on a hilltop, or in the distance, or as seen in the photographs in architectural 
magazines. It is for this reason that the art of workmanship is so evidently important. 
It takes over where design stops: and design begins to fail to control the appearance 
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of the environment at just those ranges at which the environment impinges on us.’ 
(ibid., p.62, emphasis in original) 
Pye found it very rare for diversity at this scale to be created through the workmanship of 
certainty; contemporary determining systems were unable to diversify surfaces to the degree 
afforded by the ‘slight improvisations, divagations and irregularities’ (ibid., p.63) of more 
risky techniques. Much more easily achieved were the ‘clinical’ surfaces of hospital and 
laboratory apparatus, which, whilst practical in the right context, Pye thought would ‘come 
to seem infuriatingly vacuous’ (ibid., p.70) if proliferated more generally.  
Such proliferation was a risk that Pye took seriously. He bemoaned the lack of appreciation 
for diversity across the industrial design and architectural professions. ‘One almost 
believes,’ he writes, ‘that some industrial designers only know of two surface qualities, 
shiny and “textured”; and that to them texture means something which has to be 
distinguishable in all its parts three feet away!’ (ibid., p.130). The sentiment underlying this 
statement is perhaps the one that motivated Pye to write The Nature and Art of 
Workmanship in the first place. ‘If industrial designers and architects understood the theory 
and aesthetics of workmanship better, and realised the importance of it’, he thought that 
‘they would surely make better use of the opportunities offered by the techniques which are 
now available to them’ (ibid., p.130). The way Pye contrasts the “vacuous” appearance of 
undifferentiated artefacts with his celebrations of diversity—‘[t]he beam of the engine and 
its ancillary parts are extraordinarily diversified and their appearance is delightful’ (ibid., 
p.71)—can thus be seen as part of an educational project. 
7.3.4. Nearly Romantic 
In his assessment of Pye’s writing, Glenn Adamson finds Pye’s attitude to the topic of 
diversity to be ‘nearly romantic’ (2007, p.75). For Adamson, it represents a slip in Pye’s 
otherwise rigorous logic, as he adopts the tone of ‘a heartbroken lover rather than the coolly 
rational analyst we have come to expect’ (ibid.). Elsewhere, Pye is able to maintain the 
equal-standing of risky and certain workmanship, continually at pains not to promote the 
work of the hand over the machine. In his appreciation of diversity however, Pye must admit 
that it is almost exclusively a product of the workmanship of risk9. In the techniques 
associated with the underwood industry (e.g. traditional methods of making wooden hurdles 
or spoons) or blacksmithing, Pye finds a special kind of “free workmanship”. ‘There is’, Pye 
                                                      
 
9 On the subject of creating small-scale diversity Pye writes ‘‘It is rarely possible to do 
this by the workmanship of certainty, but always possible by the workmanship of risk, and 
particularly easy by free workmanship’ (1968, p.63) 
 214 
writes, ‘no substitute for the aesthetic quality of this workmanship and the world will be 
poorer without it, particularly the countryside’ (ibid., p.36). In reaction to this point, 
Adamson goes so far as to suggest (in a knowingly ‘mischievous’ fashion) that Pye’s 
analysis ‘veers surprisingly close to the ideas of Ruskin, his bête noire’ (2007, p.75). 
Pye’s rebut would no doubt be that it is not the risky or skilled nature of the country crafts’ 
processes he is lamenting, but the qualities of their results. He is certainly not suggesting 
that free workmanship might offer ‘a cure for the miseries of industrialisation’ (1968, 
p.118), or advocating a retreat to an idealised bucolic state. Pye’s solution to the incapability 
of machines to produce diversity is not to stop making and using them, but to make newer, 
better ones. At the time of his writing, it was practically impossible to specify subtle 
diversity through drawings, or use machines to create it10. But Pye thought this was no 
excuse to give up on the idea—‘[a]rt is not so easy that we can afford to ignore any and 
every formal quality which will not go on to a drawing board’ (ibid., p.130)11. And he 
believes the matter to be as much a question of will as technical possibility—‘if people came 
to love diversity, they would find ways of producing it’ (ibid.). 
Although it is more of a tentative prediction than an insightful prophecy, Pye was hopeful 
that CNC machines might one day allow for the creation of ‘diversity in shapes and 
surfaces’ (ibid., p.129). With the increasingly sophisticated computer controlled machines 
now available, perhaps we are at a point wherein the diverse qualities once achieved by 
dexterous hands have been made possible by more certain means. In those techniques that 
employ CNC routers, laser cutters, waterjet cutters, and 3D printers, we might have a 
suitably advanced form of the workmanship of certainty. And the software packages used to 
drive this equipment provide a means by which to specify surface texture with new found 
precision. Contemporary practitioners and theorists are demonstrating the possibilities 
offered by these new tools and techniques (see, for example, Marshall 2008; Jorgensen and 
Matthias 2014).  
                                                      
 
10 ‘This impoverishment’, Pye writes, ‘is the price we pay at present for cheap quantity-
production in which only this very simplified level of communication and execution is 
practicable, and in which as a rule the slight free modifications of shape and surface quality 
which mark the workmanship of risk are quite unattainable and indeed unthinkable, except 
in cases where the material is flexible or translucent [such as the rippled inside of a glass jar, 
an example of which Pye provides a photograph]’ (1968, p.57) 
11 As an aside, I note that in quotes like this we find a tone similar to Alexander’s. In 
addition to the specific relevancy of his work, I am also drawn to Pye’s work for its deep 
sense of responsibility for the quality or our material world. 
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‘In principle’, Pye wrote, ‘nothing whatever is beyond the reach of design’ (1968, p.56). As 
it becomes possible to specify and produce any formal quality with precision, new 
techniques are turning this principle into a practical reality. Where diversity was previously 
a consequence of risky or free workmanship, it may now be formalised in pre-existing 
specifications, and then created with near 1:1 accuracy. In celebration of this opportunity, 
and inspired by Ruskin’s Gothic aesthetic of ‘[c]hangefulness, savageness and imperfection’ 
(2011, p.58), Lars Spuybroek argues that we must develop ways of generating these qualities 
(which I take to be synonymous with Pye’s “diversity”12) throughout processes of design. 
We must, Spuybroek claims, ‘bring craft to design’ (ibid., p.57). In a statement that mirrors 
Pye’s aspirations for simultaneous certainty and diversity, Spuybroek believes that our 
changeful, savage and imperfect creations should evolve during the design stage, and that 
their ‘final execution must be perfect - and done by slaves of steel’ (ibid., p.58). In this 
model, the creation of diversity, once a result of the free workmanship associated with hand 
tool use, has been shifted from processes of making, to instead be specified in advance of 
production.  
It is here that I return to the ideas of epistemic character, distributed decision making, and 
the work of Christopher Alexander. I have argued that there is a more fundamental 
distinction than that of risk and certainty: between processes through which things emerge 
step-by-step, and processes through which things are planned in advance of their execution. 
And I now suggest that the diversity in the environment that both Pye and Spuybroek value 
might be understood not as a result of the risk of a process, but as a consequence of 
processes that allow form to emerge as a result of frequent improvisations and adaptations, 
made in response to feedback along the way.  
According to Pye, ‘design begins to fail to control the appearance of the environment at just 
those ranges at which the environment impinges on us’ (1968, p.62). I would add that design 
also fails to control the appearance of the environment at much larger scales. The 
arrangement of country fields, or an old city, as seen from an aeroplane window could be 
said to have a diverse quality. Like the quickly hewn spoon, this is not a quality controlled 
by virtue of planning, it is a consequence of proximate decisions being made over a period 
of time. Perhaps, then, it follows that diversity occurs not despite a failure of design, but 
because of it. 
                                                      
 
12 Pye himself makes this link, when observing that Ruskin ‘described and understood 
the quality in things which I have termed diversity’ (1968, p.126) 
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This is to follow Alexander’s lead and argue for the importance of step-by-step processes. 
On this understanding, diversity is not associated with the risk of a technique, but its 
epistemic character. And to think it possible to transfer the creation of diversity into 
“design”, without also transferring the epistemic character of formerly successful 
techniques, and their processes of distributed decision making, would appear too simplistic 
an ambition. 
Under his ideal of bringing craft to design, Spuybroek suggests that computer code should 
become the material with which we engage. He discusses at length the methods of coding 
that he feels could replicate the favourable qualities of Gothic architecture. I suggest that this 
effort could be complimented by a thorough investigation of the epistemic character of 
Gothic stone masonry. Without a means for understanding the process of decision making 
performed by Gothic masons, how can we know what to code? If we don’t yet have a means 
for the describing the relatively simple epistemic character of carving a spoon and how it 
distributes decision making, how can we be expected to develop successful algorithmic 
approaches to designing complex things like buildings? I believe that the concept of 
epistemic character, and the associated ontology of emergent production, might have real 
value in these areas.  
I end with a different kind of masonry. Inspired by Pye’s paean for countryside aesthetics, I 
present a quote from a builder of dry stone walls. For me, it perfectly captures the 
technique’s epistemic character, the extended nature of mind and the kind of step-by-step 
processes that lead to a diverse, and beautiful, world. In response to philosopher Andrew 
Harrison’s questioning, as to how one goes about making a wall, ‘[t]he answer was simple 
enough, there are two things to remember, never, after picking the stone up put it down 
except onto the wall, and that the stone decides the right way for it to go’ (1978, p.76). 
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2. Scans of notebook pages 
 
The series of notebooks used throughout the research. The following selection of pages are presented 
in chronological order. 
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3. A selection of photographs used as a basis for the line drawings 
 
Reference photograph for Figure 4.1 ‘Setting a pin using a Warrington pattern hammer’ 
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Reference photograph for Figure 4.11 ‘The trajectory of a blacksmith's swing’ 
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Reference photograph for Figure 6.15 ‘Using a taper tenon cutter’ 
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Reference photograph for Figure 5.28 ‘Carving with a hook knife’ 
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Reference photograph for Figure 5.25 ‘A test split to check the run of the grain’ 
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Reference photograph for Figure 6.9 ‘Using a bench plane’ 
 
 
 
